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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation,
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard,
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David
Tuk Nedrow
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s),

Supreme Court No: 41584-2013
Case No: CV-2012-580

Vs
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Board Of County Commissioners for
Fremont County, a political subdivision of
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt,
individually and in his official capacity, and
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official
capacity
Defendant(s)/Appellant(s).

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for
THE
COUNTY OF FREMONT
Gregory W. Moeller
DISTRICT JUDGE
Attorney
For Respondent
Lynn Hossner
109 North 2nd West
St. Anthony, ID, 83445

Attorney
For Appellant
Blake G. Hall
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203
Idaho Falls, ID, 83402

,,,.... .,,,,,

,,,, 'X-Q\V. DIS'!; ,,,,_
.
.
.
. ,.,:;.••••••••••••••••~0:...
$' ~~
•• ,. ~,
'~ .·
•• C6~'

-

~ Cl1! SEVENTH\ "S~

:... :f i JUDICIAL i ~ E

.

.

;_~\COURT io$
,, ~-··.
..., .$~
\'

.. .. ~ ,.::0
. .,. ''j''FCQUN'
, OA-.·······:~
~\'''
·~

,,,,,.. ,,,,,

Page 1 of 408

Date: 1/31/2014

Seventh Judicial District Court- Fremont County

Time: 09:37 AM

ROAReport

Page 1 of 4

User: HARRIGFELD

Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal.

Date

Code

User

11/23/2012

NCOC

MACE

New Case Filed - Other Claims

MACE

Filing: L3- Appeal or petition for judicial review or Gregory W. Moeller
cross appeal or cross-petition from commission,
board, or body to district court Paid by: Karl
Lewies Receipt number: 0005958 Dated:
11/23/2012 Amount: $96.00 (Credit card) For:
Atchley, Clen P (plaintiff)

MACE

Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Karl
Lewies Receipt number: 0005958 Dated:
11/23/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For:
Atchley, Clen P (plaintiff)

Gregory W. Moeller

NOAP

MACE

Plaintiff: Flying A Ranch, Inc., Notice Of
Appearance Karl H. Lewies

Gregory W. Moeller

12/5/2012

ORDR

MACE

Order Governing Procedure On Review-Filed In
Chambers 12-3-2012.

Gregory W. Moeller

1/2/2013

HRSC

MACE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01/22/2013 02:30
PM) Motion To Disqualify Counsel

Gregory W. Moeller

1/7/2013

MOTN

MACE

Motion To Disqualify Counsel

Gregory W. Moeller

MOTN

MACE

Motion-Partial Motion To Dismiss

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

MACE

Affidavit Of Karl Lewies

Gregory W. Moeller

MOTN

MACE

Motion To Withdraw

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W. Moeller

CERT

MACE

Certificate Of Mailing-Amended

Gregory W. Moeller

1/11/2013

STIP

MACE

Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel

Gregory W. Moeller

1/14/2013

STIP

MCHANDLER

Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel

Gregory W. Moeller

NOAP

MCHANDLER

Plaintiff: Flying A Ranch, Inc., Notice Of
Appearance Lynn Hossner

Gregory W. Moeller

1/16/2013

TRAN

MACE

Transcript Filed - Notice of Lodging

Gregory W. Moeller

1/22/2013

HRHD

MACE

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
01/22/2013 02:30PM: Hearing Held Motion To
Disqualify Counsel
Motion To Withdraw

Gregory W. Moeller

HRSC

MACE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 02/26/2013 03:00
PM) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

Gregory W. Moeller

MINE

MACE

Minute Entry

Gregory W. Moeller

ANSW

MACE

Answer To Partial Motion To Dismiss

Gregory W. Moeller

1/30/2013

AFFD

MACE

Affidavit Of Attorney Fees

Gregory W. Moeller

1/31/2013

MISC

MACE

Objection To Attorney Fees

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

MACE

Affidavit Of Kristina Larson

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

MACE

Affidavit Of Karl Lewies

Gregory W. Moeller

2/4/2013

ORDR

MACE

Order On Motions-Filed In Chambers

Gregory W. Moeller

2/6/2013

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Conflict Of Interest

Gregory W. Moeller

1/9/2013

Judge
Gregory W. Moeller
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Date: 1/31/2014

Seventh Judicial District Court - Fremont County

Time: 09:37 AM

ROAReport

User: HARRIGFELD

Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller
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Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal.

Date

Code

User

2/6/2013

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W. Moeller

MOTN

MACE

Motion For Partial Dismissal

Gregory W. Moeller

CERT

MACE

Certificate Of Mailing

Gregory W. Moeller

MEMO

MACE

Memorandum In Support Of Petitioners Petition
For Review

Gregory W. Moeller

MOTN

MACE

Motion For Extention

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

MACE

Affidavit Of Karl Lewies

Gregory W. Moeller

ORDR

MACE

Order Filed In Chambers-2-4-2013

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

HARRIGFELD

Affidavit of Lynn Hossner

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Hearing On Petitioners Motion For
Extension Of Time

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Hearing On Petitioners Motion For
Extension Of Time

Gregory W. Moeller

MISC

MACE

Respondants Motion To Strike Motion For
Extension Of Time

Gregory W. Moeller

MOTN

MACE

Motion For Order Shortening Time

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

HARRIGFELD

Affidavit of Blake G. Hall in Support of Motion to
Strike Motion for Extension of Time

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

HARRIGFELD

Notice of Hearing

Gregory W. Moeller

2/15/2013

ORDR

MACE

Order Modifying Briefing Schedule-Filed In
Chambers

Gregory W. Moeller

2/19/2013

NOTC

PARKER

Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent
County

Gregory W. Moeller

2/21/2013

MISC

MACE

Reply In Support Of Motion For Attorney Fees

Gregory W. Moeller

MINE

HARRIGFELD

Minute Entry

Gregory W. Moeller

2/26/2013

MINE

HARRIGFELD

Minute Entry

Gregory W. Moeller

3/13/2013

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Lodging

Gregory W. Moeller

3/29/2013

MEMO

MACE

Memorandum Decision Re: Rule 11 Sanctions

Gregory W. Moeller

4/4/2013

JDMT

MACE

Judgment-Final Judgment On Rule 11 Sanctions Gregory W. Moeller

5/2/2013

MOTN

MACE

Motion For Dismissal Of Finding Of A Public
Road

AFFD

MACE

Affidavit Of Lynn Hossner For Dismissal Of Order Gregory W. Moeller
Of Public Road

CERT

MACE

Certificate Of Service

MACE

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory W. Moeller
Supreme Court Paid by: Karl Lewies Receipt
number: 0001997 Dated: 5/2/2013 Amount:
$109.00 (Credit card) For: Flying A Ranch, Inc.,
(plaintiff)

MACE

Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Karl
Gregory W. Moeller
Lewies Receipt number: 0001997 Dated:
5/2/2013 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Flying
A Ranch, Inc., (plaintiff)

2/12/2013

2/14/2013

Judge

Gregory W. Moeller

Gregory W. Moeller
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Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal.

Date

Code

User

5/2/2013

NOTC

HARRIGFELD

Notice of Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

5/8/2013

MISC

HARRIGFELD

Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismissal

Gregory W. Moeller

MISC

HARRIGFELD

Respondent's Opposition to Petition to Review

Gregory W. Moeller

AFFD

HARRIGFELD

Affidavit of Blake G. Hall

Gregory W. Moeller

5/9/2013

MISC

HARRIGFELD

Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript DUE
7/15/13

Gregory W. Moeller

5/13/2013

AMEN

HARRIGFELD

Amended Notice of Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

5/17/2013

CERT

MACE

Certificate Of Mailing

Gregory W. Moeller

MEMO

MACE

Memorandum In Response To Memorandum Of
Defendants

Gregory W. Moeller

6/11/2013

TRAN

HARRIGFELD

Transcript Filed

Gregory W. Moeller

6/26/2013

ORDR

HARRIGFELD

Order Consolidating Appeals

Gregory W. Moeller

HARRIGFELD

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Gregory W. Moeller
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Karl Lewies Receipt number: 0003230 Dated:
7/10/2013 Amount: $231.40 (Check) APPEAL
RECORD

7/10/2013

Judge

8/1/2013

HRVC

MACE

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
Gregory W. Moeller
02/26/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment
Motion For Patrial Dismissal

8/2/2013

CERT

MACE

Certificate Of Mailing

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

MACE

Notice Of Hearing On Petitioners Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

8/5/2013

HRSC

MACE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/27/2013 03:00
PM) Hearing On Petitioners Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

8/22/2013

MISC

HARRIGFELD

Appellant's Brief

Gregory W. Moeller

8/27/2013

MINE

HARRIGFELD

Minute Entry

Gregory W. Moeller

9/19/2013

MISC

MACE

Respondant's Brief

Gregory W. Moeller

10/16/2013

MISC

MACE

Decision On Review

Gregory W. Moeller

MISC

MACE

Appelants Reply Brief

Gregory W. Moeller

10/23/2013

MISC

MACE

Amended Decision Of Review

Gregory W. Moeller

11/6/2013

NOAP

MACE

Defendant: Fremont County Board Of
Commissioners, Notice Of Appearance Blake G.
Hall

Gregory W. Moeller

STIP

MACE

Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel Law Firm Gregory W. Moeller
Of Hall, Angell And Starnes, LLP Substituted For
Nelson, Hall, Parry and Tucker

NOTC

HARRIGFELD

Notice of Appeal

HARRIGFELD

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory W. Moeller
Supreme Court Paid by: Hall Angell & Starnes
Receipt number: 0005343 Dated: 11/8/2013
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Fremont County
Board Of Commissioners, (defendant)

11/8/2013

Gregory W. Moeller
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Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal.

Judge

Date

Code

User

11/8/2013

BNDC

HARRIGFELD

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 5344 Dated
11/8/2013 for 100.00)

Gregory W. Moeller

BONC

HARRIGFELD

Condition of Bond Preparation of the Clerk's
Record on Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

NOTC

MACE

Notice-Amended Notice Of Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

ORDR

HARRIGFELD

Order Re: Amended Notice of Appeal

Gregory W. Moeller

12/20/2013

HRVC

MACE

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
Gregory W. Moeller
08/27/2013 03:00PM: Hearing Vacated Hearing
On Petitioners Appeal

1/3/2014

TRAN

MACE

Transcript Filed

11/26/2013

Gregory W. Moeller
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

Idaho State Bar No. 4380
Attorney for Petitioners
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
)
vs.
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
official capacity,
)
)
)
Respondents.

Case No. CV-12-

S?fiJ

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Fee Category: L.3.
Fee:
$96.00

COME NOW Petitioners, by and through their attorney of record, Karl H. Lewies, and
petition the Court as follows:

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 1
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1. Petitioners, Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, George Ty
Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow, are individuals and residents of Fremont County, Idaho.
2. Petitioner Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., is an Idaho corporation that holds title to land located
in Fremont County, Idaho that is the subject of this appeal.
3. Petitioners are aggrieved persons under Idaho Code § 40-208, and the amount in
controversy exceeds $10,000.00.
4. Respondent, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County ("Board") is the
governing body for Fremont County, Idaho, a political subdivision of the state ofldaho ("County").
5. Respondents, Ronald "Skip" Hurt and LeRoy Miller are elected county commissioners
for Fremont County, Idaho ("Commissioners"). Each Commissioner is named individually and in
his official capacity.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
6. Petitioners incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5, above, as if
fully set forth.
7. Petitioners have ownership interests in real property located in Sections 8, 17, and 20,
Township 9 North, Range 42 East, Boise Meridian, Fremont County, Idaho, that will be adversely
affected by Respondents' recent passage of Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting an official road map
("Official Road Map") for Fremont County under authority of Idaho Code § 40-202 that depicts
private roads located on their land and commonly known as the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 2
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and Snow Creek Road, respectively, as public roads (the "Subject Roads").
8. Petitioners seek judicial review, under authority ofldaho Code§ 40-208, and Homestead
Farms, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855 (2005), of the Board's
October 29, 2012 action passing Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting the Official Road Map, and all
related proceedings. Related proceedings include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:
(1.) the Board's public hearing held September 27, 2012; (2.) the Board's public information
meeting held July 20, 2012, in Island Park, Fremont County, Idaho; (3.) the Board's public
information meeting held July 26, 2012, at Ashton, Fremont County, Idaho; and (4.) the Board's
public information meeting held July 30, 2012, at St. Anthony, Fremont County, Idaho.
9.

Digital recordings of the Board's public hearing held September 27, 2012, in St.

Anthony, Fremont County, Idaho was reportedly made by the County Clerk. Petitioners have been
informed that such recording is in the possession of the County Clerk, whose address is 151 W. 1st
N., St. Anthony, Idaho, 83445. Digital recordings of all related proceedings were reportedly not
made by the County Clerk.
10.

Petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies available to them and they

remain aggrieved because their real property will be adversely affected, and their substantial rights
prejudiced, by the placement of the Subject Roads on the Official Road Map as part of Ordinance
No. 2013-01.
11. Petitioners hereby petition this Court for judicial review of the Board's October 29,
2012 action passing Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting the Official Road Map, and all related
proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of Idaho Code § 40-208, and other applicable
provisions oflaw.
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 3
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12. Petitioners maintain that the Board's findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions
violated the provisions of Idaho Code § 40-208, insofar as they were:

(a) in violation of

constitutional or statutory provisions; (b.) in excess ofthe statutory authority of the Board; (c.) made
upon unlawful procedure; (d.) affected by other error of law; (e.) clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative and substantial information on the whole record; or (f.) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
13. Specifically, Petitioners seek judicial review of the following issues, and reserve the
right to assert additional issues for judicial review:
a.) Whether the Board failed to make any factual determination of the status of the
Subject Roads as public or private before placing them on the purported Official Road Map;
b.) Whether the Board engaged in unlawful procedure, acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, or abused its discretion by placing the Subject Roads on the Official Road Map
without first making a factual determination whether such road was public or private.
c.) Additional issues may be later discovered to be in violation of Idaho Code §
40-208, and other law, accordingly, Petitioners hereby reserve their rights to assert such
additional issues.
14. Petitioners request the preparation of transcripts of the Board's public hearing held on
September 27, 2012, as well as any and all other related meetings that were recorded.
15. Petitioners also request preparation of transcripts of any and all other related Board
proceedings.
16. Petitioners' counsel will make arrangements for payment with the County Clerk for the
preparation of such transcripts and the preparation of the record herein.
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 4
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

17. Petitioners incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 16, above, as if
fully set forth.
18.

Petitioners maintain that any public use or public maintenance of the Subject Roads

that may be undertaken in reliance upon the Board's adoption of Ordinance No. 2013-01 and the
Official Road Map, will cause immediate and irreparable harm to Petitioners.
19. Petitioners, therefore, seek temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions enjoining
the Board, Fremont County, and members of the general public, and their agents and
representatives, from maintaining or using the Subject Roads during the pendency of this appeal.

CERTIFICATION

I, Karl H. Lewies, attorney for Petitioners, hereby certify that true and correct copies of this
Petition for Judicial Review have been served on the Board, the individual commissioners, and the
County's prosecuting attorney; and further certify that the County Clerk has been contacted, and
will be paid, the estimated fee for preparation of the transcripts and preparation of the record herein.

WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray for the following relief:
1. That the Board's passage of Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting the Official Road Map, be

vacated;
2. That any and all public use and public maintenance that could be undertaken in reliance
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 5

Page 10 of 408

upon the Board's passage of Ordinance No. 2013-01 and the Official Road Map be enjoined
pending the Court's final decision on this Petition for Judicial Review;
3. That Petitioners be awarded attorney's fees and costs in accordance with I.C. §§ 12-117,
12-119, 12-120, and 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e) and I.R.C.P. 84, as applicable.

4. That Petitioners be awarded such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
equitable.
DATED this 23rd day ofNovember, 2012.

KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC

;G~ ?-::2'.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 23rd day of November, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct
postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. 1st N.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Ronald "Skip" Hurt
151 W. 15tN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

LeRoy Miller
151 W. 15tN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Joette Lookabaugh, Esq.
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney
22 W. l 5tN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 23rd day ofNovember, 2012.

;6,?/X£2._

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 7
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FL YING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
v.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
)
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, )
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and )
in his official capacity, and LEROY
)
MILLER, individually and in his official
)
capacity,
)
Respondents.
)

Case No. CV-12-580

ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW

_________________________)

The Court has before it Petitioner's November, 23, 2012 Petition for Judicial Review of the
Fremont County Board of Commissioners' action passing Ordinance No. 2013-01, dated October
29, 2012, and all related proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that:
1. This appeal shall be determined on the record.
2. The above-named governmental entity shall prepare the record and lodge it with the
District Court. Upon such lodging, the Clerk of the Court shall mail to counsel for both
parties' a notice that the updated record has been lodged. The fee for preparing the updated
agency record shall be paid according to statute;

oocur.1~NT
ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW -- 1

SCANNE!l
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3. An updated transcript of the proceedings before the agency shall be prepared at the
petitioner's expense;
4. Briefing shall occur according to the following schedule:
a. Petitioner's brief shall be filed with this Court within 35 days of the date on which
notice that the transcript and record have been filed with this Court is served;
b. Respondents' brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's brief;
c. Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of
Respondents' brief.
5. A courtesy copy of any pleading filed in this matter, including the briefs, shall be lodged
with the District Court for Madison County, Idaho, 134 E. Main, Rexburg, Idaho 83440.
6. When all the foregoing conditions have been complied with, Petitioner shall schedule a
hearing for oral argument in Fremont County on the next convenient law and motion day
following the expiration ofthe time limit for Petitioner's reply brief. Notice ofthe hearing
date shall be served upon this Court and counsel for Respondents. In the event that no
hearing is scheduled, this Court will assume that the matter has been submitted for
resolution without oral argument.
So ordered.
Dated this

D~

day ofDecember, 2012.

Gregory
District

ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW -- 2
Page 14 of 408

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON REVIEW was this

:{\)\ day of December, 2012, sent via

US mail to the following individuals:
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC.
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Attorneys for Petitioner
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Respondent
Ronald "Skip" Hurt
151 W. 1st N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Respondent
LeRoy Miller
151 W. lstN.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Respondent
Joette Lookabaugh, Esq.
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney
22 W. l 5tN.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Attorney for Respondents

ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW -- 3
Page 15 of 408
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OISIF'JC I S
State of Idaho
county ot r=remon
-

filed:-

I

Blake G. Hall
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
(208) 522-3001
(208) 523-7254
Idaho State Bar No. 2434
Attorney for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
COUNSEL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision ofthe state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
motion to disqualify Petitioner's attorney Karl Lewies pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional
Conduct 1. 7 and Idaho Code § § 31-2604.
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INTRODUCTION

The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct clearly require that an attorney not engage in a
representation of a client that is a conflict of interest with a current or former client. In this case,
Petitioners have retained Karl Lewies to represent them on the Petition for Judicial Review.
However, and despite Mr. Lewies having knowledge of his future appointment as the Fremont
County Prosecutor, Mr. Lewies accepted a representation that would place him squarely in
conflict against the entity that he has been elected to represent starting on January 14,2013.
There will exist a concurrent conflict of interest and Mr. Lewies should be disqualified from
continued representation in this matter.
ARGUMENT

Mr. Lewies should be disqualified from continuing to represent Petitioners because he has
a concurrent conflict of interest that cannot be waived and will result in representation directly
adverse to another client. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct specifically prohibits representing a
client if that representation will cause a conflict of interest with a current client. Specifically, Rule
1.7, Idaho Rules ofProfessional Conduct, states as follows:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.
A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or

(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client, a former client or a third person or by the
personal interests of the lawyer, including family or domestic
relationships.
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL- 2

Page 17 of 408

(c) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) The representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by

one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4)

Each affected client gives informed consent. confirmed in
writing.

I.R.P.C. 1.7 (emphasis added).
In this case, Mr. Lewies was elected as the Fremont County Prosecutor. He officially
takes oath on January 14, 2013. As the Fremont County Prosecutor, he has statutorily created
duties that make it impossible for him to continue to represent Petitioners in this matter. Idaho
Code § 31-2604 identifies the duties of the county prosecutor as follows:
It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney:

1. To prosecute or defend all actions, applications or motions.
civil or criminal. in the district court of his county in which the
people. or the state. or the county. are interested. or are a
ruu:ty; and when the place of trial is changed in any such action or
proceeding to another county, he must prosecute or defend the
same in such other county.
2. To prosecute all felony criminal actions, irrespective of whom
the arresting officer is; to prosecute all misdemeanor or infraction
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL- 3
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actions for violation of all state laws or county ordinances when
the arresting or charging officer is a state or county employee; to
conduct preliminary criminal examinations which may be had
before magistrates; to prosecute or defend all civil actions in
which the county or state is interested; and when a written
contract to do so exists between the prosecuting attorney and a city,
to prosecute violations for state misdemeanors and infractions and
violations of county or city ordinances committed within the
municipal limits of that city when the arresting or charging officer
is a city employee.
3. To give advice to the board of county commissioners. and
other public officers of his county. when requested in all public
matters arising in the conduct of the public business entrusted
to the care of such officers.
4. To attend, when requested by any grand jury for the purpose of
examining witnesses before them; to draw bills of indictments,
informations and accusations; to issue subpoenas and other process
requiring the attendance of witnesses.
5. On the first Monday of each month to settle with the auditor, and
pay over all money collected or received by him during the
preceding month, belonging to the county or state, to the county
treasurer, taking his receipt therefor, and to file, on the first
Monday of October in each year, in the office ofthe auditor ofhis
county, an account verified by his affidavit, of all money received
by him during the preceding year, by virtue of his office, for fines,
forfeitures, penalties or costs, specifying the name of each person
from whom he receives the same, the amount received from each,
and the cause for which the same was paid.
6. To perform all other duties required of him by any law.

I. C. § 31-2604 (emphasis added).
In this matter, Mr. Lewies has endeavored to sue both the County and two County
Commissioners whom are his clients as of January 14, 2013. While he does not currently have a
conflict of interest, on January 14,2013, Mr. Lewies will have a conflict of interest because he
has an obligation to defend the County and to advise the County Commissioners. Mr. Lewies
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 4
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cannot represent either party now because he has been provided with sensitive and privileged
information regarding the Petitioners claims. Likewise, Mr. Lewies cannot discharge his duties
as the County Prosecuting Attorney because he would have been normally required to represent
the County. Mr. Lewies should be disqualified from future representation of either Petitioner or
Respondent in this matter because his continued involvement is an indisputable conflict of
interest with current clients.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Court disqualify from
continued representation of Petitioners or Respondents because such representation is a conflict of
interest with a current client.
DATED this

-I-

day of January, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~ I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this
----+--day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below:

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440

J>t1

Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

~6#
L:IBGH\7525- Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pieadings\Motion to Disqualify Counselwpd
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Blake G. Hall
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
(208) 522-3001
(208) 523-7254
Idaho State Bar No. 2434

DISTRICT SE'/i:h: COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho
Fiied:

:___-==============!-

~
ABBIE

2013

MACE,-CCERK

0

)'lj

Attorney for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.
COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
Partial Motion to Dismiss Commissioners Hurt and Miller in their individual capacity pursuant to
Rule 12(b)( 6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In disposing of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may only consider those facts that
appear in the complaint. See Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App.
1990). In order to survive such a motion, the non-moving party's complaint must, on its face,
contain allegations that, if proven, would entitle the non-moving party to the relief claimed. See
Wells v. United States Life Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). The standard
for reviewing such a motion is the same as that employed in a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party is entitled to all inferences from the record being resolved in his favor. See
Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993); Miles
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991). A complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if, "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Gardner v.
Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730,732 (1975).
ARGUMENT
This matter comes before the Court because Petitioner has named Commissioner Ronald
"Skip Hurt and Commissioner Leroy Miller (referred to collectively as the "Commissioners") in
both their official and individual capacities. A review of the Petition for Judicial Review fails to
articulate any grounds for which the Commissioners can be named in their individual capacities.
The central focus of this matter is a request for judicial review centered on the adoption of
Ordinance No. 2013-01, adopting an official road map. Each paragraph of the Petition alleges
that the Board of Commissioners failed to make the necessary factual determination prior to
adopting the road relative to whether a road was private or public. Absent from the Petition is
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS- 2
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any suggestion that the Commissioners acted in their individual capacity. Rather, the Petition
recognizes that the actions of the Commissioners were while sitting as elected Commissioners
for Fremont County. There was never any action by either Commissioner in their individual
capacity. Because there are no allegations in the Petition that can be construed as action in their
individual capacity, the Court should dismiss Commissioners Hurt and Miller in their individual
capacity.
There was never any reason for Petitioners to sue the Commissioners in their individual
capacity. There is no suggestion that they acted in any capacity other than their official capacity
as a Fremont County Commissioner. To include the allegations against the Commissioners in
their individual capacity is bad faith, frivolous, and unjustified. Because Petitioners have acted
with bad faith by including unsubstantiated allegations against the Commissioners, Respondents
should be awarded their attorneys' fee incurred in this matter. Idaho Code§ 6-918A permits the
award of attorneys' fees:
At the time and in the manner provided for fixing costs in civil
actions, and at the discretion of the trial court, appropriate and
reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the claimant, the
governmental entity or the employee of such governmental
entity, as costs, in actions under this act, upon petition therefor and
a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party
against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad
faith in the commencement. conduct. maintenance or defense
of the action.
(Emphasis added). Petitioners have acted in bad faith by commencing litigation that lacks any
foundation for claims against the Commissioners in their individual capacity. Attorney's fees
should be awarded in having to defend against these frivolous allegations.
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Respondents further requests attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. Rule 11.2
provides in pertinent part:
Every notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief and other document
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
(1) licensed attorney of record ofthe state ofldaho ... The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the
attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion,
brief or other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other
document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(Emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a signed legal document violates
Rule 11.2 if "(1) it is not well grounded in fact; (2) it is not warranted by existing law or a goodfaith extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) it was interposed for an
improper purpose." Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2010) (citing

Readv. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364,209 P.3d 661,668 (2009)). The Commissioners are being forced
to defend against allegations that are completely unsupported by fact and serve to only harass and
needlessly increase the cost of litigation. As such, an award of attorney's fees is appropriate.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Court dismiss
Commissioners Hurt and Miller in their individual capacity. Respondents further request that the
Court enter an order awarding costs and fees incurred in preparing and arguing the instant motion.
DATED this_$_ day of January, 2013.

~6/¥1
AK G.HALL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

p/ I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this

--t-- day of January, 2013, by regular mail, CM-ECF electronic notification or electronic mail.
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440

n

Mailing
Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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Blake G. Hall
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
(208) 522-3001
(208) 523-7254
Idaho State Bar No. 2434

OIST::IICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho

==========;---

Fiiedi=:

JAN - 7 2013
By:

ABBIE MACE, CL*_$

~~

D puty Clerk

Attorney for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580

NOTICE OF HEARING

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision ofthe state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 22nct day of January, 2013, at 2:30p.m., of said day,
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Courthouse, in Fremont County, Idaho,
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Partial Motion to Dismiss will be brought on for
hearing before the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller.

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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DATED this__£_ day of January, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IJJereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this-+ day of January, 2013 by regular mail, CM-ECF electronic notification or electronic
mail.
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N. , Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440

~ Mailing

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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•

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4380
Attorney for Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,)
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA )
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
)
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political )
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP")
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
)
official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

STATEOFIDAHO
County of Fremont

Case No. CV-12-580

AFFIDAVIT OF
KARL H. LEWIES

)
) ss:
)

Karl H. Lewies, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

DOCUMENT
o..J"'A''
'-<.i
1uN:n

1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES
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1. I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
2. Effective as of January 14, 2013, I will be sworn-in as the duly elected prosecuting
attorney for Fremont County, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho.
3. Once I take office, a conflict of interest will arise in connection with my continued
representation of Petitioners in this case.
4. Under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.16, such circumstances require
my mandatory withdrawal of representation.
5. Given the nature and posture of the pending litigation, it is my good faith belief that
Petitioners will not be prejudiced in any way by my withdrawal.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to on oath before me this

l

day of January, 2013.

2 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES
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~ounty of Fremont State of Idaho
Flled:r=============:::=:;---

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4380

JAN - 7 20::
By:

AB~:'·
. MA.CE, CLERK
--~~+-~~~~

Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
)
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
)
)
official capacity,
)
Respondents.
)

Case No. CV -12-580

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

COMES NOW counsel for Petitioners, attorney of record, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., and moves
the Court for an order allowing his withdrawal of representation in this matter based on the
following:
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 1
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1. Effective as of January 14, 2013, the date on which counsel will be sworn as prosecuting
attorney for Fremont County, Idaho, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho, continued
representation of the Petitioners will likely result in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 1.16(a)(l).
2. Upon termination of representation, reasonable steps shall be taken to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect Petitioners' interests, as required under Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.16(d).
3. This motion is based on the pleadings and the affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, filed herewith.
DATED this ih day of January, 2013.

KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC

;4~

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the

ih

day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW to be served upon the following persons at the addresses
below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon,
or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Deputy Fremont County P.A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 7th day of January, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 3
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•

•

DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4380

filed:;::===========::;--

JAN -8 2013
A~ACE,CLERK

By: --~~~--~D~e-p~ut~a~e~rk
./JL!.}.

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)

)
)
Petitioners,
)
vs.
)
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
)
official capacity,
)
)
)
Respondents.

Case No. CV-12-580
NOTICE OF HEARING

TO: DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD:
You will please take notice that on Tuesday, January 22, 2013, at 2:30P.M. o'clock, or as
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, at the Fremont County Courthouse, located at 151 W. 1st
N., St. Anthony, Fremont County, Idaho, counsel for Petitioners will move the Court for its order
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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allowing withdrawal from representation.
DATED this

gth

day of January, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 8th day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be served upon the following persons at the addresses
below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon,
or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Deputy Fremont County P .A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Flying "A" Ranch, Inc.
Clen & Emma Atchley
4054 E. 1300 N.
Ashton, ID 83420

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Clay & Laura Picard
4198 E. 1300 N.
Ashton, ID 83420

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

George Ty Nedrow
David Tuk Nedrow
1401 N. 3125 E.
Ashton, ID 83420

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 8th day of January, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.

NOTICE OF HEARING - 3
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4380

DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho

Filed:~- _ o-· ____

j

J,':..N-

8 l.

L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

•

~

MACE, CLERK

By: ~~~----~D~e-p~ut-y~Cl~er~k
Ul}4

Attorney for Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision ofthe state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
)
official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

Case No. CV-12-580

AMENDED CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 8th day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
MOTION TO WITHDRAW that I filed with the Court on January 7, 2013, to be served upon the
following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S.

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE- 1
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,.

-.

Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set
forth below:
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc.
Clen & Emma Atchley
4054 E. 1300 N.
Ashton, ID 83420

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Clay & Laura Picard
4198 E. 1300 N.
Ashton, ID 83420

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

George Ty Nedrow
David Tuk Nedrow
1401 N. 3125 E.
Ashton, ID 83420

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 8th day of January, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE- 2
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

?;1~~;ty of Fremont State of Idaho
Blake G. Hall
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
(208) 522-3001
(208) 523-7254
Idaho State Bar No. 2434

JAN 1 1 2013
By:

!Jl) ')'

ABBIE ,M
..ACE CLERK

.

/

Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580

STIPULATION FOR
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.
Defendants, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY,
IDAHO, RONALD "SKIP" HURT, and LEROY MILLER by and through counsel of record,
Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and Blake G. Hall and Nathan R.
Starnes, ofNELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, hereby stipulate that the law firm ofNELSON

STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 1
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HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. shall be substituted as counsel of record for Defendants, and
copies of all pleadings or other papers should be directed to:
BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
NATHANR. STARNES, ESQ.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

Date

/-9-13
..

Date

Ne son Hall Parry Tucker, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _t_ day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below:
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440

[~ Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 2
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

•

Idaho State Bar No. 4380
Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
vs.
)
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
)
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

Case No. CV-12-580

STIPULATION FOR
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

Petitioners, by and through their attorney of record, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., and Lynn
Rossner, Esq., hereby stipulate that Lynn Rossner, Esq., has substituted as counsel of record for
Petitioners, and copies of all pleadings and other papers should now be directed to him at the
following address:
STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 1

DOCUMENT
SCANNED

ORIGINAL
Page 40 of 408

---------------------------------~. -~. '·-·-··"''"-·~C,i'>ci""'''"

Lynn Hossner, Esq.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
109N. 2"d W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
DATED this

13th

day of January, 2013

;~_/~:.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq. '
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC

/;::::?

DATED this J..!fday of January, 2013

~Li?~,Esq.
Attorney at Law

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am .a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the ~~~day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing STIPULATION F R SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL to be served upon the
following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S.
Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set
forth below:
["-,~] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Deputy Fremont County P.A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630
DATED this J.!{!aay of January, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners

STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 2

Page 41 of 408

DISTR: ,-;T SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JU ICffMcO:::IS~I~R!~C:=I==:=====:==::::;--

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FRE

)

ONT

Cr~~;N

i

1013

ABBIE MACE, CL

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC. an Idaho corporation,

)

CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW,

)
)

Case No.

and DAVID TUK NEDROW

)

NOTICE OF LODGING

)
)
)
)
)

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD
"SKIP" HURT, individually and in his official
capacity, and LEROY MILLER, individually and in
his official capacity
Respondents.

Notice is hereby given that on January 15, 2013, the Clerk's Record (X),
Reporter's Transcript ( ) in the above referenced appeal was lodged with the
District Court Clerk.

Abbie Mace
Clerk of the District Court

/~ b,a&!&AJ
laUr;~ngleton

~

Deputy Clerk

VI
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FLYING A RANCH, INC., ET AL.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, ET AL.

L ·-------~~~..:J:"r::..::>.:._·~.,'·.___

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
Hearing
Judge:

Tuesday, February 26,2013 at 03:00PM
Gregory W. Moeller

Courtroom:

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 25th, 2013.
Attorney's will please notify clients of court date(s), time(s) and location(s).

PlaintifPs Counsel:

Lynn Hossner
I 09 North 2nd West
St. Anthony ID 83445
Mailed____:i,__

Defendant's Counsel:

Blake G. Hall
Attoney At Law
490 Memorial Drive
P.O Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Id. 83405-1630

MailedL

Dated: January 25th, 20 I 3
Abbie Mace
Clerk Of The District Court
By:
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DISTRJCT SPIEN COtn:;T
C;.n.:nty of Fremont St8te ot idaf-1o
Fued:

fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH J DICiifrmffiFfF~H:=~THE STATE OF IDAHO COUNTY 0 FRE
DISTRICT COURT
2 2 ?.013

I

-@i.

J

~-.~-.,

By: _ _
A_B-l;I}J-.EI#MrAC_E_,-C;::::-LE-.
-..___ _ _---.:,_ ____:D~·:t:.f·:.:.:_··· ~·
L_::Y

-----...l

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESIDfNG JUDGE:
DATE:
ATTORNEYS PRESENT:
COURT REPORTER:
CLERK:

257

304

LAW AND MOTION
GREGORY W. MOELLER
JANUARY 22,2013
DAVE MARLOW
DEBORAH MACE

FLYING A RANCH VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM.
E.C GWALTNEY VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM.
MR HOSSNER APPEARS ON BEHALF OF FL YfNG A RANCH
MR HALL APPEARS ON BEHALF OF BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
MR LEWIES APPEARS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON MOTIONS.
WILL TAKE UP REPRESENTATION ISSUES.
THE COURT ASKS MR LEWIES AS TO SEEKfNG TO WITHDRAW
AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS. STATES COUNSEL ON FL YfNG A
MR HOSSNER WILL STEP fN ON THAT CASE.
ON GWALTNEY HAS NOT HEARD BACK FROM THAT PLAfNTIFF
THE COURT ASKS AS TO MOTION TO DISQ.
MR LEWIES WILL NOT REPRESENT FREMONT COUNTY OR
PETITIONERS ON THESE CASES.
FEELS MOTION TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE FfNE.
THE COURT CLARIFIES CASES. ARE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW CASES.
THE COURT ASKS MR LEWIES WHY THESE CASES WERE FILED
WHEN HE KNEW HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE THESE CASES.
MR LEWIES STATES TIME WAS OF THE ESSENSE AND DID NOT SEE
ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT. HIS CLIENT KNEW HE WOULD NOT BE
ABLE TO TAKE CASES.
THE COURT IS TAKEN ABACK AS TO HOW THESE CASES WERE
FILED. MR LEWIES STATES NO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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307
316

324

330

WAS BREACHED.
WAS UP AGAINST A DEADLINE. THE COURT WANTS TO KNOW WHY
MR HALL HAD TO FILE A MOTION TO DISQ.
MR HALL WANTS TO MAKE SURE TIME LINE IS ACCURATE.
COMMENTS ON FILING DATES.
THE COURT WILL ALLOW MR LEWIES TO RESPOND ON REPRESENT
ATIONAL ISSUE. MR HOSSNER ON MOTION TO DISMISSAL
MR LEWIES DOES NOT FEEL MR HALL SHOULD BE REPRESENTING
FREMONT CO. GIVES REASONS. COMMENTS ON FINDING OF
NEC. STATES BILLIE SIDDOWA Y SHOULD BE REPRESENTING FREM.
COUNTY.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON CONCERNS OF RULING FROM THE
BENCH ON THESE MATTERS. GIVES CONCERNS.
THE COURT STATES MR LEWIES SHOULD HAVE NO ROLL IN THESE
CASES WHAT SO EVER IN THESE CASES. DOES NOT FEEL MR HALL
SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD TO FILE A MOTION IN THESE CASES.
THE COURT WILL ALLOW MR LEWIES TO WITHDRAW AND NOT TO
HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THESE CASES.
THE COURT WILL ORDER ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE COUNTY.
MR HALL MAY MAKE THAT REQUEST. WILL NOT BE AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS BUT AGAINST MR LEWIES. MR LEWIES MAY CONTEST
THE ISSUE OF MS SID DOWAY REPRESENTING THE COUNTY NEEDS
TO BE BRIEFED MORE.
MR HOSSNER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL.
MR HOSSNER COMMENTS.
MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL-THE COURT WILL MR HURT AND
MR MILLER BOTH SHALL BE DISMISSED INDIVID. AS RESPONDANTS
IN THESE CASES. ISSUE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION, MR LEWIES
CANNOT BE ATTORNEY FOR ANY PARTIES IN THESE CASES.
MR HALL WAS JUSTIFYED IN MOTION TO DISQ. COUNTY DOES
HAVE A RIGHT TO ATTORNEY FEES.
WILL DEFER RULING ON ATTORNEY FEES ISSUE.
WILL ALLOW 14 DAYS FOR MR LEWIES OFFICE, THROUGH BILLIE
TO FILE APPROP BRIEFING AS TO WHY THEY SHOULD BE CONSID.
AS ATTORNYS OF RECORD. AND MR HALL TO FILE RESPONSE
WITHIN 17 DAYS. WILL HAVE HEARING ON FEB 26m.
MR HALL ASKS AS TO MOTION TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
THE COURT COMMENTS ON JURISDICTION ISSUE.
WILL NOT AWARD ATTORNEY FEES ON PARTIAL SUMM JUDGEMENT
MR HALL MAY SUBMIT REQ FOR ATTORNEY FEES. WILL ALLOW
MR LEWIES TO RESPOND TO THAT.
MR HALL ASKS AS TOMS SID DOWA Y OR WHO EVER TO FILE A
MOTION. THE COURT DOES NOT FEEL A MOTION IS NEC.
WANTS BOTH SIDES TO SUMIT LEGAL ARGUMENT.
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Lynn Rossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State Bar No. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

I
-------~~:::_-_~-""--.--~~

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
LAURA PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE
TY NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,
'
Petitioners

vs

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-580
ANSWER TO PARTIAL
MOTION TO DISMISS

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision ofthe State of Idaho, RONALD
"SKIP" HURT, individually and in his
)
individual capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
)
individually and in his official capacity,
)
Defendants.

)
)

Comes now Lynn Rossner, attorney for Plaintiffs, and in answer to Defendants' Partial
Motion to Dismiss, alleges as follows:
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL
Commissioners Hurt and Miller were named in their official capacity as well as
individually. Plaintiffs allege, in their Petition for Judicial Review of the "Boards" action on
October 29, 2012 in passing Ordinance No. 2013-01 and the adoption of an Official Road Map,
that the public hearings and lack of specific Findings of Fact do not support the findings. In this
case, commissioners' Miller and Hurt are the individuals who passed the adoption of the Official
Road Map and passed Ordinance No. 2012-01. If it is determined that the legal process was not
adhered to as required by law, then plaintiffs claim they were damaged not only by the
commissioners in their individual capacity, but also by the named commissioners.
It is text book law that if a party "may" be affected by a judgment in an action that those
parties should be included and are "proper parties." 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, paragraph 8. By
joining the commissioners individually, litigation is kept at a minimum, with the rights of all
Page 1 of 2
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persons who have an interest or are concerned may be determined by one action. 59 Am. Jur. 2d,
Parties, paragraph 8.
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
There is nothing in Defendant's Petition for Partial Dismissal to indicate that the above
action brought against the two named commissioners in "bad faith, frivolous or unjustified" as
urged by defense counsel which merits an award of attorney fees. The Motion for Partial
Dismissal brought by defense indicates plainly in the first paragraph that "Come now
Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt
and Leroy Miller, .... " There is no indication that defense counsel is acting for commissioners
Hurt and Miller individually.
DATED this 22nd day of January 2013.

Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 22, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs
Response to Partial Motion to Dismiss as follows:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001
METHOD OF SERVICE:
[]Mailed [X] Hand Delivered [] Facsimile

Page 2 of 2
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{

...,. 'T SE"EN COURT
-"
nt State o t Idaho
-

D'STniG
1

County ot Fremo

Blake G. Hall
Nathan R. Starnes
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
(208) 522-3001
(208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484

Filed:

r

JAN 3 0 20\3
j
ASBIE MACE, CLERK

By:

,,~'ll i

'

D·~:p·.::'J

~!-·~·
·-·
·. , J

Attorney for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580

AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bonneville )
Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney for Respondents in this action.
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2.

That our office has spent substantial hours in preparation and attendance of the

Motion to Disqualify previously heard by the Court. Said motion was heard by the Court on
January 22, 2012, at such time the Court granted Respondents request for attorney's fees.
3.

That Respondents have incurred attorney's fees in filing and arguing the Motion

to Disqualify in the sum of $1,777.50. Attorney time for Blake G. Hall (BGH) was billed at
$225.00 per hour.
4.

The following are the entries billed in preparation and argument of the motion to

compel:
•

12/2112012: BGH

Prepare motion to disqualify (2.0); research re: disqualification
standards (.7); research re:

county prosecutor duties and

requirements (.7).
•

1/3/2012: BGH

Revise and file motion to disqualify Karl Lewies ( 1.0).

•

1/22/2013: BGH

Prepare for hearing on motion to disqualify (.5); telephone call
with L. Hossner concerning pending motions (.3); travel to St.
Anthony for hearing (.7); participate in argument on motion to
disqualify (1.3); return to Idaho Falls (.7).

5.

The attorney's fees incurred by Respondents in the within action were

necessitated by Plaintiffs failure to recognize an indisputable conflict of interest with current
and future clients given his prior election as the Fremont County Prosecutor. The Motion to
Disqualify was not a routine motion and required unique research in its preparation. The time
expended in preparing and arguing this motion was reasonable and necessary.
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6.

The rates charged Defendant for representation in the within action are reasonable

and similar to, or less than, those charged by attorneys with comparable experience and expertise
in the vicinity of Fremont County, Idaho.
7.

To the best of the moving party's knowledge and belief, the items of fees are

correct and in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and are in compliance with
relevant case law and statute.
DATED this .J.~ day of January, 2013.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

4-~ day of January, 2013.

Residing at: ~ ~ , rD
Commission expires: ~(/l._!t::_:_o+{__:_:'t'~----
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ----t:1.S_ day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below:
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
343 E. 4th N. , Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440

Lynn Hossner
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

[ {Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[;(Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

L:\BGH\7525 -Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pleadings\Defendant's\DQ Attorneys Fee Affidavit.docx
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C'Q'
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4380

}'~Y of

SE\/EN COURT

Frernunt State of ldaro

'""":!,~ 1" 3 Jl
L-0-~-,_~--~-··--~~N31

1

.

ABBIE MACE, CLE! ,.,..

By:

~' Li
. ·•yr'""l"vk
._. t.,
C·epL,,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

S

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
)
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
)
official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.

Case No. CV -12-580

COMES NOW Karl H. Lewies, Esq., in his individual capacity and respectfully objects to
the Court's award of attorney's fees to Respondents' counsel, on the following grounds:

1.

On November 11, 2012, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") accepted the representation of

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 1
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Petitioners to complete 1 on their behalf the filing of a petition for judicial review pertaining to their
private road.
2. On January 2, 2013, Blake Hall, Esq. ("Hall"), or his representative, telephonically
scheduled a court hearing on his forthcoming motion to disqualify counsel.

2

3. On January 7, 2013, Lewies, filed a motion to withdraw from his representation of
Petitioners, citing afuture conflict of interest that would arise, "[e]ffective January 14, 2013 .... "
4. Also on January 7, 2013, Hall filed his motion to disqualify Lewies stating in relevant
part, "While [Lewies] does not currently have a conflict of interest, on January 14, 2013, Mr.
Lewies will have a conflict of interest .... "3
5. On January 22,2013, the Court granted Lewies' motion to withdraw.

4

6. Also on January 22, 2013, however, the Court ordered Lewies to pay attorneys' fees to
Respondents' counsel, Hall, on the grounds that, "Mr. Hall should not have had to file his motion to
disqualify. Your actions, Mr. Lewies, put everyone injeopardy."
7. Yet, Hall did not have to file his motion to disqualify at all. A simple, courteous

1

"Complete" is explained by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRPC") Rule 1.16, Comment 1, as, "Ordinarily, a
representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been completed." Here, the Petitioners wanted
Lewies to quickly file a petition for judicial review in order to meet a rapidly approaching 28-day deadline for filing such a
petition, under I. C. § 40-208. Petitioners and Lewies first communicated on November 20, 2013, just two (2) business days
before the time for filing a petition was to expire. Under IRPC 1.3, Lewies acted diligently to "pursue the matter on behalf of the
client despite personal inconvenience."
2

At no time prior to telephonically scheduling a court hearing on his forthcoming motion to disqualifY did Hall make any effort
whatsoever to confer with Lewies. Analagous to the discovery rules, if Hall had "in good faith conferred or attempted to confer" with
Lewies "in an effort to secure disclosure without court action," he would have been informed that Lewies would seek to withdraw
prior to any actual conflict of interest arising, and therefore, there would be no reasonable basis in law or fact for Hall to file a motion
to disqualifY.
3

Hall had no reasonable basis, in law or fact, for filing a motion to disqualifY Lewies since in his own motion he admitted "Mr.

Lewies does not currently have a conflict of interest .... "
4

CD recording of court hearing held January 22, 2013, where District Court Judge Gregory Moeller is heard saying, "The Court
allows Mr. Lewies to withdraw." (CD recording at 31:00 minutes.)

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 2
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telephone call by Hall to Lewies prior to filing his motion could have quickly resolved any doubt
whether Lewies intended to continue representation, or withdraw.

But, Hall made no such

"reasonably inquiry" 5 prior to filing his motion; rather, he interposed his disqualification motion for
an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation. " 6
8. Whereas, the Court "allowed Mr. Lewies to withdraw," 7 it must find that Lewies was the
prevailing party.
9. The Court may award attorneys' fees only upon a finding that "the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C. § 12-117.

In this instance, Hall was the

nonprevailing party.
10. Imposition of attorney's fees against a prevailing party is an abuse of discretion.
11. The Court should find that Hall's motion to disqualify was without a reasonable basis in
fact or law, and was interposed for the improper purpose of harassing Lewies, contrary to Idaho
Code§ 12-117 and Rule 11(a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively. 8
12. Alternatively, if the Court reverses its existing ruling in this matter, and rather than
allowing Lewies to withdraw as it has already done, decides to grant Hall's motion to disqualify
Lewies, then the Court should not allow the amount of attorney's fees requested by Hall in his
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees because of the following:
5

See, IRCP Rule ll(a)(l).

6

The Court, itself, noted on the record that, "It's time to end the pettiness." (CD recording at approximately 43:45 minutes.)

7

See, footnote 4, supra.

8

When Hall filed his motion to disqualifY Lewies, on January 7, 2013, the undisputed fact is that Lewies had no current conflict
of interest. Further, Hall had failed to cite any legal or ethical violation by Lewies that had actually occurred at the time he filed
his motion to disqualify. Therefore, Hall's motion was obviously not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry; and was not
warranted by any existing law. See, IRCP Rule ll(a(l).

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 3
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a.) Hall was employed by Fremont County, Idaho as a salaried deputy prosecuting
attorney through January 14, 2013;
b.) Hall's Fremont County salary was $805.94/week;
c.) Based on a 40-hour work week, Hall was earning $20.13/hour while employed
by Fremont County, not $225.00/hour;
d.) According to ,-r4 of Hall's own sworn affidavit, he billed Fremont County 3.4
hours on 12/21/2012 at the rate of$225/hr. for a total of$765.00, and he billed Fremont County 1.0
hour on 1/3/201[3] at the rate of$225/hr. for a total of$225.00;
f.) According to Hall's own sworn affidavit, he billed Fremont County an extra
$990.00 on top of his regular county salary.
12. The Court should disallow Hall's request for attorney's fees during the period of time
during which he was employed by Fremont County as a salaried attorney.
13. This objection is based on the record and the affidavits of Karl H. Lewies and Kristina
Larson, filed herewith.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013.

KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 31st day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct
postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
NELSON, HALL
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 31st day of January, 2013.

;0d~

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 5
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•

•

DISTRICT SEVEN COU~T
County of Fremont State ot idaho

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

Filed::.======:::;--

JAN 3 1 2013

Idaho State Bar No. 4380

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
)
official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

Petitioners,

STATEOFIDAHO
County of Fremont

Case No. CV-12-580
AFFIDAVIT OF
KRISTINA LARSON

)
) ss:
)

Kristina Larson, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am employed by Fremont County, Idaho, in the county clerk's office.

DOCUMENT
SCANN~D

2. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINA LARSON.
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4. Blake Hall was employed by Fremont County as a deputy prosecuting attorney and paid
an annual salary of$39,413.
5. From December 30, 2012, through January 12, 2013, Fremont County paid Blake Hall a
bi-weekly amount of$1,611.88.
6. A copy of the payroll information is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and incorporated
herein by this reference.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013
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Exhibit 11A"
Payroll Information
(Fremont County's Deputy Prosecuting Attorney- January 2013}
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KRISTINA LARSON

FREMONT COUNTY

PAGE 1

FISCAL YEAR 2013 FROM 0110112013 TO 09/30/2013 FUND 0008 DEPT 0001
FUND

0008 JUSTICE FUND
-01 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
----------PAYMENT----------

Acct No.
0401-0000

Acct Description I Vendor Name

. - ... ::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::

Payment For
~--:.-

Invoice No.

Warrant No.

Date

SALARIES-OFFICER
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

01/03/2013

3,326.35

*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

01/17/2013

3,326.35

*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

01/31/2013

-------------------------

AcctTotal:
0402-0000

Amount

------:::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::---- :: -.::::::::::::::-::::.::::::::::.::::::::.::::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::.:.:::::::::::.:;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

3,326.35

9,979.05

"

9,979.05

**

CHIEF DEPUTY
*PAYROLL - EXPENSE
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*
*PAYROLL*

*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

01/03/2013
01/17/2013
01/31/2013

96.15
115.39
96.15

-------------------------

307.69
0402-0001

"

SALARIES-ADMIN ASSISTANT
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*
*PAYROLL*
*PAYROLL*

01/03/2013
01/17/2013
01/31/2013

293.76
293.76
257.04
844.56

0402-0002

DEPUTY-CRIMINAL
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

01/03/2013

1,515.88

*PAYROLL-EXPENSE
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*
*PAYROLL*

01/17/2013

1,515.88
1,515.88

01/31/2013

----------------

4,547.64
0402-0003

*

DEPUTY CIVIL
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*

01/03/2013
01/17/2013

1,515.88
1,819.06

------------------

3,334.94

Acct Total:
0406-0001

9,034.83

**

PARALEGAL
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE

*PAYROLL*
*PAYROLL*
*PAYROLL*

01/03/2013
01/17/2013
01/31/2013

1,555.19
10,959.29
1,509.62
14,024.10

Acct Total:

14,024.10
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KRISTINA LARSON

PAGE 3

FREMONT COUNTY

EXPENDITURE ACTIVITY DETAIL
FISCAL YEAR 2013 FROM 01/01/2013 TO 09/30/2013 FUND 0008 DEPT 0001
FUND

AcctNo.

0008 JUSTICE FUND
-01 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Acct Description I Vendor Name

Payment For

Invoice No.

----------PAYMENT---------Amount
Date
Warrant No.
Acct Total:
7,854.71

Total 'D' Expenses- (Benefits):
0439-0000

175.22 ....

TRAVEL- OTHER
BANK OF IDAHO- CARDMEMBER
SERVICE

JOETTE L'S CARD@ THE HICKORY

4798 5100 4209
9065

2013-0002619

27.34

01/11/2013
~

~

.. - .. -------

27.34

Acct Total:
0440-0000

27.34

ALSCO INC

FLOOR MAT ROTATION 4 X 6 MATS

THOMPSON WEST PAYMENT CENTER

ARREST LAW BULLETIN

LBLA 1302362

2013-0002651

01/14/2013

2013-0002684

01/14/2013

Acct Total:

44.22
----------------

41.79

86.01

....

MISC. EXPENDITURE
JENSEN, CAROL A.

NALA CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COURS

2013-0002472

01/07/2013

NALA PAYMENT CENTER

NALA PARALEGAL CERTIFICATION D

2013-0002474

01/07/2013

250.00
125.00

------------ ------------

375.00

Acct Total:
Total 'B' Expenses-- (Other Expenses):
0806-0000

....

SUPPLIES - OFFICE

86.01

0559-0000

..

..

375.00

488.35

CAPITAL- OFFICE EQUIPMENT
LOOKABAUGH, JOETTE

REIMBURSEMENT FOR TABLE & MICR

2013-0002473

Total 'C' Expenses -- (Capital Outlay):
DEPTARTMENT TOTALS:
Total 'A' Expenses-- Salaries:
Total 'D' Expenses -- Benefits:
Total 'B' Expenses-- Expenses:
Total 'C' Expenses -- Capital Outlay:

01/07/2013

300.00
300.00

..

Acct Total:

300.00

....

Dept Total:

41,681.04

300.00

33,037.98
7,854.71
488.35
300.00
41,681.04
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

JAN 3 1 2013
ABB~E, CLERK

By:

Idaho State Bar No. 4380

/

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)

)
)
Petitioners,
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
)
HURT, individually and in his official capacity,
)
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his
official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

STATEOFIDAHO
County of Fremont

Case No. CV-12-580

AFFIDAVIT OF
KARL H. LEWIES

)
) ss:
)

Karl H. Lewies, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES - JANUARY 31, 2013.
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2. On November 20, 2012, Clen Atchley telephoned me saying he "had a project that had to
be done right away."
3. In discussing the matter with Mr. Atchley, it became apparent that he was facing a strict
28-day deadline for filing a petition for judicial review and that such time period would
expire in two (2) business days.
4. Knowing that I had special expertise in filing petitions for judicial review, and
recognizing that Mr. Atchley was in need of urgent legal assistance, I accepted
representation for the limited purpose of filing the petition for judicial review to preserve
his legal rights.
5. Once I reviewed the official road map, I determined that a private road belonging to some
close friends of my family, namely petitioners E.C. Gwaltney, III, of Alexander City,
Alabama and Lana Varney, a partner in the Houston, Texas law firm of Fulbright &
Jaworski, had also been listed by Fremont County as a public road, contrary to the law
and facts of the matter.

Accordingly, I contacted my friends notifying them of the

looming expiration of time to file a petition for judicial review. They promptly asked me
to prepare and file a petition for judicial review to preserve their legal rights.
6. On November 23,2013, I filed petitions for judicial review in Fremont County cases CV12-580 and CV -12-581, just one (1) day before expiration of the 28-day time for filing.
7. On January 7, 2013, I filed a motion to withdraw from representing petitioners in both
pending cases, CV-12-580 and CV-12-581.
8. Also on January 7, 2013, Blake Hall, Esq., of Idaho Falls, Idaho, filed a motion to
disqualify me from representing petitioners in the two above-referenced cases.
9. Prior to filing his motion to disqualify me, Blake Hall, made no good faith effort to
confer, or attempt to confer, with me to determine whether I intended to withdraw from
representing the petitioners once I was sworn-in to office as the elected prosecuting
attorney for Fremont County.
10. I believe that Blake Hall filed his motion to disqualify me for an improper purpose, to
harass me.
11. Indeed, following the court hearing on these matters held January 22, 2013, District
Judge Gregory Moeller, invited me into his chambers and told me he was aware of the
ongoing bitter personal disputes among my predecessor-in-office, Joette Lookabaugh and
2 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES - JANUARY 31, 2013.
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her deputy prosecutor, Blake Hall, and myself. Judge Moeller advised me that everyone
would be better off if the disputes ended.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013

;04~

Karl H. Lewies

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to on oath before me this 31st day of January, 2013.
/ '~·,
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MADISON COURTS 2083585425

MAmSON C)'Ulf!."l,

Fl..YING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CL.EN ATClfl..EY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, G~ORGE TY NEDROW, and
DA VJD TUK NEDROW,
Petil.ioners,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY. IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP'' HURT, individually and
in his ofticial capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official

capacity,

Respondents.

!1.: ·.

i:lv,, _ __

)

)
)
)
)

Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV·l2-581

)

)
)
)
)
)

)

)
)
)
)

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO:
1) DISQUALIFY COUNSEL,
2) WJTHDRAW, AND
3) DISMISS INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS.

)

)

E.C. GWAL ThJEY, III and
LANA K. VARNEY

)

Petitioners,

)

)

)

)

v.

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

On November 23, 2012, Karl H. Lewies filed Lwo petitions for judicial review of
decisions made by the Fremont CounLy Board of Commissioners ('~he County''). The petitions
were filed on behalf of various individuals and one corporation identified in the c.:apLion

("Petitioners"). At the time Mr. Lcwies filed these petitions, he was the prosecutor-elect for
Fremont County, having been duly elected in the general election on November 6, 2012. Mr.
ORDER ON MOTIONS -- Page 1
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FROM MADISON COURTS 2083585425

Lewies ran unopposed in the general election. havin2. defeated the incumbent Fremont County
prosecutor in the primary eJection on May

Is. 2012.

Mr. Lewies had not yet taken office when

he tiled the petitions; he was sworn in on January 14,2013.
On January 2, 2013, Fremont County, through Blake Hall, its then deputy prosecutor,
tiled a motion seekjog to disqualify Mr. Lewies from representing Petitioners against the County.
Mr. Hall also filed a motion for partial dismissal of the individual claims against the
commissioners. Mr. Lcwies then filed a motion to withdraw on January 7, 2013. On January 14,
2013, after a substitution of counsel was signed, Lynn Rossner appeared on behalf of Petitioners
Flying'"A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard. Clay Pickard, George Ty
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow in Case No. CV-12-580. As of the date of the hearing, no
other attorney had appeared on behalf of the Petitioners in Cast: No. CV·l2-581.
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had

failed to withdraw voluntarily until the County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity he had just recently been
elected to reptesen.t on behalf of clients he could no longer represent. Mr. Lcwies attributed the
delay to an oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct wa..:; violated. He claimed
that his clients were operating under time constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed
that he should no longer represent his 1onncr clients or the County on these matters in the future.
Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Mr. Hall to file any motions or argue on behalf of
the County. Mr. Hall responded by noting that he was still an acting deputy prosecutor for the
County when he filed his motions and that he is now acting under a contract with the County
Commissioners. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County
of legal counsel in this matter. Mr. Lewies asserted that his newly appointed deputy prosecutor,
Billie Siddoway, could take over his representation of the County in this matter. Mr. Hall
disagreed and ao;;ked tor attorney fees incurred by the County in filing both motions.
Mr. Hall also addressed his motion tbr partial dismissal. arguing that the County

Commissioners could not be sued "individualJy." The Court questioned Mr. Lewies and Mr.
Hossner as to the appropriateness of making claims against elected officials individually in a
petition for judicial review wtder I.RC.P. 84.
After considering the pleadings and arguments of counsel. the Court ordered as follows:

ORDER ON MOTIONS ·- Page 2
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1. Noting its stron.~~t disagreement with Mr. Lewies' action~ in tn1~:. m~tter. the Cnuri

hereby bars Mr. Lewies from further representing Petitioners or Respondents in these matters.
2. The motion for partial dismissal of the named County Commissioners as individual
Respondents is hereby granted. Neither Mr. Lcwies nor Mr. Hossner could articulate a factual or
legal ba.~is tor bringing individual claims against the commissioners via a petition for judicial
review. Future pleadings shall contain a correct caption, removing the words "individually and"
after each commissioner's name.

3. The Court concludes that the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against Mr. Lewies personally, but not
against his clients, the Petitivners. Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate
supporting documents within 14 days. Mr. Lcwies will be allowed to appear tbr purposes of
contesting the attorney fees only.
4. The Court concludes that the inclusion of the individual claims against the

commissioners in the caption was likely an oversight that could have been cleared up without
tiling a motion. Thcrelbre, no fees will be assessed at this time.
5. If Ms. Siddoway wishes to assert the position that she should be pem1itted to represent

Fremont County on these matters, ruther than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing, she
may ti.le an appropriate motion within 14 days. Mr. Hall will be allowed to respond within 7
days.
6. All pending matters (attorneys 1ees against Mr. Lcwics and Ms. Siddoway's eligibility

to represent the County in this matter) will be taken up on February 26, 2013, at 3:00p.m.
7. This order is effective immediately; however, the Court is willing to reconsider any
portion ofthe order during the hearing on February 26,2013.
8. Inasmuch as the Court does not possess the individual addresses of Mr. Lewies'
unrepresented, fanner clients in Case No. CV-12-581., he shall provide a copy of this order to
each of them as soon a" possible by certified mail, and submit proof of mailing to the Court.
SO ORDERED thislst day of February, 2013, nunc pro tunc January 22, 2013.
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FROM MADISON COURTS 2083585425

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
f'!!""'tl""

T HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER WdS this
.

_o__ day of february, 2013, sent via US mail to the following individuals:
Karl H. Lcwics

Billie Siddoway

Fremont County Prosecuting Attorneys Office
22 w. 1St N.
Sr. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake Hall
:P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Lynn Hossner
109 North 2"d West
St. Anthony, ID 83445

Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W.N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

By:

ORDER ON MOTIONS -- Page 4
Page 68 of 408

Feb 06 2013 0!5:39PM Siddoway Law Office, PLLC 208-3!54.0440

P•se

1

DISTF<:CT SEVEN COURT
Cou!1ty of Fremont State of Idaho

F11eo.:r============::::;--

l_ FEB - 6 2013
Billie J. Siddoway (ISB No. 6628)

ABI.:l!E-MACE:'CLER_K_

;~}1,

By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

bsi.ddowa.y@co.fremont.id.us

DepL;ty Cie:k:

OFFICB Of THE FREMONT COUNTY PROSECUTOR

22 West 1st South

St. Anthony, ID B3445
Tel: 208-624-4418
Fax: 208-624-3404
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FREMONT COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

FLYING A RANCH, INC. et al,

Plaintiffs,

v.
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, ,, a/.,
Defendants.
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, et aL,

Case Nos. CR-2012-580, CR-2012-581,

Plaintiff,

CR-2011-215

v.

FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, et ai.,

NOTICE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Defendants.
STEPHEN A. HUBER, 111 al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FREMO~T

COUN1Y BOARD OF
COMMISSIOKERS, et al.,
Defendants.

1
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Feb 06 2012 0!5:29PM Siddoway Law Offic:e, PLLC 208-2!54..0440

2

I respectfully submit this notice in response to the Court's request fat briefing of January 22,

2013. A conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct prevents me
&om taking a position adverse to the decision of the Fremont County Commission to retain outside
counsel in thi3 matter. I have provided legal advice to the Fremont County Commiesion on the
matter of retaining outside counsel and, while I do not represent the County in this mAtter, I

consider the County to be a "cuttent client" as that tetm is used in Rule 1.7.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February, 2013.
OFFICE Of TI-IB FREMONT COUNTY PROSBCl:TOR

2

NOTICE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Page 70 of 408

p•s•

Feb 06 2013 0~:39PM Siddoway Law Offic:e, PL.LC 208-3!54-0440

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on February 6, 2013, a true a.nd cottect copy of the fotegoing
was caused to be sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Blake Hall

NeLson Hall ParryTucket, P.A.
490 Memorial Dtive
Idaho Fa.llil, ID 83402

Lynn Hossner
109 North 2nd West

St. Anthony, ID 8l445

3

NOTICE OF CONFLICf OF INTEREST
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:i=======:::;--

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484

FEB - 6 2013
ABBIE rv~, CLERK
By: _ _ _ _..e:.:.z.U.J?\ -=--__,.-4
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
Case No. CV-12-580

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

NOTICE OF HEARING

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

I

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 26th day of February, 2013, at 3:00p.m., of said
day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Courthouse, in Fremont County, Idaho,
Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss will be brought on for hearing before the Honorable
Gregory W. Moeller.
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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DATED this___£____ day of February, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this___£____ day of February, 2013 by the method indicated below:
Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109N2ndw
St. Anthony, ID 83445

~ Mailing

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484
Attorney for Respondents

DISHiiCT SE'/f::.N COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho

Filed::.=================;--

FEB - 6 2013
AB~ACE,CLERK

By: _ _...~.LJ~
h~l),l.----;::;:-:-::-:-:T.:""~::i7

Deputy C!erk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
Motion for Partial Dismissal of any challenge to the January 7, 2013 actions of the Fremont
County Commissioners based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the explicit
language ofldaho Code§§ 31-1506 and 67-5273.

Page 1
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INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Respondents' Motion for Partial Dismissal of any challenges to the
January 7, 2013 Fremont County Commissioners decision to retain Mr. Blake G. Hall and the
firm of Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. to handle four pending lawsuits against Fremont County.
An oral motion was made by Fremont County Prosecutor Karl Lewies following a motion by
Fremont County to disqualify Mr. Lewies from the above-referenced matter given his concurrent
conflict of interest. At the hearing, the Court disqualified Mr. Lewies. Following the order
disqualifying Mr. Lewies, the Court entertained a verbal motion by Mr. Lewies, after being
disqualified, about Fremont County being represented by Mr. Hall and his law firm in the

instant matter. Mr. Lewies mislead the Court by indicating that the County had not retained Mr.
Hall. In reality, Fremont County had adopted a resolution on January 7, 2013 to hire Mr. Hall
and Nelson Hall Parry Tucker to handle the pending litigation.

The Fremont County

Commissioners are entitled to retain outside counsel for pending litigation and the instant matter
is not a proper forum to challenge a County Commission decision.
ARGUMENT
1. There Is Not Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Hear A Challenge To The January 7,

2013 Commissioner's Action.

For a Court to issue any binding order, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject
matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type or class of dispute." State
v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162-63,244 P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (2010) abrogated by Verska v.
Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) (quoting Bach v. Miller,

144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007)). Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution,
provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in

Page 2
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equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." Idaho Const., art. V, § 20.
Thus, subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a court has a duty to
ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. See Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 163, 244
P.3d at 1249. See also I.R.C.P. 12(g)(4). A judgment or order issued by a court that lacks
subject matter jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral attack. !d.; Sierra Life Ins. Co. v.

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978).
In order to challenge an action of the county commissioners a petition must be timely
filed. The failure to timely file a petition will moot any challenge. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 311506, the judicial review of a Commissioners decision must be initiated by the filing of a petition
that complies with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act:
Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act.
order or proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person
aggrieved thereby within the same time and in the same manner as
provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of
actions.
I. C. § 31-1506(1) (emphasis added). Thus, judicial review of any act, order or proceeding must
comply with Idaho Code§§ 67-5201 et seq. A petition that fails to comply with the
requirements ofldaho Code§§ 67-5201 et seq. will be denied.
Idaho Code §§ 67-5273(3) specifies the time period in which a petition for judicial
review of an action must be filed, "A petition for judicial review of a final agency action other
than a rule or order must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, except as
provided by other provision oflaw." The failure to timely file a petition within the prescribed
period of time will render the petition invalid.
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The specific challenge raised by Mr. Lewies is to the Commissioners hiring of Mr. Hall
to represent the County in four pending civil matters. On January 7, 2013, the Fremont County
Commissioners took up the following motion:
We currently have three lawsuits pending that are being handled by
our civil deputy Blake Hall. They are Flying A Ranch, Inc., et al.
v. Fremont County; Gwaltney, III, et al. v. Fremont County; and
Stoddard Bros v. Fremont County. Additionally, we have the case
of Huber v. Fremont County that Mr. Hall has been our legal
counsel. In each of these cases, the incoming prosecuting attorney,
Karl Lewies, has a conflict of interest and neither he nor his office
can represent us. Therefore, pursuant to our authority under I.C.
31-813, and to ensure continuity in the representation of the
County, Commissioner Miller moved that we retain Blake Hall of
the firm Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. to represent us in the
above matter commencing on January 16, 2013. Commissioner
Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with
all commissioners voting in favor.
(Fremont Co. Minutes, January 7, 2013, p. 7, attached hereto as Ex. A). Thus, the failure to file a
petition within 28 days of the January 7, 2013 action-or February 4, 2013 is invalid. Moreover,
it is important to note that the issues addressed in this proceeding deals with a challenge to the
County's classification of a road. The instant petition does not challenge the January 7, 2013
action. No petition challenging the Commissioners decision was timely filed. Challenging a
commissioner decision that is completely unrelated to the instant petition is inappropriate. The
instant matter is not the proper forum for a challenge to the Fremont County Commissioner's
January 7, 2013 action to hire independent counsel and the Court should dismiss any such
challenge.
2. The Fremont County Commissioners Can Hire Outside Legal Counsel To Handle
Pending Civil Litigation.

Notwithstanding the above, the oral motion made by Mr. Lewies is without legal support.
The Fremont County Commissioners are entitled to retain outside counsel to address "suits to
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which the county is a party in interest." I.C. § 31-813. Specifically, Idaho Code § 31-813
specifically vests a board of county commissioners with the right to control who handles civil
suits where the county is a party in interest:

To direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to
which the county is a party in interest, and employ counsel to
conduct the same, with or without the prosecuting attorney, as
they may direct.
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to the unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 31-813, the Fremont
County Commissioners have the right to hire counsel to defend the County in civil actions where
the County is a party. The language further states that hiring outside counsel does not have to be
the prosecuting attorney. Rather, the statute vests the decision solely with the Commissioners"as they may direct." Jd.
In this case, the County specifically determined that, based on the clear conflict of
interest, that Mr. Lewies was unable to defend the County in four pieces of pending litigation
against the County: Flying A Ranch, Inc., eta! v. Fremont County, Gwaltney, et a!. v. Fremont

County, Stoddard Bros v. Fremont County, and Huber v. Fremont County. Given the pending
nature of the civil suits and a desire to ensure continuity of the representation of the County, the
Commissioner determined that it was in the County's interest to continue to have Mr. Hall
represent the County on those pieces of litigation. While there is no statutory requirement that a
resolution be adopted prior to hiring outside counsel, the Fremont County Commissioners
adopted a resolution further confirming their intentions.
In the January 7, 2013 Commissioners meeting, the Fremont County Commissioners took
up the issue of hiring Mr. Hall and his law firm, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., to continue to
represent the County on the four above-referenced matters. Based on the unambiguous authority
granted to the Commissioners pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-813, the Commissioners were
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entitled to hire Mr. Hall. When the hearing in this matter took place on January 22, 2013, Mr.
Hall had been retained to represent the County in the four above actions. Given the appropriate
actions taken by the Commissioners to hire Mr. Hall in this matter, any challenge to the
Commissioners' actions is without merit. Based on the unambiguous language of Idaho Code §
31-813, the Commissioners acted within the scope of their authority and there is no viable legal
grounds to challenge the Commissioners January 7, 2013 action.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Respondents respectfully request that the Court dismiss any
challenge to the January 7, 2013 Fremont County Commissioners action to to employ Mr. Hall
and Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. in the four pending civil actions for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In the alternative, the Respondents request that the Court find that the Fremont
County Commissioners actions were legal and appropriate under Idaho law.
DATED this

.5'

day of February, 2013.

~Hi[~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this__£___ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below:
Lynn Hossner
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

M

Mailing
Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

L:\BGH\7525 -Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pleadings\Defendant's\Jurisdiction Challenge (Mot).docx
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FREMONT COUNTY St. Anthony, ID

Present for the meeting was: Commissioners Skip Hurt, Lee Miller and Jordon Stoddard.
Also attended by: Deputy Clerk Laura Singleton, Assessor Kathy Thompson, Sheriff Len
Humphries, Treasurer J'Lene Cherry, and Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh
Commissioner Hurt called the meeting to order and welcomed those in attendance.
Extension Agent Lance Ellis offered the prayer.
Public Works Director Brandon Hanis led the pledge.
Elected Officials & Department Heads
Emergency Management Director Keith Richey reported they have been monitoring the rivers tor
ice build~up, He has been working in Island Park on sustainable tire issues. He reported the public
has been very responsive to this program. Mr. Richey stated he is getting ready to do Hazmat
reports. He also stated there is an extra $7,000 available to send Sheriff Humphries' officers to
SWAT training. Mr. Richey stated he has also been working on several grants.
Five County Juvenile Detention Administrator Nicky Chavez reported they had a bit of a water
problem with a broken sprinkler head but everything is deaned up now. They have hired five part
time reserve officers and are preparing to send three of their employees to POST. Mr. Chavez
stated they are working with PREA. He also reported that there are fourteen kids in treatment with
several that have been released. Mr. Chavez gave a quarterly report of the numbers at the facility.
He is now preparing for the Five County Board Meeting next week.
Extension Agent Lance Ellis reported they have finished up the last of their classes that were
taught at 5C. Mr. Chavez thanked lance for sharing his expertise with the student there. Mr. Ellis
stated they have been running the Master Gardner Program at the Work Camp. They will start
doing projects when the snow is gone in the spring. He would like any suggestions on work they
could do in the community to use as service hours. They will start the Master Gardner Program for
the people in the community on Jan. 30th. They will be holding a Grain School on Feb. 7th at the
Relay Station. Mr. Ellis stated they are hoping to start a new program for people who own small
acreage. They would like to be able to teach them ways to farm their land and make money off the
ground they own or at least make it productive. He reported on the Designated Surveillance Area
Line meeting. This involves testing for brucellosis in cattle. All of Fremont County is in this
surveillance area.
·
4-H Coordinator Dana Miller stated now is the time she starts to go to the public schools to teach
classes to the students. Ms. Miller stated she is traveling to the Capital with a number of students
in February to Jearn about government. She reported she received a grant from Walmart and also
Northwest Farm Credit. She hopes to buy some seWing machines with the money to teach kids
how to sew.
Sewer Supervisor Dan Lostutter gave the year-end report for 2011-2012 for the Mack's Inn
treatment plant and the Last Chance treatment plant. They have put a hold on working on the Lift
Station due to the onset of winter. Hopefully they can start working on it again in June or July. Mr.
Lostutter reported on the total number of lines they have cleaned. Mr. Lostutter reported they held
two classes last fall. One class was on electrical safety and one was on repairing pipes without
having to dig them up. He stated both classes were very good. Mr. Lostutter reported they hired a
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new employee that started today. He also reported snow making season is under way and they
have gone from working four days a week to five.
Weed Supervisor Brvce Fowler reported they have been working on grants. He has been asked to
do a presentation at a conference in Twin Falls. Mr. Fowler stated he will be spending a lot of time
in Boise working on getting grants. Mr. Fowler also reported the state is changing things on the
aquatics program so he has been working on that. So far Idaho has tested negative for mussels.
They have also been working on setting up their new 4-wheelers and equipping them with a GPS
system.
Assessor Kathy Thompson reported things are going well in her office. The appraisers have been
out doing appraisal work. They have gotten a lot of calls regarding personal property and how it is
going to affect them. They have had quite a few deeds come through which has surprised her. Ms
Thompson stated mapping is going well. They have started some property reductions which
usually benefits the older people. She reported the office looks really nice now that all the work has
been done. Ms. Thompson stated the Motor Vehicle Department has been very busy. There has
been concern about Fremont County not getting all the money for roads when people license their
vehicles. They did some checking into this and stated there really aren't very many Fremont
County residents who buy their plates in Madison County.
Planning and Building Administrator Tom Cluff stated things are going well. November and
December were slower like they typically are. They are in the middle of renewing cabin permits. So
far there have been no problems. He reported there still are many people who rent cabins but are
not getting permits. One of their employees will be cutting back their hours while he is in school. He
reported they need to be thinking of people to replace those who are working on the HUO Grant
who are leaving office. Commissioner Miller asked Mr. Cluff to check into those people who have
moved trailers or mobile homes onto their property by filing for hardship status and see if they still
qualify for this.
IT Administrator Lisa Tumer reported that the tower is now up and turned the rest of the time over
to her assistant Josh Warnke to update the commissioners on the status of the rest of the work that
needs to be done on the tower.
Josh Warnke updated the commissioners on the work that still needs to be done on the tower and
how they will be hooking up to all the departments. There has been some concern over radiation
levels from the tower. Mr. Wamke stated the radiation level from the tower is very low because the
antenna is actually higher. Commissioner Miller asked Keith Richey to check into some kind of
funding so we can put a fence around the tower because there could be some safety issues that
arise.
Public Works Director Brandon Harris reported things are going welt. There haven't been too many
complaints as far as plowing goes. He reported the sander went down, so they had to make a
quick trip to Twin Falls to get a part. Mr. Harris stated Red Road Is closed now. The crews have
been working on shoulder material. The crews will be starting work on the cross cut bridge on
Monday (400 North). They will then work on the bridge in Chester. Mr. Harris reported Stonebridge
is being redesigned with four foot piers instead of eight foot piers. Hopefully this will bring the cost
of the project down. Also the construction window is bigger so that should help lower the price of
the bridge. Mr. Harris stated they would like to work on the Salem Highway, but they still need to
find help with the funding. Mr. Harris also reported the St. Anthony Landfill Transfer Station design
for the landfill should be back this week so they can review it.
Juvenile Probation Director Darin Burrell stated they are seeing a lot more marijuana issues and
said this was to be expected because of the issues in the surrounding states. He reported that kids
are stealing cough medicines now and prescription medications are still an issue.
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Treasurer J'Lene Cherrv stated they are winding down on taxes. They have collected close to 62%.
They are starting on the warrants. Ms. Cherry stated she will send out reminders first before they
send out warrants. She also reminded everyone that credit card bills need to be tumed in by the
12th of the month with receipts. Ms. Cherry reported she is working on a public administrator case
and stated it will have to be published in the newspaper before we can do any more with this. She
stated she hopes she can close this case out in about a month. She stated her office doesn't have
any heat this morning and they have called someone to come check it.
Sheriff Len Humphries reported 12 inmates in county custody this morning. There were several
slide offs this morning. He reported deputies have started doing snowmobile checks. There is
concern on how things will work next year with snowmobile licensing. Mr. Humphries stated that
according to Idaho code, those who have filed for a concealed weapon permit will not have their
names released to the public. He stated they will need a replacement for Commissioner Hurt on
the DIGBY 6 Board. Commissioner Jordon Stoddard will take Commissioner Hurt's place. There
has been a lot of talk about increasing 911 fees. Sheriff Humphries stated he doesn't foresee this
happening until possibly next year though.
EMS Director Bob Foster reported numbers are basically the same as last year. He reported
collections seem to be higher than last year. Mr. Foster stated Radio Narrow Banding has been
completed. Mr. Foster stated that the bids have been sent out for the new ambulance. Also, the
training program for 2013 starts next Tuesday. He reported the Island Park area had a busy
weekend and the St. Anthony area had a busy week last week.
Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh stated she had a quiet holiday with her family. She
reported she is wrapping up things in her office since this is her last week as prosecutor.
Commissioner Lee Miller stated that he hoped everyone had a great holiday with their families. He
stated he has mixed feelings at this time with Commissioner Hurt leaving office and Prosecuting
Attorney Joette Lookabaugh also leaving office. He also reported he had a conference call with
Dustin Miller last Friday about wolf depredation. Apparently there was some money left over so
they were able to pay some late applicants. He stated they have a lot of documentation coming in
on loss of livestock and money is running out. Dustin Miller will be meeting with the legislature on
this issue. Commissioner Miller stated he is looking forward to moving ahead with the Transfer
Station at the Landfill. He also expressed appreciation to all the employees for all the hard work
they are doing.
Commissioner Jordon Stoddard has received an estimate for the repairs on the electrical work at
the fairgrounds. He is still doing a little bit of work in the Assessor's Office. He went to the swearing
in of the new judge. He thanked everyone for their work.
Commissioner Skip Hurt stated this is his last week as County Commissioner. He stated we are all
under scrutiny of the public and everyone watches us. He appreciates the way everyone works
together here. Everything hasn't always gone smoothly but it has all been ironed out and come
to~ether.

Commissioner Hurt made a motion to go into executive session pursuant to IC 67~2345(1){b) To
consider the evaluation) dismissal or disciplining of, or to hear complaints or charges brought
against, a public officer, employee, staff member or individual agent~ or public school student; at
10:18 a.m. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A roll call vote was taken with
Commissioner Miller voting "Aye·~ Commissioner Stoddard voting "Aye·, and Commissioner Hurt
voting "Aye•. Commissioner Hurt declared the meeting open at 10:34 a.m.
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Veterans Service Officer stacy Whitmore RE: Increasing Office Hours
Ms. Whitmore asked the commissioners if she could increase her hours from six to twelve hours
per week. She stated that she has been busy enough that she has to tell veterans that they will
have to come back the following week in order for her to help them. The commissioners feel that
there is enough work for her to add the additional hours.
Commissioner Stoddard made a rnotion to change Veterans Service Officer Stacy Whitmore's
hours from six per week to twelve per week. Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. A full voice
vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor.

Parks and Recreation Director Tamra Cikaitoga RE: 2014 Grant Applications
Ms. Cikaitoga reported she has been putting together three grant applications. She needs approval
to move forward with a boat ramp at Jump-Off Canyon, which is about ~of a mile from the Ashton
Bridge. She also stated she would need to use the Road and Bridge Crew to get this done. She
would also like to put new boat docks in at Buttennilk and Mill Creek. There was discussion on
putting some parking area in at the Jump-Off area.
She also reported that the Forest Service is working on grant applications so they can repair a
couple of boat docks in the Island Park area.
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to sign and approve a grant application with Idaho Department
of Parks and Recreation in the amount of $3,000 with a match from the county of $2,500 for a
Jump Off Canyon Angler Access Development Project. Commissioner Miller seconded the motion.
A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor.
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to sign and approve a grant application with Idaho Department
of Parks and Recreation in the amount of $10,000 with a match from the county of $3,000 to fund
the upgrade of Mill Creek Boat Launch. Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. A full voice vote
was heard with all commissioners voting in favor.
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to sign and approve a grant application with Idaho Department
of Parks and Recreation in the amount of $10,000 with a match from the county of $3,000 to fund
the upgrade of boating facilities at Buttermilk Boat Launch. Commissioner Miller seconded the
motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor.
Ms. Cikaitoga updated the commissioners on how trail grooming is going. She stated everything
seems to be going good but there just isn't a lot of snow up there.

Planning and Building Administrator Tom Cluff RE: Department Report
Mr. Cluff stated that he didn't really have any more to add than what was said this morning. He will
report next week.
Social Services - Debbie Adams Re: Indigent Claims
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to go into executive session pursuant to IC 67-2345(1)(d) to
consider records that are exempt from disclosure as provided in chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code at
1:00 p.m. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A roll call vote was taken with
Commissioner Stoddard voting ~Aye", Commissioner Miller voting ~Aye", and Commissioner Hurt
voting ''Aye". Commissioner Hurt declared the meeting open at 1:10 p.m.
4
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Commissioner Miller made a motion to approve case #G2013-16, deny case #M2013-9, and deny
case #M2013-11. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with
all commissioners voting in favor.
Commissioners signed three new liens and two lien releases.
Public Works Director Brandon Harris RE: Department Reports
Mr. Harris reported on the issue of plowing John Searle's road. Mr. Searle had to flU out a form and
according to the score on the fonn he does not qualify to have his road plowed. Mr. Searle still
feels that the county should plow his road. Mr. Harris asked the commissioners what they would
like to do. The commissioners discussed other roads in the county that are not being plowed
because they are private roads or because the county does not maintain those roads. The
commissioners stated we need to slick to the standards that the previous Public Works Director put
in place to determine if they qualify to have their road plowed. It was also stated that Mr. Searle
lives on a steep road and it is hard to get the graders up the hill. The commissioners feel that it
would be in the countYs best interest to stick with the county's standard; therefore they will not
plow the road to his house.
Landfill - There were no issues at this time.
Sewer- Mr. Harris brought in a document for the commissioners to sign giving an extension on the
Mack's Inn Sewer Expansion Project. Also, Mr. Harris stated that there is some concem regarding
someone trespassing at the Island Park Sewer Station and looking into the garage on December
26tll.
Mr. Harris stated he is going to meet with people today in Driggs to make sure we are meeting the
requirements of both OSHA and DEQ on the Transfer Station.

Commissioner Hurt signed a contract extension for the wheel case loader with Bank of Idaho.
The commissioners directed Mr. Harris to go ahead and order a new loader.
Mr. Harris asked the commissioners if they would be willing to hire two of the work camp guys,
whose time is about up, to work for the county. One would be employed at the Landfill and the
other would work with Carey Daniels in maintenance. The commissioners asked to put this on the
agenda for next week and discuss it some more at that time.
Jerry Greenfield/Trails to Yellowstone Development Co. RE: Letter of support for Forest
Service Land Swap
The commissioners were updated on the current standing of the Land Swap between Trails to
Yellowstone Development Company and the Forest Service. The land that would be swapped is
currentiy the ground that the Landfill is on.
Mr. Greenfield gave a presentation on the history of the company's organization and how the idea
came about. He gave statistics on the tourism to Yellowstone National Park. He stated the
concerns he has regarding Yellowstone National Park. They feel they can come up with solutions
to the congestion, lodging, parking, etc. They would like to create a place outside the park that
would have a variety of restaurants available. Also, water parks and family type entertainment
would be available. He stressed the economic development that this project would bring to the
area. The first thing that would have to be done though, is finalizing the land swap. Therefore 1 they
are asking the commissioners for a letter of support for the land swap.
There was some discussion of the pros and cons of creating something like this in Island Park.
Commissioner Stoddard stated he likes to be able to drive his own vehicle through the park. He is
5
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not sure he likes the idea of traveling through the park on a tour bus as was stated by Mr.
Greenfield.
Mr. Cluff stated this letter that is being requested is just to support the land swap, not what they are
proposing to do with the land.
Mr. Miller stated the land swap would be a positive thing for Fremont County. He feels we should
support the land swap and ff that goes through, we will deal with the other issues as they come
about.
Commissioner Hurt directed Mr. Cluff to draft a letter for the commissioners to sign.

Board of Equalization 2nc1 Sub Roll Only
Commissioner Hurt opened the Board of Equalization 2nd Sub Roll at 2:27 p.m. There are no
requests at this time. Commissioner Hurt closed this at 2:29 p.m.
Sheriff Len Humphries RE: Contract for Communications System
Sheriff Humphries brought in a contract for the commissioners to sign to have AVTEC put in a
radio console at the Sheriff's Office.
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to approve the contract with AVTEC for the radio
communication system. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard
with all commissioners voting in favor.

---·"

Sheriff Humphries stated the school district has approached him about hiring an officer to rotate in
the schools. This officer would work about five or six hours a day. The commissioners feel this
would be a good idea.

Storage building at Sand Dunes
Shannon Bautista, from the Bureau of Land Management, stated they are applying for a grant to
build a storage building at the Sand Dunes. This grant is based off the Motor Vehicle Fund and the
Off-Road Fund. This building will be built on BLM ground. She presented a floor plan of what they
would like to build. The BLM would like to know how much money the county would be able to
come up with to help fund this project. With this storage building, it would help to clean up the area
so everything is stored in one place and there won't be several little trailers that store supplies.
Commissioner Miller stated that to begin with, we just wanted to build something that would house
the sand rail and now the project has grown to be a lot bigger building than was expected.
Everyone discussed the things they would like to have available at this facility. A major issue is
making a storage area that is big enough to house the sand rail so there is a bigger opening to pull
the sand rail in and out without damaging the tires. Commissioner Miller stated he feels safe in
contributing about $30,000 to this project. Mr. Foster also stated that we need to consider how we
will provide for the utilities there. BLM stated they will be responsible for maintaining the facility, but
would welcome help from the county in any form.
Commissioner Miller would like an alternate plan in place in case the grant does not come through.
He would also like an agreement where there is no limit of time as far as being partners with the
BLM on this project. Ms. Bautista stated she will look into that.
Commissioner Miller made a motion to apply for a grant together with the BLM with a match of
$30,000 to build a storage facility at the Sand Dunes. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the
motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor.
6
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Miscellaneous
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to approve the claims for January 7, 2013 as presented .
Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners
voting in favor,
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to approve a duplicate copy of Liquor License #36 to Golden
Bear Lodge, LLC doing business as Lakeside Lounge. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the
motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor.
Commissioner Miller made a motion to approve the Junior College application for Brittney Leavitt
and Aubree Hill. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with all
commissioners voting in favor.
We currently have three lawsuits pending that are being handled by our civil deputy Blake Hall.
They are Flying A Ranch, Inc., et al. v. Fremont County; Gwaltney, Ill, et al. v. Fremont County;
and Stoddard Bros. v, Fremont County. Additionally, we have the case of Huber v. Fremont County
that Mr. Hall has been our legal counsel. In each of these cases, the incoming prosecuting
attorney, Karl Lewies, has a conflict of interest and neither he nor his office can represent us.
Therefore, pursuant to our authority under I.C. 31-813, and to ensure continuity in the
representation of the County, Commissioner Miller moved that we retain Blake Hall of the firm of
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. to represent us in the above matters commencing on January 16,
2013.Commlssioner Stoddard seconded the motion, A full voice vote was heard with all
commissioners voting in favor.
There was some discussion on the Legislative Tour that will be held this year. Rexburg Chamber of
Commerce would like Fremont County to contribute $5,000 to help cover costs for this event.
Commissioner Miller stated he has reservations about donating that much money. Commissioner
Stoddard also feels that $5,000 is too much. Commissioner Stoddard stated he would like to
discuss this with people from the county and hear how they feel about this. No decision was made
on whether to contribute money.
There being no further business to come before the board the meeting was adjourned,

~~
e(MIIl;Chairman
Fremont County Commission

.. ___.
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St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

FEB 1 2 2013

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

,

Petitioners

)
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)
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)

Case No. CV-12-580
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)
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR )
)
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the State of Idaho, RONALD
)
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)
)
Defendants.

vs

I hereby certify that on February 12th, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of Petitioners
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Petition For Review and Affidavit of Lynn Hossner to:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001
Facsimile (208) 523-7254
Honorable Greg Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
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Facsimile (208) 356-5425
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

'
Petitioners

)

vs
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision ofthe State of Idaho, RONALD
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-580
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITIONERS' PETITION
FOR REVIEW

)

)
)

)
)

Comes now Lynn Hossner, attorney for Petitioners, and in support of Petitioners' Petition
For Judicial Review ofthe proceedings ofthe Board of County Commissioners for Fremont
County, Idaho, hereinafter termed "the Board," whereby the Board designated that certain road
which cross Petitioners' land in Sections 8, 17 and 20, Township 9 North, Range 42 East, Boise
Meridian as a public road which were designated as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road and
Snow Creek roads, ("the Subject Road").
INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Petitioners' Petition For Judicial Review of the actions of the Board in
adopting Ordinance No. 2013.01 on October 29, 2012 which adopted the Official Road Map of
Fremont County, Idaho. The Ordinance, among other things, designated a road as a public road
which commences at 1425 North 3125 East in Fremont County and travels one quarter of a mile
north over the property of Petitioners, George Ty Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow, hereinafter
termed Nedrow, and then proceeds north a quarter of a mile over property belonging to
Petitioners, Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard and Clay
Pickard, hereinafter termed Flying "A" Ranch. After the road leaves the Flying "A" Ranch
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property on the north side, it travels one-half a mile north over BLM property to property
belonging to Flying "A" Ranch and continues on north until it reaches the U.S. Forest Service
property where the road is blocked. There are numerous gates across the road before it
approaches the block by the U.S. Forest Service at the south edge of its property.
ARGUMENT
1. The road designated as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek

road, ("the Subject Road") is not a public road.

The county has the power and authority under I. C. 40-202 to prepare a map designating
the public roads of the County and to cause notice to be given of its intention to adopt the map as
a map showing the public roads of the county. The procedure requires that first there be notice,
then public hearings before the map shall be adopted with whatever changes are deemed
necessary.
The act of designating the road as a public road does not automatically
make the road a public road. The process by which a county selects a road does
not automatically serve to adjudicate the public status of a road. I.C. 40-202(1).
There are specific ways in which a public highway may be created. I.C. 40-203(3)
provides in part:
Highways, laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this section
(by acquiring real property and then adopting a resolution establishing an interest in the
property as a highway), by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for
a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the
expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners, are
highways.
The only testimony at the public hearings regarding the Subject Road was from
Petitioners, David Tuk Nedrow and George Ty Nedrow. Their testimony is contained on page
16 lines 24-25, page 17-lines 1-25, page 18 lines 1-25, page 19 lines 1-25, age 20-lines 1-25,
page 21lines 1-25 and page 22 lines 1-17 (See Attached Exhibit A). As is noted from the
testimony, there was no testimony that the road was laid out, used for a period of five years and
had been worked and kept up at the expense ofthe public which fits the criteria ofi.C. 40203(3). Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board ofCommissioners ofTeton County, 141 Idaho 855.
No testimony was elicited from any witnesses regarding continual use of the road for five years
and that it was worked and kept up at the expense of the public.
There is no evidence in the record that the road was ever designated as a public road and
placed on an official map, as provided by law, nor was any evidence adduced that it was created
by prescription and if it was created by prescription, whether it was abandoned or vacated. It
appears that this road was declared a public road by the Fremont County Commissioners without
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obtaining evidence determining if there was a road, how it was created, whether any work was
done on it at public expense, and if so, was the road ever vacated. Upon examination of the
record, none of the necessary perquisites were done by Respondents to arrive at the point which
allowed Respondents to determine that this is a public road. The fact that the Respondents' now
show the road on the county map as a public road does not make it so absent the proof laid been
before the commissioners that the road qualified.
2. THE ROAD IS NOT AN R.S. 2477
The question was asked during the hearing on the Subject Road whether the road was an
R.S. 2477 road. The commission chairman indicated he would look into it. There is nothing in
the record which indicates the commission chairman looked into it or if he did, what the effect
on the matter was.
An R.S. 2477 right-of-way is obtained by an "acceptance of a congressional grant of a
right-of-way for a public highway under this statute." Call v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155.
The determination may be important ifthere was a belief that there was an established right-ofway under R.S. 24 77 while the land which now belongs to the Petitioners was in the public
domain.
In order to create an R. S. 24 77 right-of-way, "there must be a positive act of acceptance
by the local government or compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time."

Farrell v. Board of Commissioners of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378. There was no testimony
given that the road was ever accepted by congressional action while the land was in the public
domain, designated as such by the local government or that the road complied with the road
creation statutes in existence at the time. The record is devoid of any finding which would
support a contention that the road was an R.S. 2477 road.
3. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DO NOT

REFLECT FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE SUBJECT ROAD BEING A
PUBLIC ROAD.
The Commissioners are required to prove the public status of the disputed road.

Homestead Farms, Inc., v. Board ofTeton County Commissioners, 141 Idaho 855 Idaho. I.C.
40-202(1) requires an express finding of fact which made the Subject Road a public road. To
make the road a public road, there would have to be a finding that:
1, The highway was laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this
section (by acquiring real property and then adopting a resolution establishing an interest in the
property as a highway), by order of a board of commissioners, or,
2. The highway was used for a period of five (5) years that they have been worked and
kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of
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commissioners.
There is nothing in the record which would make the Subject Road a public road. The
only finding of fact in the record was that the road was a public roadway absent any reasons. "If
the road is not properly created as a public highway, its inclusion on an official county highway
system map does not impose a duty on the property owner to establish it as a public highway."
Homestead Farms, Inc., !d.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioners respectfully request that the court vacate the
Official County Road Map as far as it designates the Subject Road as a public road and that
Petitioners be awarded their attorney fees and costs.
DATED this 12th day ofFebruary 2013.

ss

Attorney for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 12th, 2013, I served a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing upon:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001
Facsimile (208) 523-7254
METHOD OF SERVICE:
[]Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [x] Facsimile
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ORIGIN

LEWIES, Bar No. 4380
Fremont Co. Prosecuting Attorney
RYAN S. DUSTIN, Bar No. 8683
Deputy Fremont County P.A.
22 West 1st North
st. Apthony, Idah,o 83445
Telephone: (208} 624-4418
Fax: (208) 624-3404
KARL_H.

D''"'T'"'Ir'T SEVEN COURT

Coun~~ ~t"F~e~ont State of Idaho

Filed::~======;--

\

FEB 1 2 2013

~IE MACE, CLERK
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF J:DAa:O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC, an Idaho
Corporation, CLEN ATCHL~Y, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

vs-

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581
MOTION FOR EXTENTION
OF TIME (RULE 6(b))

}

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state
of Idaho,
Respondents.

)

)
)
)
)

_________________________________ })
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, and
LANA K. VARNEY,

Petitioners,

vs.

)
)
)

)
)
)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
)
political subdivision of the state )
of Idaho,
)
Respondents.
)

_______________________________ )
COMES NOW, Ryan S. Dustin, Esq., Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for

Fremont County,

Idaho,

in the above-entitled actions

and

MOTION AND ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
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pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) moves the Court for
its

order

memorandum
Prosecuting

enlarging
on

the

behalf

Attorney

time

of
(the

the

to

February

Office

"Office")

of

25,

2013

the

addressing

to

file. a

Fremont

County·

whether

it

is

required and/or permitted under the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho
Code,

and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct to represent

Fremont County, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho, in
the following pending cases: Case No. CV-12-580 and Case No. CV-12581.

This motion is based on the pleadings and record in the abovereferenced cases,

and the

affidavit

of

Karl

H.

Lewies,

Esq.,

Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney, filed herewith.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2013.

Deputy Fremont County P.A.

MOTION AND ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
+L-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /t7/
day of February,
2013, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioners
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Id 83405

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Id 83405

Lynn Hossner, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners
109 N. 2nd W.
St. Anthony, Id 83445
Smith, Legal Secretary

MOTION AND ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
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•

•

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE· SEVENTH JUDICIAL DI~S~~:t.JOlLF~:::-=:-:-.::~~-~
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND I'OR THE COUNTY OF ~SEVEN COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC, an Idaho
Corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

vs.

cour1tyoT'F'remont State ot Idaho
Filed::.=======:;--

FEB 1 2 2013
)
)
)
)
)
)

.,... ~
"'
Case No. CV-1 9 MACE,CUBRK
Case No . ~ -:,;1~2:..:-:.;;;5~J.8:..;!;
~1;._,__--;l:.JY't~-:t:";-r.r;-;:i;
0

Deputy Clerk

AFFIDAVIT OF
KARL H. LEWIES

)

)
)
)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
)
political subdivision of the state )
of Idaho,
)
Respondents.
)
)
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, and
)
LANA K. VARNEY,
)

__________________________________
Petitioners,

vs.

)
)

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state
of Idaho,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)

________________________________ )
COUTNY OF FREMONT
STATE OF IDAHO

)

)
) ss
)

I, Karl H. Lewies, having been first duly sworn upon oath,
state as follows.
1. I am over the age of 21 years,

and am competent to testify

in this matter.

1
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2. I

make this

statement based on personal

knowledge

of the

events testified to herein.
3. On January 7,

2013,

I filed motions to withdraw as counsel

for Petitioners in Case No.

CV-12-580 and Case No.

CV-12-

581.
4. On that same day, January 7, 2013, Blake Hall, Esq., acting
in

his

capacity

as

Fremont

County

Deputy

filed

P.A.,

motions to disqualify me as counsel for the Board of County
Commissioners
cases,

of

citing

a

Fremont
future

County,

in

the

above-referenced

conflict

of

interest

that

would

eventually arise.
5. On January 14, 2013, I was sworn into office as the elected
Prosecuting Attorney for Fremont County.
6. On January 22,

2013,

the Court heard oral argument on the

competing motions to withdraw and to disqualify.
7. On February 1, 2013 the Court ordered that I be barred from
representing Petitioners or Respondents in the cases.
8. In

its

Order,

the

Court

allowed

the

Prosecuting Attorney for

Fremont County

days

and

to

Court's

file
own

a

motion

words,

"Why

the

briefing
Fremont

Office

of

(the "Office")

addressing,
County

in

the
14
the

Prosecutor's

office should be permitted to represent Fremont County on
these matters."
9. At

the

time

of

the

Court's

Order,

my deputy

prosecuting

2
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attorney was Ms. Billie Siddoway, Esq ..
10.

On January 24,

to

prepare

a

brief

represent

for

Office

the

whether

2013,

Fremont

I

asked my deputy,

Ms.

Siddoway

Court

addressing

the

question

required

and/or

the

is

County

in

the

pending

Siddoway responded by email writing,
I

together."

left

the

matter

permitted
cases.

to
Ms.

"I will put something

in

her

hands

and

had

no

further contact with Ms. Siddoway concerning the matter.
11.

On

check

February

the

5,

Court

2013,

filings

I

had my

to

indeed filed her brief.

secretary,

confirm that

However,

Ms.

Pat

Smith,

Siddoway had

it become clear that she

had filed nothing.
12.

On February 6,

whether

she

appointment

had
of

2013,

I

"filed

outside

emailed Ms.

the

brief

counsel

in

Siddoway inquiring

on

the

'necessity'

two

road

for

cases

in

which Blake Hall is involved?"
13.
as

On

February 6,

follows:

2013,

"I haven't

Ms.

Siddoway responded by email

filed the brief.

I

have

a

draft,

but I wanted Pat to send me a copy of the minute entry with
the judge's exact request so that I can make sure I covered
everything.

I

plan

to

get

it

on

file

before

close

of

business today."
14.

To

my

surprise

and

check the Court filings

shock,
at

when

5:00 p.m.

I

had

my

secretary

on February 6,

2013,

3
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we found that Ms.

Siddoway had not filed a brief at all,

instead she filed a Notice of Conflict of Interest.
15.

It

is

excusable

neglect

by

the

Office

not

to

have

filed a brief.
16.

By

failing

Constitutional
counsel,

my

and/ or

refusing

"necessity"

deputy

to

file

requirement

deprived

the

for

Office

County

Prosecuting Attorney

and

the

County

who

the

Office

pay

counsel for
legal

taxes

for

Fremont County,

argument

in

support

prosecuting

attorney

requirement

for

county

brief

on

hiring
of

taxpayers
to

the

outside

the

Fremont

of

Fremont

provide

legal

of any opportunity to present
of

and

a

the

the

statutory

duties

Constitutional

commissioners

to

of

a

"necessity"

hire

outside

counsel.
17.

On February 10,

2013,

I

terminated the employment of

deputy Siddoway;

and on February 11,

S.

of THOMSEN-STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

Dustin,

Esq.,

2013,

appointed Ryan
PLLC,

as

Esq.,

is

deputy prosecuting attorney.
18.

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Ryan S.

Dustin,

willing and able to prepare and file a brief with the Court
on

the

Constitutional

commissioner

to

hire

"necessity"
outside

requirement

counsel,

but

for

will

county
require

additional time.
19.

By enlarging time to submit a brief, the Court will be

4
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able

to

avail

support,

from

informed

itself
the

decision

of

legal

reasoning,

Office

allowing

on

matter

a

it
of

to

argument
make

widespread

a

and
well-

public

importance.
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED this 12th day of February 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN to before me,
of February, 2013.
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a notary public, this 12th day

P~>elk~~
NOTARY PUBLICi?
Residing at: St. Anthony, ID
Comm. Expires:
r !G ,/I [

d-./

·....~ ........ ~o ..
••••• OF IDP'-'1;'•••••

················

5
Page 101 of 408

fi_b. 4 ,, .;lD 13_ ___ AT;
~

c: •oo

lltM

--a:.~:~J

DIS~' il)Gn

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FLYING" A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO:
1) DISQUALIFY COUNSEL,
2) WITHDRAW, AND
3) DISMISS INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS.

______________________________)
E.C. GWALTNEY, III and
LANA K. VARNEY
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
po1itical subdivision of the state ofldaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

__________________________)
On November 23, 2012, Karl H. Lewies filed two petitions for judicial review of

decisions made by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners ("the County"). The petitions
were filed on behalf of various individuals and one corporation identified in the caption
("Petitioners"). At the time Mr. Lewies filed these petitions, he was the prosecutor-elect for
Fremont County, having been duly elected in the general election on November 6, 2012. Mr.
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Lewies ran unopposed in the general election, having defeated the incumbent Fremont County
prosecutor in the primary election on May 15, 2012. Mr. Lewies had not yet taken office when
he filed the petitions; he was sworn in on January 14, 2013.
On January 2, 2013, Fremont County, through Blake Hall, its then deputy prosecutor,
filed a motion seeking to disqualify Mr. Lewies from representing Petitioners against the County.
Mr. Hall also filed a motion for partial dismissal of the individual claims against the
commissioners. Mr. Lewies then filed a motion to withdraw on January 7, 2013. On January 14,
2013, after a substitution of counsel was signed, Lynn Rossner appeared on behalf of Petitioners
Flying"A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, George Ty
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow in Case No. CV-12-580. As ofthe date ofthe hearing, no
other attorney had appeared on behalf of the Petitioners in Case No. CV-12-581.
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had
failed to withdraw voluntarily until the County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity he had just recently been
elected to represent on behalf of clients he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed the
delay to an oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was violated. He claimed
that his clients were operating under time constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed
that he should no longer represent his former clients or the County on these matters in the future.
Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Mr. Hall to file any motions or argue on behalf of
the County. Mr. Hall responded by noting that he was still an acting deputy prosecutor for the
County when he filed his motions and that he is now acting under a contract with the County
Commissioners. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County
of legal counsel in this matter. Mr. Lewies asserted that his newly appointed deputy prosecutor,
Billie Siddoway, could take over his representation of the County in this matter. Mr. Hall
disagreed and asked for attorney fees incurred by the County in filing both motions.
Mr. Hall also addressed his motion for partial dismissal, arguing that the County
Commissioners could not be sued "individually." The Court questioned Mr. Lewies and Mr.
Rossner as to the appropriateness of making claims against elected officials individually in a
petition for judicial review under I.RC.P. 84.
After considering the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court ordered as follows:
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1. Noting its strong disagreement with Mr. Lewies' actions in this matter, the Court
hereby bars Mr. Lewies from further representing Petitioners or Respondents in these matters.
2. The motion for partial dismissal of the named County Commissioners as individual
Respondents is hereby granted. Neither Mr. Lewies nor Mr. Rossner could articulate a factual or
legal basis for bringing individual claims against the commissioners via a petition for judicial
review. Future pleadings shall contain a correct caption, removing the words "individually and"
after each commissioner's name.
3. The Court concludes that the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against Mr. Lewies personally, but not
against his clients, the Petitioners. Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate
supporting documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to appear for purposes of
contesting the attorney fees only.
4. The Court concludes that the inclusion of the individual claims against the
commissioners in the caption was likely an oversight that could have been cleared up without
filing a motion. Therefore, no fees will be assessed at this time.
5. If Ms. Siddoway wishes to assert the position that she should be permitted to represent
Fremont County on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing, she
may file an appropriate motion within 14 days. Mr. Hall will be allowed to respond within 7
days.
6. All pending matters (attorneys fees against Mr. Lewies and Ms. Siddoway's eligibility
to represent the County in this matter) will be taken up on February 26, 2013, at 3:00p.m.
7. This order is effective immediately; however, the Court is willing to reconsider any
portion of the order during the hearing on February 26, 2013.
8. Inasmuch as the Court does not possess the individual addresses of Mr. Lewies'
unrepresented, former clients in Case No. CV-12-581, he shall provide a copy ofthis order to
each of them as soon as possible by certified mail, and submit proof of mailing to the Court.
SO ORDERED thislst day of February, 2013, nunc pro tunc January 22, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was this

5",... day of February, 2013, sent via US mail to the following individuals:
Karl H. Lewies
Billie Siddoway
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorneys Office
22W.l 51 N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake Hall
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Lynn Rossner
109 North 2"d West
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

By:
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DISTRiCT SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho
Fiied:..============:;--

Lynn Hossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State BarNo. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

FE 8 1 2 2013

L_
--------------=--:-'
AD81E MACE, CLERK
By:-------=--~::::-:--'"7"
Deputy Cierk

Attorney for Petitioners

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
vs
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR )
)
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision ofthe State ofldaho, RONALD
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)
)

Petitioners

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Fremont

Case No. CV-12-580
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOSSNER

j

)
)

)

Comes now Lynn Hossner, attorney for Petitioners, being first duly sworn, deposes as
follows:
1. I have had delivered to me a transcript of the hearings and proceedings in the above

entitled case.
2. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" are true and correct copies of the only
pages of the hearings which deal with the road under contention which commences at 1425 North
3125 East and travels one quarter of a mile north over the property of Petitioners, George Ty
Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow, then proceeds north a quarter of a mile over property belonging
to Petitioners, Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard and Clay
Pickard. After the road leaves the Flying "A" property on the north side, it travels one-half a
mile north over BLM property to property belonging to Flying "A" Ranch and continues on north
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until it reaches the U.S. Forest Service property. The road subject to Judicial Review in the
proceedings ofthe Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, which cross
Petitioners' land in Sections 8, 17 and 20, Township 9 North, Range 42 East, Boise Meridian as a
public road which were designated as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek
roads.
2. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the above entitled matter.
DATED this 12th day ofFebruary 2013.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Fremont

)
) ss.
)

Lynn Rossner, being first duly sworn, says that he is the attorney for petitioners in the
above entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof, and as to the
matters and things therein alleged, affiant believes the same to .pe true.
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of. February, 2013.
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Notary Public for Idaho'""
Residing at: Ashton, Idaho
Comm. Expires: 11/14117
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1

COMMISSIONER HURT: Imaaine that.

1

mentioned, keeo the access. Let's walk in, but keep

2

BOB RILEY: One thing abdeu boys, you don't

2

the right to g( are. I've seen it happen in
Jefferson Counl~Jlrclark County, Bonneville County,

3

have to make any mistakes, we made them all in Teton

3

4
5

Valley, so we --

4
5

Teton County and we've got a few of them in Fremont
do it.

THE CLERK: Name and address first.

County. We, the people, need to get in there. Let's

6

COMMISSIONER HURT: Name and address, Bob.

6

7

BOB RILEY: Bob Riley, 640 South 3rd East,

7

COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Questions for Bob?

8

MARLA VIK: Bob, is there any that we closed in

8

St. Anthony. When this first started up there, when

9

they first said we had to put the roads in, good old

9

10

Cobblewood and the boys got together and held a

10

11

meeting. Now, I didn't know about it so I didn't go

11

and look at it later. And what I'm saying is a

12

and they closed nine roads. They absolutely closed

12

general thing over a period of time that I've seen all

13

off the east side of Teton Valley. The other thing

13

this happen and it's wrong, it's just wrong.

this process because -BOB REILLY: I haven't looked. I'll come over

14

they did, they closed four of them to the river. You

14

15

can't get down to the Teton River. If we got an

15

MARLA VIK: Yeah.

16

access to the water, to the forest, let's keep it. We

16

was put in there in 1903. That was the only way you

17

need more of it. People need to get to it. What

17

could go to Badger Creek into the forest next to the

18

we've done, we've sold our land, we've blocked their

18

creek. They ended one over on Dry Ridge. I could run

BOB REILLY: Above my farm we had a road that

19

access, now what the hell do you do? There's no way.

19

through them, Marla. We just gave up something -- and

20

Any time you hit one of those (inaudible), the

20

once you give them up they don't come back. There's

21

answer's no. Let's keep it. I don't care whatever.

21

no way to get them back. I know that people look at

22

If it goes through the river, if it goes through a

22

today, let's look a little further down the road.

23

creek, if it goes to that forest, let's keep it.

23

The:-e's been some big mistakes made. Vandersloot

24

closed three of them down there. We're never going to

25

get them back. You can't drive up there now. There's

24
25

See, we don't have to have a maintained road.
You guys can say it's a trail. That's what they

13
1

no gate. It's a mess. I drove up there, I don't

14
1

have three pivots that cross that road. I have many,

2

know, this last fall, with a guy that showed them all.

2

many drunk fishermen that can see the reservoir is on

3

MARLA VIK: Is that that ranch (inaudible)?

3

the far end of that and when the pivots are crossing

4

BOB REILLY: Yeah. And by the way, probably

4

the road the only way around them is to drive out

5

through the Stone property, she's not going to object

5

through the field, which is usually soaked, and then

6

to that, but she's not going to have it forever. That

6

these fishermen come knock on my door in the middle of

7

road needs to be a County road. It is and it should

7

the night and want me to pull them back out. Someone

8

be. There's one of those access roads, if you ever

8

will find a dead fisherman some day.

9

lose them, they won't come back. They own 4,000 acres

9

Okay. There is one road that goes east from

10

sitting right there and they froze up and it ties in

10

there out through my field, there is one road that

11

with Fourth of July Creek. That's it.

11

goes north from that, and both of those I have -- the

12

COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Questions? Go

12

one road only has one pivot that crosses it. Neither

13

ahead, you can sit down. He's probably available

13

one of them are on a section line. This was addressed

14

after the hearing if you'd like to talk to him. Ty

14

at a County Commissioner hearing I'm guessing five

15

Nedrow.

15

years ago. John Hess was one of the Commissioners,

16

TY NEDROW: My name is Ty Nedrow. I live at

16

and at that time they were both supposed to have been

17

1401 North 3125 East, Ashton, Idaho. I am here about

17

taken off the map and they're still on the map listed

18

a couple of roads that got put on the map as County

18

as County roads and, as I say, there's always a drunk

19

roads, they're actually private roads. They lead to

19

fisherman that says I can go through there. I would

20

nowhere. I have on the one road, let me describe --

20

like them removed because they go nowhere but to

21

the description of the roads is 1425 North 3125 East

21

trouble.

22

is the corner of both these roads. Neither one of

22

23

these roads are on a section line or anything. The

23

24

one road going east on 3125 out to 3300 East goes out

24

TY NEDROW: That's another issue. People

25

through my field, is only a field service road. I

25

call -- the one going north, people call that the mail

COMMISSIONER HURT: Is that the road that I've
heard called the mail route?

15
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that pivot com~es over across that road.

1

route. I rode that country for mC)ny, many years with

1

2

my grandfather. His older brotl-rnished the

2

3
4
5

horses to the stagecoach to use, but that road was
from West Yellowstone. It was a shortcut. They

6

couldn't pull the hills going up through there with a

3
4
5
6

7

load on, nor was it safe to come down with passengers

7

on the stagecoach. Grandpa said that the only time
that they used that is if they was coming back from

8

over, but anyway.
COMMISSIONER HURT: On that northbound road,

never used unless it was an empty stage coming back

8

9

COMMis', .ER HURT: Okay.
TY NEDRO . And both those roads were put in
like that because the section lines are total swamps
back there on roadways, there's nowhere -- that's why
it jogs over a quarter and goes up and then comes back

9

when that turns off and goes off of your property,

the park empty and had a spare wheel. There are many

10

11

lava rock grates they went over and they broke more

11

does that go onto BLM property or-TY NEDROW: No, it goes onto Clint Ashley's

12

wheels. They usually couldn't even use that road

12
13

property.
COMMISSIONER HURT: Clint Ashley? Is there a
gate there?
TY NEDROW: There is a gate there. There's a

10

13

until August because of the swamp up there. They

14

called it Hound Creek back then, nowadays they call it

15

Snow Creek, but there's a crossing when you cross Snow

14
15

16

Creek that is just a swamp until about August they

16

gate at the road of my property, always has been, and

17

couldn't even use that road, so many people are

17

then there's one a quarter mile north before you go

18

misinformed saying that's the mail route. It was just

18

19

a shortcut for somebody that wanted to get to Idaho

19

into Clint Ashley's property.
COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Questions? No, no,

20

Falls in a hurry. That is the road going north. The

20

no, we'll call you up to talk to you. We have to do

21

one going to the east is not, but they both intersect

22
23

at that corner and, like I say, neither one of them
are on a section line. The one going north isn't even

21
22

it in order.
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Is it classified RS2477
or--

24
25

on a quarter line, it's 100 yards off of a quarter

23
24

25

going to have to find out.

line where it goes up through my field. That's why

COMMISSIONER HURT: Well, that's what we're

17
1

2
3

18

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: That's what my question
is, if it says it's 24 77 road.
TY NEDROW: What's a 2477 road?

1

property at all out there. It's only private

2

property. Like I say, I have right-of-ways from

3

(inaudible) crossing grandfathered in because they've

4
5

been crossing for a lot of years, they just-- it
can't get to the reservoir from this way.
COMMISSIONER HURT: We have a couple of roads
that are questionable about this RS2477 and we will

4
5
6

the County stepped up and claimed them as roads at

7

that time. Can you explain that a little bit better,

6
7

8
9

Marla?
MARLA VIK: Maybe Joyce can help me with this,

8
9

COMMISSIONER HURT: Those are roads that the
Forest Service was abandoning at one time, or BLM, and

becomes a real problem, though, to fishermen that

look into those and find out. Questions?
TY NEDROW: When would be the best time for me

10

but these were roads that were in place mostly over

10

11

public lands and people were trying to close them off

11

to check back with you and find out where we are at on

12

and there was legislation that said if people will

this?

13

come in and once the terms that they ascertain that

12
13

14

these roads were in existence over public lands at the

14

after this hearing to make a decision, and I can't say

15

time, and they have to do this before 1975, or the

15

now, but there may be a time -- we may have to collect

16

road had to be in existence before 1975 is my
understanding, somewhere in that time frame, and then

16

more information. We may have to have another public

17

18

someone had to ascertain. You can't take them away

18

hearing, I don't know.
TY NEDROW: The one road going to the east was

19

from the public, the Forest Service can't close them,

17

20

we can't close them, they have to remain available for

21

the public to go over. It's not like anything

22

current, yeah, it ended in '75 and so now (inaudible),

23
24

but someone did ascertain (inaudible).
TY NEDROW: We might deal with the one going

25

over-- the one going to the east, there's no public

COMMISSIONER HURT: Well, we've got 60 days

19

at whatever was said and decided by the County

20

Commissioners five years ago that this was on a

21

private road and it shouldn't be taken off. If we

22

have to, I guess we can go back to the minutes on that

23
24

deal, but anyway -COMMISSIONER HURT: Well, I've been here for

25

almost six, so it would have to be -- when John was

20

19
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1
2

here?
TY NEDROW: When John

~.as

one of the

1

County maintenance on it and the thing that was failed

2

to be mentiof . , that is it's a road that goes to

6

Weldon Reynolds was on the opposition on the other

7

side at that time. He was the road boss and trying to

3
4
5
6
7

8

make the County road and because it wasn't on a

8

open it no matter what the County Commissioners do.

9

section line they said that he couldn't make it a

9

It's been bulldozed since they started bulldozing

3

County Commissioners.

4

COMMISSIONER HURT: We'll look into that.

5

TY NEDROW: And it was basically -- I think

10

County road because it went nowhere.

10

COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Good. Thanks.

11

nowhere. It g61!!'through a quarter mile of our
property and a quarter mile of Mr. Ashley's and it
goes through a half a mile of BLM and then hits the
Forest Service and the Forest Service has had that
road closed for 25 years and I doubt they're going to

them.

11

So it would be a road to nowhere if you opened

12

that one, and the road going east through our farm,

12

Okay. Let's go back, Tuk's back there chomping at the

13

bit. Come on up, Tuk. Evidently Ty didn't do a good

13

it's just our farm and it's never had a piece of

14

enoughjob?

14

County equipment on it, and it goes nowhere. You

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

can't get to the river. You do not get river access

15
16

1404 Cedar Lane. He did okay. The road going east of

17

the line in question has never had a piece of County

18
19
20

equipment on it. It goes nowhere. People that look

TUK NEDROW: My name's Tuk Nedrow. I live at

at it, it does end up at the reservoir, they said
there's no access there anymore because that's been

21

turned into a private subdivision and there's very few

22

people that have access through the subdivision. The

23
24
25

public certainly will not, no matter happens to this
road.
And the road going north has never had any

(inaudible).
COMMISSIONER HURT: Thank you. Questions?
COMMISSIONER MILLER: Nope.
COMMISSIONER HURT: Thanks. Okay. Back to
this sheet. Lynn Shirley.
LYNN SHIRLEY: My name's Lynn Shirley, 396 West
Moody Road, Rexburg. Commissioners, I want to talk to
you about the Map 5 of 9 that has to do with a road, a
dry road that is a spur that goes down to Pine Creek
and Cold Springs.

21

22

1
2

14 months ago, we made a proposal to have a bridge

3

fixed that had been washed out down in the canyon in

4

the -- or a culvert fixed, it's been washed out down

5

in Pine Canyon and at that time the proposal's been to

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

When I came in to talk to these gentlemen about

be fixed as long as we had no problems with that being
a public road, which we didn't.

8

Now, talking tonight, I find out that it's been
changed from a County road to a private road and
apparently I want to relate some more information on
this road, and that is when that property was sold
Keith Robison made no inquiry that that was a private
road. That was a public road that we needed no deeded
right-of-way because that was a public road.
Now, when I was a kid we would see graders on
that road and back in the '50s they would grade all
the way through that through Pine Canyon all the way
over to Spring Creek and Snow Creek, but that's been
eliminated and recently they've just been going down
to the creek there at the bottom of the canyon. A few
years ago that washed out and the County came in and
adjusted the culvert. I think they replaced the
culvert with their loader and with their equipment
they replaced a washout and then they made some other
adjustments I believe. I'm not sure if this one is

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

locking or just this little locking, but they made it
so those trucks could make it easier to turn over that
culvert, and the County did that, and that's what I
want to emphasize is that the County has maintained
that road and that is a County road. Thank you.
COMMISSIONER HURT: Do you have-- go ahead.
COMMISSIONER MILLER: Lynn, is that road open
to the public beyond Pine Canyon across -- can the
public access that?
LYNN SHIRLEY: Well, see, what's happened is
the -- it's open down to our place, but you go past
our place over into the Wadsworth's and Willies', they
have closed that off. So we had to file for a private
right-of-way through that because of the problems that
they causes us.
COMMISSIONER MILLER: Is that accessible with a
vehicle from the east now?
LYNN SHIRLEY: It's not.
COMMISSIONER MILLER: I didn't think so.
LYNN SHIRLEY: Our access is (inaudible). We
use that east side mainly as just a (inaudible).
COMMISSIONER HURT: So your contention is that
road should remain public?

23
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LYNN SHIRLEY: Yes.
COMMISSIONER HURT: That runs in my mind,
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(BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COUNTY OF FREMONT, STATE OF IDAHO
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INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Fremont County Board of Commissioners as a requirement of Idaho Code 40202. Public information meetings were held on July 20, 2012, July 26, 2012 and July 31, 2012, in the cities of
Island Park, Ashton and St. Anthony, respectively. A public hearing was held on September 27, 2012 in St.
Anthony, Idaho. Notice of public hearing was given pursuant to law.
After due consideration of the testimony presented at the aforementioned public hearings and based upon
evidence presented, the Fremont County Board of Commissioners find as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The Fremont County Commissioners have jurisdiction of all county highways within the boundaries of
Fremont County. Idaho Code 40-202.

2.
3.

Fremont County is required to adopt a road map pursuant to Idaho Code 40-202.
Each year, Fremont County submits a road inventory map to the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD)
that shows any changes in road jurisdiction and type of road surface. The Idaho Transportation
Department {lTD) maintains archived copies of the road inventory maps, beginning with the 1961 map.

4.

The Fremont County clerk maintains a record of the Fremont County Board of Commissioners official
minutes, which contains official action taken by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to accept,
validate, abandon, or vacate county roads. Said documents have been maintained as required by law.

5.

The Fremont County Public Works Department undertook identifying the County maintained roads and
rights-of-way to be included on a County road map by researching the archived lTD inventory maps,
Forest Service and BLM road maps, Fremont County Road & Bridge records, official minutes of the
Fremont County Board of Commissioners, and all other available resources.

6.

Roads were identified as Fremont County roads based on the following criteria:
a.

The roads are routinely maintained by the Fremont County Road & Bridge Department.

b.

Documentation showed the roads have been maintained in the past by the Fremont County Road

c.

& Bridge Department.
Current or past employees of the Fremont County Road & Bridge Department testified that they
had performed authorized maintenance on the road.
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d.

The roads were identified on recorded plats of subdivision as having been dedicated to the

e.

public.
The roads were shown on government maps (such as Forest Service, BLM, State of Idaho) as

f.

being public roads.
The roads had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or
are the sole or essential connection to roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads.

7.

All identified County roads were presented at all three public information hearings and at the public
hearing. To enhance clarity, the identified County roads were presented on nine (9) maps that showed
nine (9) different areas of the County. This allowed for showing the roads at a larger scale than could be
shown on one map. These nine maps were also posted to the Fremont County website for public review.
The nine (9) maps were first posted on the website on or around July 17, 2012 and were dated July 17,
2012.

8.

Written comments were received at each of the public information meetings, i.e. the meetings held in
Island Park, Ashton and St. Anthony. Copies of these comments are presented in Exhibit "A" ofthis
document.

9.

Following the public information meetings, Fremont County Public Works staff reviewed the comments
for validity and applicability. The maps were adjusted to comply with comments that proved to be valid
and applicable. In particular, adjustments that were made included:
a. River Bend Lane from public to private access (in house correction) Sec 28 & 29 Twp 7 N Rge
b.

41 E
Cold Springs Road R.S.-2477 trail to private. Sec 13 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E

10. The maps that were adjusted following the public information meetings were the maps that were
presented to the public and to the Fremont County Commissioners at the public hearing that was held on
September 27, 2012 in the Fremont County Annex Building. These maps were dated August 20, 2012. At
the public hearing, the Fremont County Commissioners took oral and written testimony from all
interested persons on the area road map presented.
11. Minutes of the public hearing were taken and placed in the official minutes of the Fremont County Board
of Commissioners.
12. The Fremont County Commissioners acknowledge that citizens questioned the public status of certain
roads at the public hearing. These roads include the following locations:
a.

Cold Springs Rd Sec 13 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E

b.

Old Yellowstone Mail Route Sees 17 & 20 Twp 9 N Rge 42 E

c.

1425 N east off 3125 E Sec 20 Twp 9 N Rge 42 E

d.

Vernon Rd Sec 6 Twp 8 N Rge 42 E

e.
f.

2100 E north of 300 N Sec 15 & 16 Twp 7 N Rge 40 E
River Bend Ln Sec 28 & 29 Twp 7 N Rge 41 E (this was an error on our part and had already been
fixed)
FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and consistent with Idaho statues, rules, codes and requirements,
the Fremont County Board of Commissioners hereby makes the following conclusions of law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Idaho Code 40-202(6) required the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to publish a map showing
the general location of all rights-of-way under its jurisdiction.

2.

All notices of the public hearing were published in compliance with Idaho law including Idaho Code 40206.

3.

A public hearing was held concerning the adoption of the Official Road Map of Fremont County. At this
public hearing, due process was afforded to all interested persons. The minutes of said hearing and any
recording of said hearing are hereby made a part of the record.

4.

The Fremont County Board of County Commissioners reviewed all information and testimony presented
at the time of the public hearings and due process was allowed to all interested persons.

5.

After considering all of the testimony, information, prior maps, and other evidence presented at the
aforementioned public hearing, the Fremont County Board of Commissioners approved the map,
hereafter referred to as Exhibit "B", as presented at the public hearing that includes the following
adjustments:

6.

a.

Cold Springs Rd private to public Sec 13 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E

b.

Hightop Trl private to public Sec 35 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E

c.

1425 N going east off corner of 3125 E public to private Sec 20 Twp 9 N Rge 42 E

d.

Vernon Rd past Nedrow residence public to private Sec 6 Twp 8 N Rge 42 E

All accepted and dedicated public roads and rights-of-way in platted subdivisions as duly recorded in the
Fremont County Recorder's office are deemed to be part of the Official Fremont County Road Map.

7.

All roads identified in Exhibit "B" are determined by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to be
County roads, either paved, gravel or unimproved (dirt); and are not recorded in the Board of
Commissioners' official minutes as vacated or abandoned; and are routinely maintained by the County.
The foregoing is supported by substantial and competent evidence submitted at the public hearing and is
found to be in the public interest.

8.

Those roads identified in Exhibit "B" as being R.S.-2477 roads are determined by the Fremont County
Board of County Commissioners as having been asserted under Federal Law R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code
40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in official records in the Fremont County Public Works office.
The foregoing is supported by substantial and competent evidence submitted at the public hearing and is
found to be in the public interest.

9.

All roads found on the Official Fremont County Road Map constitutes public notice that evidence has
been presented to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners that the road may qualify as a public
FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
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right-of-way, but has no other legal effect. Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County Road Map
does not constitute validation or abandonment of any road.
10. Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County Road Map shall constitute sufficient authority for the
Fremont County Board of Commissioners to exercise authority and regulation as permitted by statute,
ordinance, or law.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Fremont County Board of Commissioners
hereby Order as follows:
1.

The approved road map listed as Exhibit "B", together with all roads in recorded subdivisions previously
accepted by the Board of Commissioners, and all roads asserted to be R.S.-2477, are hereby adopted as
the Official Fremont County Road Map.

2.

An Order shall be entered into the official Fremont County Board of Commissioners minutes that the
approved road map listed as Exhibit "B", together with all roads in recorded subdivisions previously
accepted by the Board of Commissioners, and all roads asserted to be R.S.-2477, has been adopted as the
Official Fremont County Road Map.

3.

That the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and this Order together with the approved
road map listed as Exhibit "B", hereinafter known as the Official Fremont County Road Map, shall be
recorded in the office of the Fremont County Recorder.

It is hereby Ordered this 2ih day of December, 2012.

FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Attest:

d\\6
Abbie Mace

Ae:

Jordon Stoddard, Commissioner

Fremont County Clerk
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho

Filed::.=======;--

FEB 1 4 2013

Attorneys for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C ,,. TY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. tV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

Petitioners,
vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
Respondents.
RC. GWAL1NEY, III and LANA K.
VARNEY,

Petitioners,
vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a

political subdivision ofthe state of Idaho,

Respondents.
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COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald '•Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
Motion to Strike Motion. This motion is made pursuant to fRuled 6(e)(2) and 7(bX3) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and is based upon the pleadings and papers filed in this matter and
should be granted for the reasons set forth below.

ARGUMENT
As this Court is aware, at the January 22, 2013 hearing, Fremont County Prosecutor Karl
Lewies, after being disqualified from representation in this matter, questioned the authority of
Fremont Cowtty to hire Mr. Hall and his law fll'Ill in the instant matter. Mr. Lewies represented
to the Comt that he believed his deputy prosecutor Billie Siddoway could take over
representation in this matter. On this discrete issue, the Court ordered that "[i]f Ms. Siddoway
wishes to assert the position that she should be permitted to represent Fremont Cowtty on these
matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing, she may file an appropriate
motion within 14 days." (Order on Motions, Filed February 1, 2013, nunc pro tunc January 22,
2013, p. 3, ,5).

On February 5, 2013, Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal

challenging this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (See Motion for Partial Dismissal, filed

with the Court on February 5, 2013). On February 6, 2013, deputy prosecutor Billie Siddoway
filed a Notice of Conflict of Interest regarding the Court's order for briefing on this issue.
On February 12, 2013, Mr. Lewies, who has already been disqualified in this matter,
along with a new deputy prosecutor RyanS. Dustin, served via mail a Motion for Extension of
Time and set a hearing for the morning of February 15, 2013, a day after the this parties receipt
of the motion. No courtesy copy of the motion was sent via facsimile and Respondents did not
actually receive the motion to until approximately 4:45p.m. of February 13. 2013. A notice of
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hearing was not actually faxed until approximately 4:07p.m. on February 13, 2013. (Hall Aff.,
Ex. A, B, and C). Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's untimely filings have put Respondents in the
precarious and prejudicial situation of having to respond to a motion that was not timely served
pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedwe.

Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin have failed to provide sufficient notice in violation of Rules
7(b)(3)(A) and 7(b)(3XE) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly provides that a
written motion and supporting materials must be received "no later than fourteen (14) days
before the time specified in the hearing.n Pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3)(E), Respondents' cannot even
provide a response to the Court in a timely fashion. Furthermore, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dustin
have not filed a motion to shorten time in this matter and there is no good cause articulated why
said motion must be heard on an expedited basis without adequate notice provided to
Respondents. Given the approximate ont?day notice, counsel is unable to address this issue with

their clients. This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that Counsel has other commitments,
responsibilities, and work assignments that prevent them from providing this Court with
meaningful and adequate response in opposition to the unnecessary filing by Mr. Lewies and Mr.
Dustin regarding the extension of time in a timely fashion. The instant motion is untimely and
the Court should strike said motion due to the severe prejudice born by the Respondents for the
filing.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing. Fremont County respectfu1ly requests that this Court enter an
order striking Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's Motion for Extension of Time as the motion is
untimely and failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 7(b)(3), Idaho Rules of

Civil Procedure.
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DATED this _d day of February. 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this __L£_ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below:
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
RyanS. Dustin, Esq.
22 West 1st North
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax (208)624-3404

[ ]
[ ]
_lk1
[ ]

Mailing
Hand Delivery
Fax

Overnight Mail

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208) 523-9518

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
lY1 Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109 N. 2Dd w.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax (208) 624-3783

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery

[>4 Fax

[ ] Overnight Mail
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Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER. P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484
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Attorney for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUI{ NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581
MOTION FOR ORDER
SHORTENING TIME

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a

political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
Respondents.

E.C. GWALTNEY, Ill and LANA K.
VARNEY.
Petitioners,

vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho,
Respondents.

MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME- 1
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COMES NOW the Respondents, by and through counsel of record, Nelson Hall Parry
Tucker, P .A., and hereby move the Court for an Order shortening the time period within which
the hearing required under Idaho Code§ 39-6306 must be held.
Notice is hereby given that the Respondents plan to appear through their attorneys to
provide argument and testimony.

Dated this

&

O

Lfday of February, 2013.

~ALL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this .../:t:__ day of February, 2013 by the method indicated below:

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 41h N. , Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440
Charles A. Homer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208) 523-9518
Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109N. zmt W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax (208) 624-3783

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery

[)d Fax

[ ] Overnight Mail

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
~Fax

[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery

pq

Fax

[ J Overnight Mail
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County of Fremont State of Idaho

Blake 0. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.

NELSON HALL PARRY TIJCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484

hied::.==============!-

LFEB 1 4 2013
AB31E MACE, CLERK

3y: --------:~'""7.'":"-:::::i":::i:
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING ..A" RANCH, INC .• an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK. NEDROW,
Petitioners,

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
Respondents.
E.C. GWALTNEY, III and LANA K.
VARNEY.
Petitioners,
vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho,

Respondents.
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STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bonneville )
BLAKE G. HALL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney of record for Respondents and I am familiar with the facts raised

in the above-referenced Petition. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testify in Court.
This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Courfs Docket in

Gwaltney v. Fremont County, Fremont Case No. CV-12-581, I obtained from the Idaho
Repository website on February 14,2013.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Court's Docket in

Flying A Ranch v. Fremont County, Fremont Case No. CV ~ 12-580, I obtained from the Idaho
Repository website on February 14,2013.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the Notice of Hearing

faxed to me on February 13,2013 at approximately 4:07p.m. bearing the facsimile time stamp.
5.

Despite filing the Motion for Extension of Time on February 12, 2013, Mr.

Lewies mailed the motion. Mr. Lewies' Motion for Extension of Time was received by my
office at approximately 4:45p.m. on February 13,2013.
6.

Under these circumstances, and due to prior obligations and the press of other

matters and responsibilities, COWlsel for Respondents cannot adequately and appropriately
respond to Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's Motion for Extension of Time prior to the hearing set
for February 15,2013,2013.
7.

Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin have unfairly prejudiced Respondents through the

Motion for Extension of Time by depriving Respondents the time required W1der the Idaho Rules
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of Civil Procedure to respond to the motion, and by serving the Motion for Extension of Time in
a manner that was likely to deprive Respondents of a full opportunity to respond to the Motion.

8.

Given prior commitments, obligations and work load, Respondents and their

counsel are unfairly prejudiced by Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's failure to comply with Rule
7(b)(3)(E) with respect to the Motion for Extension ofTime. This motion is particularly
prejudicial in light of the pending Motion for Partial Dismissal due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction previously filed in this matter and set for hearing on February 22,2013.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETII NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIB_~!a_AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, this ~y of February, 2013.

LESLIE GEORGESON
Notary Public

State of Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following

this -L!J_ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below:

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
RyanS. Dustin, Esq.
22 West 1st North
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax(208)624-3404

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
.[;)cl Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC

[ ]
[ ]
[?c]
[ ]

P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208) 523-9518

Mailing
Hand Delivery
Fax
Overnight Mail

Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109 N. 2nd W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax (208) 624-3783
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https://www.idcourts.uslrepository/caseNumberResults.do

Idaho Repository - Case Number Result Page

Case Number Result Page
Fremont
1 Cases Found.

E.

c. Gwaltney# ·eta I:,.-. Fremont County Boa~d tit. County Com..;"a.S.oners, etal.
Oth

~ase:CV-2012·0000581 District Flied: 11/23/2012 Subtype: Claler

Gregory

w.

Status: Pending
Moeller
Defendants: Premont County Board of County Commlaaloners Hurt, Ronald "skip" Miller,
ms

Leroy

Plilll'tlff5:Gwaltney,

Peh ndllng

earngs:

E. C. Vam.,-, Lana K.

Date/Time Judge

02/26/2013
Gregory
3 :30 PM

Judge:

Type of Hearing

w. Moeller

Hearing

Register Date
of
actions:

11/23/2012 New Case Flied • Other dalms
Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or cross
appeal or cross-petition from commission, board, o~ body to
11/23/2012 district court Paid by: Gwaltney, E. C. (plaintiff) Receipt
number: 0005964 Dated: 11/23/2012 Amount: $96.00
(Credit card) For: Gwaltney, E. c. (plaintiff)
Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Gwaltney, E. C.
11/23/2012 (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0005964 Dated: 11/23/2012
Amount: $3.00 {C11!1dlt card) For: Gwaltney, E. c. (plalntllf)
11/23/2012 Petition
11/23/2012 Plaintiff: Gwaltney, E. C. Notice Of Appearance Karl H. Lewles
Order Governing Procedure On Review-Filed In Chambers
1210512012
12·3·2012
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01/22/2013 02:30PM) Motion
0110212013
To Dtsq~o~allfy Counsel

01/07/2013 Motion To Withdraw
01/07/2013 Affldevlt Of Karl Lewles
01/07/2013 Motion To Disqualify Counsel
01/07/2013 Motion-Partial Mobon To Dismiss
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Blake G. Hall, Esq.

Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.

NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ldaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484
Attorney for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581

NOTICE OF HEARING

Petitioners,
vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
Respondents.

E.C. GWALTNEY, lli and LANA K.
VARNEY,
Petitioners,
vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
Respondents.
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 15"' day of February, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., of said
day. or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Courthouse, in Fremont County, Idaho,
RespondenC s Motion to Strike Motion for Extension of Time will be brought on for hearing
before the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller.
Dated this

/~ay of February, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

this

4

I hereby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
day of February, 2013 by the method indicated below:

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4m N. , Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440
Charles A. Homer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208) 523-9518
Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109N. 2"d W.
St. Anthony, 10 83445
Fax (208) 624-3783

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
(>l] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Mailing

[ ] Hand Delivery
[~Fax

[ ] Overnight Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FLYING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581

ORDER MODIFYING
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

E.C. GWALTNEY, III and
LANA K. VARNEY

)
)
)
)
)

___________________________)
Petitioners,

v.

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

____________________________)
This matter came before the Court for oral argument in Madison County, Idaho, on
February 15, 2013. The Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, through Karl H.
Lewies 1 and RyanS. Dustin, has moved the Court for an extension oftime to file a brief in this
matter from February 5, 2013 until February 25, 2013. The Fremont County Commissioners,

The Court reminds counsel that Mr. Lewies has been barred from any participation on this issue by virtue of the
Court's bench ruling of January 22, 2013. Mr. Lewies cannot now represent the County in a case he earlier filed
against the County. See Order on Motions (February 1, 2013).
1
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through Blake Hall, has objected to the motion, asked for an order shortening time, and moved to
strike.
The Court having been fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS AS
FOLLOWS:
1. The motion to shorten time for hearing the Board of Commissioners' objections and
motions to strike is GRANTED. However, the motion to strike is DENIED. While the Court is
mindful of the excusable neglect standard generally applicable to such matters, it still reserves
substantial discretion in modifying its own orders as long as it limits the prejudice to the nonmoving party. The Court has attempted to do that here.
2. Mr. Dustin's request for an extension until February 25 is DENIED. However, as a
courtesy to him given his recent entry into this complex matter, he will be allowed until
February 19,2013 at noon to file a brief concerning the issue of whether the Fremont County
Deputy Prosecutor can represent the Fremont County Board of Commissioners on these pending
matters. As a result, the Commissioners' deadline for filing a response is now extended to
February 25,2013, at 5:00p.m., the day before the scheduled hearing of this matter.
SO ORDERED this 15th day ofFebruary, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was this

_1Q_ day of February, 2013, sent via US mail to the following individuals:
Karl H. Lewies
Ryan S. Dustin
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
22 W. 15tN.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake Hall
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Lynn Hossner
109 North 2nd West
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

B~
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed::.=======•-

KARL H. LEWIES, ISBN: 4380
Prosecuting Attorney
RYANS. DUSTIN, ISBN: 8683
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
RICHARD R. FRIESS, ISBN: 7820
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
22 West 1st North
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-4418
Fax: (208) 624-3404

FEB 1 9 2013
ABBIE MACE, CLER~ ,..
By: -------:::--"""'l!IL~O~

Oepl,IW Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC, an Idaho
Corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
vs.

Petitioners,

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state
of Idaho,
Respondents.
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, and
LANA K. VARNEY,
vs.

Petitioners,

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state
of Idaho,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581
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OF MOTION TO REPRESENT
FREMONT COUNTY
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COMES NOW, Fremont County Prosecutor's Office, by and through Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, RyanS. Dustin, Esq., and submits this Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent
Fremont County in the instant petitions for judicial review.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
After winning the election for Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney, but before being
sworn into office, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., filed-on November 23, 2012-petitions for judicial
review of decisions the Fremont County Board of Commissioners made. Then-sitting Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney Blake G. Hall, Esq. became defense counsel. On January 7, 2012, Mr. Hall
filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr. Lewies as counsel for petitioners before Mr. Lewies was sworn
into office. On the same day, Mr. Lewies filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioners.
Relying on Idaho Code § 31-813, the Commissioners hired Mr. Hall in his private
capacity to continue as defense counsel after he ceased to act as Fremont County Deputy
Prosecutor.
DISCUSSION
Idaho Code § 31-813 states that the board of county commissioners has the power to
"direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county is a party in
interest, and employ counsel to conduct the same, with or without the prosecuting attorney, as
they may direct." ld. This statute was drafted and adopted before the Idaho Constitution was
adopted. See Amicus Brief, filed by Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association in Kline v. Power
County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, attached as "Exhibit A." At the time, Idaho operated under the

district attorney system whereby each district attorney covered several counties. Under that
system, it was foreseeable that the district attorney would be occupied in one county and
physically unavailable to act as legal counsel for another county in the district. With the adoption

2 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO REPRESENT FREMONT COUNTY
Page 144 of 408

of the Idaho Constitution, the legislature limited the authority of the board of commissioners to
hire outside counsel to situations only where doing so was necessary. Article XVIII, Section 6 of
the Idaho Constitution states that "county commissioners may employ counsel when necessary..
. ." In all other circumstances, the county prosecutor is to act as "legal adviser" to the board of
commissioners and "oppose all claims and accounts against the county when he deems them
unjust or illegal." I.C. § 31-2607.
In 1894, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the necessity standard, stating that, "The board
of county commissioners may, when the necessity exists, employ counsel, but that necessity
must be apparent, and the action of the board in each case is subject to review by the courts."

Meller v. Logan County Comm'rs, 4 Idaho 44, 53,35 P. 712,715 (1894). The Court further
explained the necessity standard two years later. In Conger v. Comm 'rs of Latah County, the
Court said the commissioners had authority to hire outside counsel "in matters within their
jurisdiction and control when necessary-for example, when the district attorney could not
perform such duties by reason of being absent, or when the board must decide upon some
question before them before they could have time to get the advice of the district attorney
thereon." 5 Idaho 347, 355, 48 P. 1064, 1066 (1897). Later that same year, the Idaho Legislature
abandoned the district attorney system in favor of the county prosecutor system, providing all
counties greater access to legal counsel, thereby raising the necessity standard. See Amicus Brief,
p. 9.

Attorneys in Idaho are bound by the rules adopted by the Board of Commissioners of the
Idaho State Bar under the supervision of the Idaho Supreme Court. I.C. § 3-408. Paragraph 11 of
the Commentary to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10 states: "where a lawyer represents
the government after having served clients in private practice, nongonvemmental employment or
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in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers
associated with the individually disqualified lawyer."
In this case, no conflict of interest existed at the time Karl Lewies filed the petitions for
judicial review. Though he had been elected county prosecutor before filing the petitions, he had
not yet assumed office. Nevertheless, he set himself on a collision course with his former clients
had he not withdrawn. Moreover, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, the conflict of
interest that would have arisen after he took office would not have been imputed to other
attorneys in his office. Therefore, a conflict of interest would not preclude the deputy prosecuting
attorney from defending the county in these petitions for judicial review.
In addition, while the Fremont County Board of Commissioners did not err in relying on
I.C. § 31-813, they apparently did not consider that the authority granted in that particular statute
was significantly curtailed by the Idaho Constitution and subsequent case law. Even so, the
Commissioners acted in good faith, believing that Mr. Lewies had a conflict of interest, which
was also imputed to his deputy.
The facts and circumstances of this case are rather unique in that the prosecutor-elect
represented petitioners against the county after the election but before taking office.
Nevertheless, Idaho law and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct place the representation of
the county in these petitions for judicial review in the Fremont County Prosecutor's office. The
Fremont County Prosecutor's office does not believe the facts of this case rise to the level of
necessity required by the Idaho Constitution. Furthermore, there was no conflict of interest
because Mr. Lewies withdrew as petitioners' counsel before taking office; nor was any apparent
conflict of interest imputed to the deputy prosecutor according to the rules of professional
conduct. However, in addition to the law and the rules of professional conduct, there are public
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policy and judicial. economy considerations. Upon further review of all aspects of the unique
facts peculiar to this particular situation and for the considerations stated, the Fremont County
Prosecutor's Office withdraws its motion to represent Fremont County in these petitions for
judicial review.
DATED this

_f1f! day of February, 2013.

By:

~~,Esq
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

this~

I hereby certify that on
day of February, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO REPRESENT
FREMONT COUNTY to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their
names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Id 83405
FAX: (208) 523-7254

[ ] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Facsimile

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioners
Idaho Falls, Id 83405
FAX: (208)523-9518

[ ] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Facsimile

Lynn Rossner, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners
109 N. 2nd W.
St. Anthony, Id 83445
FAX: (208) 624-3783
Honorable Gregory Moeller
159 E. Main St.
P.O. Box 389
Rexburg, Id 83440
FAX: (208) 356-5425

[ ] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Facsimile

[ ] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Facsimile
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,

POWER COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY, F. RANDALL KLINE,
Petitioner, Respondent,

v.

SUPREME COURT
DOCKET NO. 40112-2012

POWER BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS,
VICKI MEADOWS
RON FUNK
DELANE ANDERSON
Respondents, Appellants.

AMICUS BRIEF

HONORABLE DAVID C. NYE, District Judge, Presiding
F. RANDALL KLINE

M. JAY MEYERS, and

Power County Prosecuting
Attorney
543 Bannock Avenue
American Falls, Idaho 83211

THOMAS D. SMITH

Petitioner/Respondent

Co-Counsel for
Respondents/Appellants

Meyers Law Office, PLLC
P.O.Box474
Pocatello, Idaho 83205

DAN T. BLOCKSOM

Canyon County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
Civil Division
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Idaho Prosecuting Attorney's
Association
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The nature of this case is not in dispute. Petitioner/Respondent, F. Randall Kline
("Kline"), the Power County Prosecuting Attorney, filed two petitions seeking judicial review of
actions taken by the Respondents/Appellants, the Power County Board of Commissioners
(''PBOCC"). The petitions were filed in the Dis1rict Court of the Sixth Judicial Dis1rict of Power
County, the Honorable David C. Nye presiding.

IT. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The course of the proceedings is as accurately stated in the briefs filed by PBOCC and
Kline.

ID. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts as jointly articulated by both PBOCC and Kline are correct, but the following

brings attention to a few additional details.
Before Kline filled the vacancy as Prosecuting Attorney, Paul Laggis ("Laggis") served
as the elected Prosecuting Attorney. During his term, PBOCC got involved with the Gateway
West Project, a joint venture between Rocky Mountain Power and Idaho Power Company. (R.

Vol. ll, p. 186). According to the record, Laggis apparently had a potential conflict of interest
with this project, and so PBOCC employed outside counsel, Douglas J. Balfour, Chartered
(''Balfour'') for representation regarding this project. Id. The record reflects no other conflict of
interest regarding the other projects for which PBOCC hired Balfour.

ISSUE PR£SENTED ON APPEAL
1.

What constitutes adequate necessity to justify a board of county commissioners'

decision to hire outside counsel?

AMICUS BRIEF
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE LEVEL OF NECESSITY REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY HIRING
OUTSIDE COUSEL WELL EXCEEDS MERE CONVENIENCE OR
PERSONAL PREFERENCE.
A.

The relevant statutes on their face are ambiguous, and thus the Court
must look beyond the plain language.

When the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, the Court can consider more than
just the statute. "If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable

construction it is ambiguous." State v. Yzagui"e, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187
(2007); citing Carner v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655,
658 (2006). The Yzagui"e Court stated as follows:
An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it
to mean. [citations omitted]. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines

not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed
interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.

144 Idaho at 475, 163 P.3d at 1187. See also Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d
524, 526 (2009); Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398-99, 111 P.3d 73,
83-84 (2005); Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595
(2000).
Both the constitutional and statutory language at issue in this case are ambiguous, and
thus a proper decision requires a close look at the legislative history. The most ambiguous
language comes from Article XVITI, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, which states that
"[t]county commissioners may employ counsel when necessary...." [emphasis added], but does
not fwther define ''necessary." Furthermore, Idaho Code ("I.C.") § 31-2607 establishes the
prosecutor as the county commissioners' legal advisor as follows:

AMICUS BRIEF
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The prosecuting attorney is the legal adviser of the board of commissioners; he
must attend their meetings when required, and must attend and oppose all claims
and accounts against the county when he deems them unjust or illegal.
To add to the confusion, LC. § 31-813 states the following:
To direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county
is a party in interest, and employ counsel to conduct the same, with or without the
prosecuting attorney, as they may direct.
This statute does not mention anything about necessity, and seems to grant a board of county
commissioners (''BOCC") unchecked authority to hire outside counsel. Neither the constitution
nor the state statutes clarify the level of ''necessity'' required for BOCCs to justify hiring outside
counsel. This ambiguity therefore requires a look at the legislative history of the office of the
County Prosecutor.

B.

The legal history of the constitutional and statutory provisions
regarding county prosecuting attorneys demonstrates that BOCCs
must have a dire need to hire outside counseL

Enacted before the Idaho constitution convention, the statute which granted the BOCC
authority to hire outside counsel did not specify any necessity standard. The successor of
Revised Statute (''R.S.'') § 1759, I.C. § 31-813 as quoted above, grants commissioners the power
to employ counsel "[t]o direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the
county is a party in interest . . . with or without the prosecuting attorney ... " No other check
appeared to be in place.
The proceedings of the Idaho constitution convention in 1889 demonstrated that BOCCs
were to hire outside counsel only when not doing so would have catastrophic results. The 1889
convention resulted in a district attorney system with no county prosecutors. The delegates'
primary consideration in eliminating county prosecutors was cost cutting. Throughout the
convention, the delegates emphasized that "[t]he principle all through is to get the cheapest
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county government we can and be efficient ... " Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention of Idaho 1889, Hart ed. Vol. II, at 1809. In criticizing the proposed alternative
district attorney system, Delegate Beatty voiced the concern that the BOCCs would hire counsel
whenever they wanted to, and that the BOCCs might do so on a contingency fee basis, resulting
in attorney fees that would outweigh the cost of having county prosecutors. ld. at 1821, 1823-24.
Delegate Reid countered this argwnent, stating that BOCCs rarely needed legal help, and that
commissioners would be smart enough to hire affordable counsel. Id. at 1821-22. His opposition
to creating the office of county prosecutor was based on his fundamental stance of keeping down
government costs, and thus not creating any new offices. Id. at 1830.
The 1889 convention contemplated that BOCCs could hire outside counsel in dire
circumstances. The exchange between delegates regarding the circumstances under which
outside counsel would be justified was as follows:

Mr. Reid.... If the county has an important suit or has important legal business,
the commissioners ought to be allowed to go into the market and get the best legal
talent; and if they do not have the business they do not have to have to have [sic]
the counsel.
Mr. Beatty. Suppose an important murder case has to be prosecuted before the
committing magistrate?

Mr. Reid. There is the district attorney who is already paid by the state to do that.
Mr. Beatty. But he is off in some other county.
Mr. Reid.... I have seen this very system, and if it be necessary, the chairman of
the board is always on hand, and upon application to him, when he sees public
justice is about to fall, he can employ a man.
[emphasis added]. Id. at 1821. As demonstrated by their exchange, the delegates contemplated
commissioners hiring outside counsel either when the district attorney was physically
unavailable, or when public justice was about to fail. Delegate Reid further suggested that
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commissioners should be allowed to obtain the best legal talent for important legal matters. Id.
The resulting constitution did not provide any guidance for gauging necessity. The language did,
however, expressly prohibit commissioners from creating new county offices.
During its first legislative session in 1890-1891, the Idaho Legislature firmly established
the district attorney as the BOCC's lawyer. The Legislature amended R.S. § 2052, the
predecessor to I.C. § 31-2604, which set forth the duties of the district attorney, such as to
prosecute or defend all cases when a county of his district is an interested party, and to give
advice to the BOCC. See Conger v. Commissioners of Latah County, 5 Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064,
1065-66 (1896). The Legislature also amended R.S. § 2051, the predecessor to I.C. § 31-2603, so
as to set forth the procedure for appointing a substitute prosecutor when no district attorney
existed, or the district attorney was absent or had a conflict. See id at 1065.
Under the district attorney framework, the Idaho Supreme Court set the ''necessity''

standard rather high, perhaps to the level of an emergency. In 1894, the Idaho Supreme Court did
not allow commissioners to hire outside counsel without some showing of necessity. In Meller v.

Logan County Com 'rs, the Logan BOCC appointed and retained a legal advisor for itself. 4
Idaho 44, 35 P. 712, 713 (1894). In addition to entering a two year contract with the attorney, the
Logan BOCC delegated to the outside counsel duties typically performed by the district attorney
and attorney general. Id. at 713, 715. In making its ruling, the Meller Court considered the intent
of the makers of the constitution, and stated as follows:
While we recognize the right of the board of county commissioners, as expressed

in the constitution, ''to employ counsel when necessary," we do not assent to the
construction of that provision claimed by the plaintiff in error,-that it gives to the
boards unbridled license to establish a new office, and to devolve upon an officer
unknown to the constitution and the statutes the functions and duties which the
law has already affixed to another officer or office. The board of county
commissioners may, when the necessity exists, employ counsel, but that
necessity must be apparent, and the action of the board in each case is subject to
AMICUS BRIEF
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review by the courts. To hold otherwise would, as we have already stated, be to
leave the taxpayers of the state at the mercy of the boards of county
commissioners, without remedy.
[emphasis added]. Id at 715. The Court thus required that the BOCC face necessity before hiring
outside counsel, and affirmed the district court's findings that the BOCC's actions were
unauthorized, illegal, and void. Id. In ruling on the same facts but different issues on appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court in 1896 further elaborated in dicta on its view of necessity:
The evident purpose and intent, both of the constitution and the statutes, was
that the counties should be put to no expense on llCCOunt of attomey's services,
beyond that of district attomey, but having in view the fact that each district was
oomposed of several counties, an emergency might arise where the interests of
the county or the people might require other legal services than those of the
district attorney; and it was in anticipation of, or to meet, such a contingency, that
the provision above referred to was incorporated in the constitution.

We think that before the authority given to county commissioners by section 6,
art. 18, of the constitution can be exercised, the necessity which authorizes it must
not only be apparent, but the facts creating such necessity must be made a matter
of record by the board.
[emphasis added]. Hampton v. Logan County Com'rs, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324, 325-326 (1896).
The Court did not list either convenience or the district attorney's experience level as a primary
consideration for determining necessity.
In April 1896, the Idaho Supreme Court narrowed the authority that BOCCs had to hire

outside counsel. Conger v. Commissioners ofLatah County, 5 Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064 (1896). In

Conger, the Latah BOCC hired a private attorney to help the district attorney prosecute a crime,
and then later tried to pay the private attorney. At the time of the Conger decision, the language
ofthestatuteat subdivision 13, § 1759 oftheRevised Statutes, thepredecessorofi.C. § 31-813,
suggested that BOCCs had free rein to hire outside counsel whenever they wished:
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To direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county
is a party in interest, and employ counsel to conduct the same, with or without the
District Attorney, as they may direct.
This ''free-rein" statute, however, had been enacted before the adoption of the state constitution.
Article

xvm,

Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution imposed a new restriction on the BOCC's

authority to employ outside counsel, requiring that the outside counsel be ''necessary." The freerein statute also preceded the enactment of statutes regarding district attorneys during the
Legislature's first session starting in 1890. The Conger Court therefore ruled that the BOCC
could not employ counsel to assist the district attorney, even under the apparent grant of
authority in the previously enacted free-rein statute. The Court noted that the Legislature had
enacted this statute before Idaho adopted its state constitution and enacted the newer district
attorney statutes. Finding that the older free-rein statute clashed with the new statutes and
constitution, the Court reasoned that "[i]f there is a conflict, as suggested, the latest expression of
the legislative will must control." Id. at 1066. The grant of authority to hire outside counsel from
the previous statute, therefore, was now ''restricted to suits in which the county is a party in
interest" Id.
The Conger Court's examples of when outside counsel would be ''necessary'' were
limited to virtual emergencies. The Court envisioned situations in which the district attorney was
absent or the BOCC needed legal advice immediately:
The authority given by said section 6, art. 18, of the constitution, to the county
commissioners to employ counsel when necessary, was not intended to authorize
them to employ counsel in matters over which they had no jurisdiction or control,
but simply authorizes them to employ counsel in matters within their jurisdiction
and control when necessary,-for example, when the district lltto17JeY could not
perform such duties by reaon of being absent, or when the board must decide
upon some question before them before they could have time to get the a [sic]
advice ofthe district attomey thereon.
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ld. Again, Conger's examples do not suggest that the perceived ability and experience level of

the district attorney, or the BOCC's personal preference, constituted ''necessity."
The Court's decision in Ravenscraft v. Blaine BOCC did not provide much helpful
guidance in describing the "necessity" standard, because the reason for outside counsel in
Ravenscraft was essentially an emergency. 5 Idaho 178, 47 P. 942 (1897). In Ravenscraft, the

Blaine BOCC hired outside counsel ''for the purpose of determining the validity of the act
creating said Blaine county." Id. at 943. In the Ravenscraft case, taxpayers sued, claiming that
the BOCC had no jurisdiction to employ outside counsel because the record did not show
necessity, and the .attorney general and district attorney should have been relied on instead. Id. at
943-944. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that because ''the constitutionality of the act
creating Blaine county was to be litigated, and was litigated, in the highest court in the state,'' the
facts satisfied the necessity threshold. Id. at 944.
The burden of demonstrating the necessity for outside counsel does not necessarily fall
on the BOCC. In Anderson v. Shoshone County, the Shoshone BOCC hired outside counsel to
perform certain legal services. 6 Idaho 76, 53 P. 105 (1898). Instead of arguing a lack of
necessity for outside counsel, or excessive fees, the respondent merely argued that the BOCC
had ignored the district attorney by hiring the private attorney. Id. at 105-106. The district
attorney himself, however, did not make any objection to the hiring. Id. at 106. Noting the lack
of opposition from the district attorney, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the BOCC was

within its authority to hire outside counsel without consulting the district attorney, even though
doing so would have been "eminently proper..." I d.
On the legislative end, in 1897, the Idaho Legislature abandoned the district attorney
system,

and created the office of the county prosecutor. By amending Article V, Section 18, the
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Legislature created the county prosecutor system, instantly increasing the number of elected
attorneys available for county commissioners to consult.

1

Even after the county prosecutor system was established, however, the Idaho Supreme
Court continued to use the necessity standard from the district attorney line of cases. In Barnard

v. Young, the Power BOCC hired outside counsel to assist the county prosecutor in suits against
bondsman for not paying certain depository bonds owed to the County. 43 Idaho 382, 251 P.
1054 (1926). The BOCC hired the outside counsel with a retainer· and a twenty percent
contingency fee. Id. at 1054. In addition to contesting the contingency fee contract, taxpayers
contested the necessity for hiring outside counsel. Jd. Instead of going into detail as to the level
of necessity required, the Court simply concluded that the BOCC's meeting minutes and the
contract demonstrated the necessity as required under Hampton, Conger, and Ravenscraft, all
Idaho cases involving district attorneys.

In fact, the only change, if any, to the necessity standard after the implementation of the
office of the county prosecutor was a further heightening of that standard. When asked whether
county commissioners have the ability to retain outside civil counsel on a long-term or
continuous basis, the Idaho Attorney General ("AG'') centered its answer on the necessity
standard in Article XVITI, Section 6. Looking first to the definitions in the Webster dictionary
and Black's Law Dictionary, the AG concluded that ''mere convenience or personal preference
does not rise to the level of 'necessary' or 'necessity' in this context." 1993 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen.
91, fh. 3 (1993). Similar to the Barnard Court, the AG also relied on case law pre-dating the
switch to the county prosecutor system. The AG observed that the Idaho Supreme Court struck
down retention of private counsel when the contract was for two years at a fixed salary as in the
1

Per email from Kristin Ford on October 29, 2012 at the Idaho Legislative Services Office (''LSO'') the LSO does
not have record of the minutes or discussion that went into this enactment.
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Meller and Hampton case. Id. at 4. The AG further pointed out that the Court upheld retention of
private counsel in narrow factual circumstances, such as when the existence of the county was at
stake (the Ravenscraft case), when the taxpayer did not contest the necessity for outside counsel
(the Anderson case), and when the retention was ''for a specific legal problem and not on a
retained or continuous basis" (the Barnard case). Id. In the AG's mind, the increased availability
of attorneys heightened the ''necessity'' standard:
The district attorney system was ultimately abandoned by returning to the county
prosecutor format in 1897 by constitutional amendment. Since the framers
adopted the "necessity'' language of art. 18, sec 6, expressly with a five member
district attorney system in mind, it would appear that a board of county
commissioners would be held to a more exacting ''necessity'' standard since there
are now forty-four county prosecutors.
1993 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 91, fu. 3 (1993). The reversion to the county prosecutor format
therefore did not change anything about the necessity standard, except perhaps ratcheting it even
higher.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the entire legal history of this statute, the Court should construe the
''necessity'' standard as requiring a showing of one of two prongs. Specifically, the Court must
find either (1) the county prosecutor's lack of physical capacity to perform a required task, or (2)
the failure of public justice.

Prong One: The County Prosecutor's Lack ofPhysical Capacity to Perform a Required Task
The first prong, the county prosecutor's lack of physical capacity to perform a required

task, finds deep roots in this statute's legal history, and originates from the constitutional
convention itself. The delegates contemplated that county commissioners could hire outside
counsel if the district attorney were off in some other county. The Conger Court similarly
envisioned that outside legal counsel was appropriate when the district attorney was absent or the
AMICUS BRIEF
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commissioners needed legal advice immediately. Conger v. Commissioners of Latah County, 5
Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064, 1066 (1896). The lack of physical capacity required to justify hiring
outside counsel arguably increased after the transition to the county prosecutor system in 1897.

See 1993 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 91, fh. 3 (1993).
This lack of physical capacity is not to be confused with lack of experience or mental
capacity. Specifically, the legal history of this statute does not ever envision allowing county
commissioners to employ outside counsel because the county prosecutor was inexperienced. The
courts, the Legislature, and the constitutional convention only discuss absence and immediacy,
not ineptitude, as factors determining necessity for this prong.
Under this train of reasoning, the existence of a legitimate conflict of interest could
effectively render the county prosecutor "physically incapable" of working on certain projects on
the county's behalf. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 effectively prohibits county
prosecutors from representing their county if such representation involves a concunmt conflict
of interest When continuing to represent the county would violate a prosecutor's ethical
obligations, then that constitutes sufficient lack of physical capacity that would justify county
commissioners hiring outside counsel. Therefore, a written confirmation from the county
prosecutor to the county commissioners regarding a conflict of interest could reach the necessity
threshold.
Fundamental disagreement between the county prosecutor and the board of county
commissioners could also constitute a physical lack of capacity. Although county prosecutors are
the legal counsel for the board under I.C. § 31-813 and I.C. § 31-2607, county prosecutors are
also subject to the rules of professional conduct. According to comment 2 of Idaho Rule of
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Professional Conduct 1.2,2 if the client and lawyer have a fundamental disagreement, then the
lawyer may withdraw and/or the client may discharge the lawyer. Similarly, Idaho Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.16(b) lists reasons why a lawyer may withdraw from xepxesenting a
3

client, such as a fundamental disagreement or criminal conduct by the client. In addition to not
bringing frivolous claims, see Idaho Ru1es of Professional Conduct 3.1, lawyers are to give
candid advice to their clients, even if their clients should find such advice distasteful. Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct 2.1, Comment 1. Therefore, when the county prosecutor faces an

ethical dilemma in his representation of the board, or if the county prosecutor has a fundamental

2

Idaho Rule ofProfessional Conduct 1.2, Comment [2]
On occasion. however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the
client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to
the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical
matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be
inCUlTed and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the

matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate
the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be
resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should
also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement q such efforts
tl1'e JIIUI11tliling tmd the lawyer Juzs ll/urultunentlll disflf/1WIIttmt with the client, the lawyer mil)' witlulraw
from the representlltion. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by
discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3).
[emphasis added]
3

Idaho Rule ofProfessional Conduct 1.16(b)

Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is

criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(4) the client insists upon tllking tzetion thllt the lfiHI',J1el' considers repugtlllllt or with which the lllwyer hilS ll
.funtltmaenttll di.wlgreement;

{5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has
been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(6) the representation will result in an umeasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered
unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(1) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
[emphasis added]
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disagreement with the board, then this situation could also rise to the level of necessity required
to hire outside counsel.

Prong Two: The Failure ofPublic Justice
The second alternative prong - the failure of public justice - can also trace its
background to legal precedent and the original constitutional convention. The delegates
contemplated that the county commissioners could hire outside counsel if they saw that "public
justice [was] about to fail ..." Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of
Idaho 1889, Hart ed. Vol. ll, at 1820. Similarly, the Hampton Court anticipated that outside
counsel would be necessary when "an emergency might arise where the interests of the county or
the people might require other legal services than those of the district attorney... " Hampton v.

Logan County Com'rs, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324, 325-326 (1896). Accordingly, the Ravenscraft
Court allowed the hiring of outside counsel ''for the purpose of determining the validity of the act
creating said Blaine county." Ravenscroft v. Blaine BOCC, 5 Idaho 178, 47 P. 942, 943 (1897)
The Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association therefore respectfully requests that the
Court carefully weigh and consider the full legal history of the county prosecutor system when
rendering a decision in this matter. IPAA believes that the necessity standard previously
established by this Court has not been met in this case.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2012.

UT~

Dan T. Blocksom
Canyon County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
reply in support of an award of attorney's fees as follows:
ARGUMENT
When considering whether an attorney fee award is "reasonable" the Court should
examine the factors ofRule 54(e)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The factors of Rule
54(e)(3) include: time and labor; difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or contingent
fee; time limitations; amount and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with the client;
awards in similar cases; costs of automated research; and any other factors. See I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3); see also Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769,
86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004).
Mr. Lewies contends that the contract under which the parties operate should be
considered. Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(3), examination of the contract between the client and
attorney is not an enumerated factor. In this case, a statement of account was provided via the
affidavit of Blake G. Hall providing to the Court the hourly rate billed by Mr. Hall as well as the
billing entry for the work performed. While the Courts have considered the hourly rate, there is
no case law that supports the position that the contract should be reviewed. The contract
between Mr. Hall and the County does not identify a specified hourly rate for the services. The
rate of$225.00 per hour 1 is the standard and customary rate billed by Mr. Hall for his services.
This rate is reasonable considering his expertise and years of practice. The bottom line in an
award of attorney fees is reasonableness. See Sun Valley Potato Growers, 139 Idaho 761, 86
P.3d 475.
It is unreasonable to suggest that Mr. Hall, or any attorney in Idaho, should bill $20.13 per hour
for their work.
1
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In this case, the necessity for the filing of the motion arose not by any action of the
County but by Mr. Lewies actions that he understood would be a direct conflict of his
forthcoming role as the Fremont County Prosecutor. The County could not simply sit idly by
and hope that Mr. Lewies would file a withdrawal with the Court, especially where more than a
month and a half had elapsed from the date the Petition was filed. The County felt that the
motion was necessary to ensure its interests would be properly protected. 2
In light of the plain language of Rule 1.16, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct, the
County's decision to file the disqualification motion was even more apparent. Rule 1.16
addresses an attorney's obligation to decline or terminate representation in matters. Rule
1.16(a)( 1) specifically states that a lawyer shall not represent a client if "the representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." The commentary provides
further support for the warranted actions ofthe County in filing the motion to disqualify, "A
layer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently,
promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion." Mr. Lewies was aware of
his obligations to his clients and future clients in the County when he undertook a representation
in conflict of Rules 1.7, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct. (See generally Respondent's
Motion to Disqualify). Thus, Mr. Lewies intentional representation was in direct violation of an
ethical rule and Mr. Lewies should never have accepted the representation. By filing the Motion
to Disqualify, the County was not seeking to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost oflitigation." If any action caused unnecessary delay or needlessly increased
the cost of litigation, it was Mr. Lewies decision to appear in a case that could not be resolved

2

Mr. Lewies contention that he is a prevailing party is misplaced. The filing of a motion to withdraw accomplished
the same relief being requested by the Motion to Disqualify; namely, remove Mr. Lewies from any representation of
the parties in this matter. As noted, the representation by Mr. Lewies was improper and a direct violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
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prior to his taking office as the Fremont County Prosecutor. As this Court noted in its Order on
Motions, the Court " ... questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity he
had just recently been elected to represent .... " and further noted that," ... its strong
disagreement with Mr. Lewies actions in this matter .... " (See Order on Motions, pp. 2-3).
Ultimately, under the considerations ofRule 54(e)(3), the requested fees of$1,770.50 are
both warranted and reasonable. The fees charged by counsel for the County are in line with, or
lower, than the "prevailing charges" in Eastern Idaho. The time spent on the motion was not
excessive and it included a novel issue of disqualification based on a concurrent conflict of
interest. Mr. Hall is a well-respected and competent attorney that has nearly 35 years of
experience and an expertise in municipal law. When considering an award of attorneys' fees, the
contact between a client and attorney is irrelevant to the consideration. As such, the Court
should grant the request for attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Fremont County respectfully requests that this Court grant the
request for attorney's fees in the amount of$1,770.50.
DATED this

__L[ day of February, 2013.

i§f.~U
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[ ] Overnight Mail

L:\BGH\7525- Fremont County files\7525.17 Gwaltney\Pieadings\Defendant's\Strike Extension Motion (Mot).docx
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MINUTE ENTRY OF TWO FREMONT COUNTY CASES
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
CV-2012-580- FLYING A RANCH v. FREMON ~~~tPfKFremont State of Idaho
CV2012-581-GWALTNEY v. FREMONT C N rrts
FEBRUARY 15, 2013, 10:23 A.M

JUDGE MOELLER- PRESIDING
ALL PARTIES APPEARED BY PHONE
KARL LEWIES- REPRESENTS FREMONT COUNTY
RYANS DUSTIN- REPRESENTS FREMONT COUNTY
BLAKE HALL- REPESENTS FREMONT COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
LYNN HOSSNER- REPRESENTS FLYING A RANCH
GWALTNEY$ DID NOT APPEAR

FEB 2 1 2013
ABBIE MA

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME ON EXCUABLE NEGLECT
10:23 AM
INTRODUCTION OF CASE
GAWALTENEY- AN ATIORNEY HAS NOT APPEARED, BUT CHARLES HOMER MAY BE REPRESENTING
MS. BILLIE SIDDOWAY, THE DEPUTY PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO THE CASE, HAS BEEN DISCHARGED BY
MR. LEWIES AND RECENTLY REPLACED BY RYAN DUSTIN
MR. HOSSNER ASKED TO BE EXCUSED- FLYING A RANCH DOES NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THE
MATIER S,ET FOR TODAY- EXCUSED BY JUDGE M9ELLER
PARTIES ADVISED NO COURT REPORTER PRES~N(-WAIVED COURT REPORTER
RYAN DUSTIN- BEGINS ARGUMENT ON MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF
BLAKE HALL -INTERUPTS AND ARGUES HIS PENDING MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND TO SHORTEN TIME
JUDGE NOTES THAT HE INSTRUCTED THE COURT CLERK TO SET THIS FOR A HEARING ASAP IF THE
MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION WAS NOT STIPULATED TO BY COUNSEL
JUDGE QUESTIONS COUNSEL ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND ETHICAL RULE 1.7, NOTING THAT THE
PRIOR DEPUTY HAD CONCLUDED THERE WAS A CONFLICT
MR. DUSTIN EXLAINS WHY MS. SIDDOWAY FELT THERE WAS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST-SHE HAD
PREVIOUSLY MET WITH THE FREMONT COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
JUDGE ORDERS:
(1) THAT AS A PROFESSIONAL COURTESTY TO MR DUSTIN, HE WILL BE ALLOWED UNTIL TUESDAY,
FEBRUARY 19, 2013 AT NOON TO FILE THE PLEADINGS HE ALLOWED MS SIDDOWAY TO FILE. THE
EXTENSION IS GRANTED ON THE CONDITION THAT MR. DUSTIN AND MR. LEWIES CONTACT BAR
COUNSEL TO DISCUSS THE ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED IN THIS CASE.
(2) TO AVOID PREJUDICE TO THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, THE DEADLINE FOR MR. HALL'S RESPONSE
IS EXTENDED ~0 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2013, AT 5:00P.M. (THE DAY BEFORE THE HEARING).
KARL LEWIES INDICATES THAT THERE IS A PENDING CASE SIMILAR TO THIS IN POWER COUNTY

ooCU\JSNT
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THE COURT REMINDED COUNSEL THAT IT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT MR LEWIES CANNOT BE INVOLVED
IN THE MATTER BEYOND RESPONDING TO THE REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES. ANY PARTICIPATION
FROM THE FREMIONT COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE MUST BE THROUGH MR. DUSTIN.
JUDGE WANTS TO MAKE SURE THE ATTORNEYS DO NOT COMPROMISE THEMSELVES ETHICALLY AND
WISHES TO RESOLVE THE REPRESENTATION ISSUES QUICKLY SO THAT IT CAN ADDRESS THE MERITS.
ON FEBRUARY 26, THE COURT WILL COME UP WITH A RESOLUTION
MR HALL- RENEWS MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS FOR THE RECORD
THE COURT NOTES THE OBJECTION, BUT BELIEVES ITS ACTIONS HAVE NOT PREJUDICED THE COUNTY
BECAUSE IT EXTENDED THEIR DEADLINE AS WELL
COURT WILL PREPARE THE MINUTE ENTRY ON THIS MATTER
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County of Fremont State of ld
Filed:;======;---

FEB 2 6 2013
IN THE DISTRICT CO

THESTATE~~~~~~~~~J~

QJJ/2--6"80
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESIDING JUDGE:
DATE:
ATTORNEYS PRESENT:
COURT REPORTER:
CLERK:

259

302
303
305
308
310
313

LAW AND MOTION
GREGORY W. MOELLER
FEBRUARY 26,2013
DAVE MARLOW
DEBORAH MACE

FLYING A VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM.
GWALTNEY VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM
MR RYAN DUSTIN APPEARS ON BEHALF OF FREMONT CO
MR BLAKE HALL APPEARS ON BEHALF OF BOARD OF COMM.
ISSUES TODAY WOULD BE WHOM MR DUSTIN WOULD BE
REPRESENTING. SECOND ON ATTORNEY FEES REF TO MR
LEWIES.
THE COURT GOES OVER HISTORY OF THE CASE.
COMMENTS ON MR DUSTINS BRIEF.
MR BLAKE AND MR DUSTIN FEELS BRIEF SHOULD RESOLVE
ISSUE OF CONFLICT.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE
THE COURT HAS RECEIVED AFF OF FEES FROM MR BLAKE AND
OBJECTION OF MR LEWIES.
THE COURT WILL ALLOW MR HALL ON ARGUMENT.
MR HALL REFERS TO PAGE TWO OF DOCUMENT THE COURT
SUBMITTED.
THE COURT REFERS TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ITS ORDER.
MR HALL STATES HE HAS FILED MEMORANDUM OF FEES.
THE COURT INQUIRES OF MR LEWIES OBJECTION. COMMENTS
ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST. MR HALL STATES THE COURT IS NOT
LIMITED TO RULE.
MR LEWIES ON AGRUMENT. APPRECIATES THE COURTS DESIRE
TO GET THIS RIGHT. COMMENTS ON 12-117 IN IDAHO CODE.
THE COURT INQUIRES OF MR LEWIES REF FILING.
REFERS TO PARAGRAPH FOUR OF MR HALLS AFFD.
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344
345

352

•

I

MRHALLONREBUTTAL
THE COURT WILL TAKE THE MATTERS UNDER ADVISEMENT.
ASKS AS TO RECORD BEING COMPLETED ON THIS CASE.
MR HALL WILL SUPPLY THE COURT WITH RECORD.
MR HOMER HAS NEVER ENTERED AN APPEARANCE.
THE COURT WOULD LIKE CASES TO BE ON TRACK.
A NOTICE OF LODGING NEEDS TO BE SENT.
MR HALL COMMENTS ON TWO SEPARATE CASES. THE COURT HAS
NOT CONSOLIDATED AT THIS POINT.
GWALTNEY ARE NOT REPRESENTED AT THIS TIME.
THE COURT STATES A NOTICE OF LODGING NEEDS SENT TO ALL
PARTIES. MR HALL IS TO COMMUNICATE TO MR HOMER.
BRIEF WILL BE DUE IN 35 DAYS.
MR HALL WILL MAKE MR HOMER A WARE OF ISSUES.
THE COURT DOES NOT SHOW IN RECORD WHERE MR LEWIES
PROVIDE NOTICE. MR LEWIES HAS SENT CERT. LETTER.
THE COURT WILL TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT.
MR LEWIES HAS A FEW EXHIBITS.
MR LEWIES WILL OFFER AS AN AUTHORITY. PUBL OF AMERICAN
BAR ASSOC. ANNOTATED RULE 1.11
REPOSITORY RECORD.
THE COURT WILL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE.
THE COURT WILL TAKE BOTH FILES BACK TO REXBURG.
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho

Filed:r========i--

. . 13 2013
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTill( '1 OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT
~~TiBBIE MACE, CLEF-tK
y.

FLYING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.
E. C. GWALTNEY, III and
LANA K. VARNEY
Petitioners,
v.

'

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

0;~·:pu 1·y t.,._, (_'n<'

Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581

NOTICE OF LODGING

\

.,......
'

,--

~

.

.. \,

,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a record of the appealed proceedings in the
above-captioned matter and the court's record have been lodged with the District Court.
The parties in this matter have fourteen ( 14) days from the date on which this
notice is served in which to file with the District Court, in writing, any objections related

NOTICE OF LODGING

-1-
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to the contents of the transcript or record. Should there be no objections to the contents
ofthe transcript or record, the transcript and record shall be deemed settled at the
expiration of the aforementioned fourteen (14) day period, and the transcript and record
shall be filed within the District Court within fourteen (14) days of settlement of the
transcript and record. The briefing schedule will be as follows:

1.

Petitioner's brief shall be filed with this Court within 35 days of the date on
which notice that the transcript and record have been filed with this Court is
served;

2.

Respondents' brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's
brief;

3.

Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of
Respondents' brief.

4.

A courtesy copy of any pleading filed in this matter, including the briefs,
shall be lodged with the District Court for Madison County, Idaho, 134 E.
Main, Rexburg, Idaho 83440.

5.

When all the foregoing conditions have been complied with, Petitioner shall
schedule a hearing for oral argument in Fremont County on the next
convenient law and motion day following the expiration of the time limit for
Petitioner's reply brief. Notice of the hearing date shall be served upon this
Court and counsel for Respondents. In the event that no hearing is
scheduled, this Court will assume that the matter has been submitted for
resolution without oral argument.

So ordered.

NOTICE OF LODGING
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·Dated this

·-

f3~day of March, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON REVIEW was this IS-H'" day ofMarch, 2013, sent
via US mail to the following individuals:
Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109N. 2ndw.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. N.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Ryan Dustin.
Fremont County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
22 W. lstN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

NOTICE OF LODGING
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By:

DATED this

..-t1

('3

day of March, 2013.

NOTICE OF LODGING
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FILED IN CiL\\!aERS ,\T R;~X:1L'
MADISON COUi~TY, IDAHO.
Date.

Time
By

Mllcc.lo. ~ 4 . Q..O /3

~0~.~eo.
c.piAJ
o tcT1ol

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Nos. CV-1117-a& CV-12-581

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
RULE 11 SANCTIONS

____________________________)
E.C. GWALTNEY, III arid
LANA K. VARNEY

Petitioners,

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofidaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and
in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

___________________________)
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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 23, 2012, attorney Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") filed two separate petitions
seeking judicial review of decisions made by the Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
("the Commissioners" or ''the County"). 1 These petitions were filed on behalf of two separate
groups of petitioners:
A. Case No. CV -12-580 was filed on behalf of Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., an Idaho
Corporation, Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, George Ty
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow (collectively referred to as "Flying 'A"'); and
B. Case No. CV-12-581 was filed on behalf ofE.C. Gwaltney, III and Lana K.
2
V amey (collectively referred to as "Gwaltney").
At the time of filing, Lewies was the prosecutor-elect for Fremont County, having been duly
elected in the general election held November 6, 2012. Lewies had not yet taken office when he
filed the petitions; he was sworn-in on January 14, 2013. Lewies defeated the incumbent
Fremont County prosecutor in the primary election on May 15, 2012, and then ran unopposed in
the general election
On January 2, 2013, the County, through its then deputy prosecuting attorney, Blake Hall
("Hall"), set a hearing for a motion to disqualify Lewies from representing the Petitioners and the
County in these matters. On January 7, 2013, the County filed a motion to disqualify and
requested attorney fees. In response, Lewies filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
Petitioners later that same day. He filed an affidavit acknowledging "a conflict of interest will
arise in connection with my continued representation of Petitioners in this case."3 Lewies did not
withdraw his claim to represent the County on these matters.
On January 11, 2013, the County filed a substitution of counsel, advising the Court that
the County had retained Hall and his law firm, Nelson, Hall, Parry, & Tucker, P.A., to defend it
in the cases at issue here. On January 14, 2013, Lewies and Lynn Hossner ("Hossner")
1

The actions for which Petitioners seek judicial review took place on October 29, 2012. Petition for Judicial
8 (November 23. 2012) (CV-12-580); and Petition for Judicial Review,~ 8 (November 23, 2012) (CV-12581).
2
The Court notes that although both cases concern public roads designations made by Fremont County, the cases
have not been consolidated because the facts and issues are dissimilar. However, the issue presented to the Court in
this decision is identical in both cases.
3
Affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, p. 2 (January 7, 2013). The Court notes that at oral argument Lewies conceded that due
to his busy schedule, he had forgotten to withdraw until he received the County's motion.
Review,~
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4

stipulated to the substitution ofHossner for Lewies in representing Flying "A." No attorney has
yet made an appearance for Gwaltney.
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013 on Hall's motion to disqualify and
Lewies' motion to withdraw. The Court has previously summarized that hearing as follows:
The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had failed to withdraw voluntarily until the
County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also questioned the wisdom and
ethics of filing actions against an entity he had just recently been elected to
represent on behalf of clients he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed
the delay to an oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was
violated. He claimed that his clients were operating under time constraints due to
the statute of limitations. He agreed that he should no longer represent his former
clients or the County on these matters in the future.
Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Mr. Hall to file any motions or argue on
behalf of the County. Mr. Hall responded by noting that he was still an acting
deputy prosecutor for the County when he filed his motions and that he is now
acting under a contract with the County Commissioners. The Court noted that
Mr. Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County oflegal counsel in this
matter. Mr. Lewies asserted that his newly appointed deputy prosecutor, Billie
Siddoway, could take over his representation of the County in this matter. Mr.
Hall disagreed and asked for attorney fees incurred by the County in filing both
motions. 5
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court barred Lewies from representing either his
former clients (Petitioners) or his new client (the County) in this matter, thereby effectively
granting both the motion to disqualify and the motion to withdraw. The Court further concluded:
... the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in filing the motion
to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against Mr. Lewies personally, but not
against his clients, the Petitioners. Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with
appropriate supporting documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to
appear for purposes of contesting the attorney fees only. 6
The Court allowed Lewies' newly appointed deputy, Billie Siddoway ("Siddoway"), 14 days to
file a brief explaining why the Fremont County Prosecutor's Office should be allowed to
continue representing the County on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners'
choosing. 7

4

Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel (January 14, 2013).
Order on Motions to DisqualifY Counsel, Withdraw, and Dismiss Individual Respondents, p. 2 (February 1, 2013).
6
/d., p. 3.
7 !d.
5
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Following the hearing, Siddoway filed a Notice of Conflict of Interest on February 6,
2013. 8 She was "terminated" by Lewies four days later. Lewies then appointed Ryan Dustin
9

("Dustin") to serve as his new deputy prosecutor on February 11, 2013. At a hearing on
Lewies' motion for an extension of time for briefing, held February 15, 2013, the Court granted
the extension on the express condition that both Lewies and Dustin visit with counsel from the
Idaho State Bar ("bar counsel") about the ethical ramifications of Lewies conduct in these
matters. Shortly after visiting with bar counsel, Dustin filed notice with the Court that his office
was withdrawing from representation ofthe County on the two petitions. 10
The County filed a timely affidavit of attorney's fees and Lewies filed an objection. Oral
argument took place on February 26, 2013, after which the Court took the matter under
advisement.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An abuse of discretion standard is used in reviewing sanctions imposed pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l). Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P .2d 993, 1000 ( 1991) (citing Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 65 8, 660, 651 P .2d 923, 925
(1982)). The United States Supreme Court has explained that because the trial court is "familiar
with the issues and litigants, [it] is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the
pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11." Cooter &

Gel! v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).
Likewise, the decision to grant or to deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the
discretion of the trial court. Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct.App.
1991 ). All discretionary decisions require the Court to rightly perceive the issue as one of
discretion, act within the outer boundaries of the discretion allotted, and reach a decision through
the exercise of reason. Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824,
826 (Ct. App. 1987).

8

Notice of Conflict of Interest (February 6, 2013).
Affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, ~ 17 (February 12, 2013).
10
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County (February 19, 2013).

9
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III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court has the discretion to award sanctions for "misguided filings"
and "litigative misconduct" pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l).
At the conclusion of the January 22, 2013 hearing, the Court invited the County to submit
an affidavit setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in seeking Lewies'
disqualification. Although much of the oral argument and briefing has since focused on a
prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54(e) and I.C. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that
such an effort is misplaced. 11 The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for
which attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are not
reasons that will support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)." Sun Valley

Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 96,803 P.2d 993, 1002 (1991).
Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the
provisions ofRule 11 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(a)(l) provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of record of the state ofldaho,
in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated before the same
may be filed .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that
the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he intent of the rule is to grant courts the
power to impose sanctions for discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct."

Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 650, 115 P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). Rule 11
has been construed as "a management tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish
and deter specific frivolous and other misguided filings." Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937,
11

In the event I.R.C.P. 54(e) and I.C. § 12-121 were controlling, the Court notes that the record would support
findings that the County was the prevailing party and that both petitions were brought and pursued unreasonably.
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940, 120 P.3d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). To properly impose Rule 11
sanctions, the Court must not base its decision on acts that are "part of the trial itself," but rather
it must only consider "the attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers."

Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995).
Given the totality of the circumstances present in this matter, and for the reasons set forth
below, the Court concludes that Lewies' filing of these petitions was clearly misguided and his
failure to immediately withdraw as counsel for both parties amounted to litigative misconduct.
While such a conclusion logically gives rise to ethical concerns under the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct ("IRPC"), such matters are not questions typically answered by this
court. 12 Rather, the Court must review this matter pursuant to its "court management" role and
act using its inherent discretion to ensure that the adjudication of this matter is fair to all sides.
When considering a motion to disqualify counsel, "[t]he goal of the court should be to shape a
remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process."

Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692,697, 819 P.2d 110, 115 (Ct. App. 1991).
B. The circumstances presented by these cases justify imposition of
sanctions under Rule ll(a)(l).

The Court is mindful of its dual role in protecting the integrity of the judicial process and
policing litigative misconduct. This is why Rule 11 allows a court to impose sanctions against
an attorney or parties on the motion of a party or sua sponte. Although discretionary, the Court
is mindful that "[t]he power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing
on discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the overall course of a
lawsuit." Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 23, 773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct. App. 1989).
In the cases at bar, Lewies filed two petitions for judicial review against Fremont County
just 17 days after winning the general election. Inasmuch as he ran unopposed in the general, he
had essentially known since May 2012 that he would be representing the County in January
2013. The Court understands Lewies' contention that since he had not yet been sworn-in, no
See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.7 through 1.11. The Court urged Lewies to visit with bar
counsel about the ethical issues raised by having his deputy represent the County in an action that was initiated by
Lewies against the County. Shortly after doing so, Dustin filed notice that he and Lewies would acquiesce and
allow the County to seek independent outside counsel to represent them on this matter. In so doing, the Court notes
that Dustin and Lewies did not concede they were ethically obligated to take such action, but were doing so for
"public policy and judicial economy considerations." Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont
County, p. 5.
12
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actual conflict of interest existed. However, even ifLewies' actions did not amount to an ethical
violation under the IRPC, that is not controlling on the Court's analysis. The Court must still
consider the questions of whether Lewies' actions adversely affected the integrity of the judicial
process and/or constituted the type of litigative misconduct governed by Rule 11.
The Court finds that regardless of the ethical ramifications, Lewies' filing of the petitions
against a known, future client was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial
system. Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as
County prosecutor would not be filing new legal actions against the County on behalf of private
individuals. Similarly, the Commissioners had every reason to be concerned when they were
sued in both their official and personal capacities by the incoming county attorney. By so doing,
Lewies initiated a chain of events that any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would
create mistrust and animosity from everyone involved-greatly undermining public confidence
in the outcome of both cases.
It is simply unfathomable to the Court how Lewies could have failed to understand that

his actions would almost immediately deprive Petitioners of legal counsel since he would have to
immediately withdraw before he was sworn-in. Likewise, Lewies should have anticipated that
his actions would deprive his future clients, the County and the Board of Commissioners, of
representation since they would be understandably uncomfortable having Lewies or his deputies
defend them in legal matters he initiated against them. Therefore, the Court concludes that
Lewies' decision to sign and file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected the
integrity of the judicial process. The Court notes that with the application of wisdom and
common sense, one could have reasonably predicted that such conduct would meet with the stem
disapproval of Mr. Lewies' future clients, the County and Commissioners, as well as the Court,
whose duty it is to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.
The Court also finds that the timing of Lewies' filing of the petitions, coupled with his
subsequent delay in withdrawing as counsel for Petitioners and the County, constitutes the type
oflitigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectify. Here, Lewies' actions have directly
delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review because the Court has been required to
spend over two months dealing with issues related to representation, rather than hearing the
merits of the petitions. Although Lewies eventually withdrew as counsel for Petitioners before
he was sworn-in, it was only in response the County's motion to disqualify him. Even then, he
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: SANCTIONS - Page 7
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only withdrew as counsel for Petitioners-he initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the
County. Lewies later fired his first deputy, Siddoway, after she filed a notice of conflict with the
Court. 13 Lewies only changed his mind after he discussed the matter with bar counsel at the
urging of the Court. Although Flying "A" has now obtained new counsel, Gwaltney is still
unrepresented. While this appears to be a case of first impression, based upon the undisputed
record before it, the Court must conclude that Lewies should be subject to Rule 11(a)(l)
sanctions for failing to exercise "reasonableness under the circumstances ... before signing and
filing the [petitions]." Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995).
Although contested by Lewies, the Court deems appropriate the decision by the County
to retain Hall, its former civil deputy, to defend it in these cases Lewies' contentions that the
County's hiring of Hall and subsequent response to this matter were motivated by an "improper
purpose" are irrelevant. 14 Despite any animosity between Lewies and the current County
Commissioners, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the County to remind him of
his legal and ethical duties before filing the motion for disqualification. Lewies also contends
the County's motion was premature, since he had not been sworn-in and, therefore, an actual
conflict did not yet exist. Of course, this ignores the fact that he had not withdrawn as counsel
for the County prior to the hearing. Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "a
motion to disqualify opposing counsel should be filed at the onset of the litigation, ... once the
facts upon which the motion is based have become known." Crown v. Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128
Idaho 114, 122-23, 910 P.2d 786, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1996). By acting when it did, one week
before Lewies was sworn-in; the County may have actually prevented Lewies from suffering the
ethical consequences of failing to withdraw sooner.
Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that he would unable to see
either case through to completion -this is undisputed. Even if the Petitioners were acting under
time constraints, that does not justify Lewies acting in an ethically questionable manner. From

13

Notice of Conflict of Interest, p. 2.
Affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, ~ 10 (January 31, 2013). The Court disagrees with Lewies' account ofthe
conversation that took place after the hearing on January 22, 2013, because he appears to imply the Court was
critical of the County Commissioners and Hall. While the Court acknowledges that it briefly met with Lewies in
chambers following the January 22, 2013 hearing, the Court merely advised him to avoid allowing a political grudge
to interfere with his professional judgment. The merits of the cases were not discussed. The Court initiated this
conversation after consulting Idaho Code ofJudicial Conduct, Canon 3(D), which provides, in part: "Judges are
encouraged to bring instances of unprofessional conduct by judges or lawyers to their attention in order to provide
them opportunities to correct their errors without disciplinary proceedings; ..."
14
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the moment Lewies knew of his clients' legal claims against the County, he should have acted
promptly to assist them in obtaining new counsel to file the petitions. Instead, he filed the
petitions and set in motion a series of events that would not only result in an imminent conflict of
interest with Petitioners, but also a conflict of interest with the County. Any existing bad
feelings between Lewies and the Commissioners would only be escalated by such provocative
conduct. An objective view of the circumstances suggests that it was unreasonable and
misguided for Lewies to file an action against a known future client. Such conduct would
predictably create delay, additional fees, and lack of continuity of representation. In essence,
Lewies pursued the one course of action that would render him useless to both his current and
future clients.
As a result of Lewies' actions, over two months have been wasted sorting through the
issue of representation. Setting aside considerations of judicial economy, Lewies' failure to
timely withdraw from the case caused the County to incur attorney fees unnecessarily.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Lewies' actions in signing and filing the petitions and in
failing to promptly withdraw were "unreasonable," "misguided," and constitute the type of
"litigative misconduct" which entitles the County to an award of fees pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1).
Since Lewies' is solely responsible for the tactical and ethical choices made in this matter,
especially after he withdrew from representing the Petitioners, any fees assessed should be
awarded against him personally, not against Petitioners.
C. Reasonableness of the requested fees
Rule 11(a)(1) permits a court to impose, as a sanction against an attorney, the "reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." The County is seeking $1,777.50 in attorney fees for 7.9 hours of
work billed at $225 per hour. Of the 7.9 hours billed, approximately 4.4 hours were for the
drafting of the motion. An additional3.5 hours were billed for work performed on the day of the
hearing. 15 Normally, the amount of attorney's fees awarded should be that sum which the trial
court in its discretion determines to be reasonable. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho
266, 561 P .2d 1299 (1977). The Court notes that it should not blindly accept the amount of fees
claimed. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebreaker, 108 Idaho 704,706,701 P.2d 324,326
15

Affidavit of Attorney's Fees,~ 4 (January 30, 2013).
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(Ct.App. 1985). Therefore, the Court must independently review the reasonableness of the fees
requested in this matter.
The Court has previously concluded that it was both necessary and proper for the County
to ask Hall to file the motion for disqualification and retain him to represent it on the petitions.
The time he spent researching and drafting the motion appears reasonable, especially given what
Lewies' current deputy conceded was the ''unique" nature of the issue presented. 16 If once
Lewies had filed his motion to withdraw as counsel for Petitioners he had also agreed that the
prosecutor's office would not continue to represent the County on these cases, the Court would
have only granted fees for the 4.4 hours of research and drafting. However, due to Lewies'
insistence that the prosecutor's office should continue to represent the County in defending
against the two petitions, the motion had to be heard. Therefore, an award of fees for Hall's
appearance at the hearing and arguing on behalf of the motion is also an appropriate sanction.
Applying the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3), the Court finds and concludes that this
matter did require considerable time and labor. The issues presented required significant skill to
address, given the uniqueness of the issue. The "experience and ability of the attorneys" of Hall
in this "particular field of law" was high and necessary. The total hours billed appears to be
reasonable given the amount of work performed and the caliber of the representation.
At oral argument, Lewies argued without rebuttal that Hall offered his services to the
County at the rate of$150 per hour in a letter dated November 20, 2012. The County agreed to
retain him on those terms. 17 The Court finds that this is an appropriate and reasonable rate,
absent evidence that the County actually paid more than $150 for Hall's services. 18 This is well
within the range of ''the prevailing charges for like work" in Eastern Idaho and consistent with
the understanding reached between Hall and the County. In the exercise of its discretion, the
Court will reduce Hall's requested fee accordingly and concludes that a fee of$1,185.00 is an

16

Notice of Withdraw~/ of Motion to Represent Fremont County, p. 5
In the letter, Hall offered his fees to the County at the rate of $150 per hour. Acceptance of the offer by the
County was noted by the signatures of the County Commissioners (Ronald Hurt, LeRoy Miller, and Jordon
Stoddard) on the attached page. See Letter to Fremont County Board of Commissioners (November 20, 2012). The
County made no objection the Court's consideration of the letter and offered no rebuttal to the assertion that Hall
was actually paid no more than $150.00 per hour for his work on this matter.
18
At the hearing and in briefing, Lewies argued that as a salaried deputy Hall's fee amounted to only $20.13 per
hour. This questionable assertion is based on the unsubstantiated assumption that Hall, who was previously paid
$805.94 per week by the County, was actually working for 40 hours per week for the County.
17
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appropriate sanction under Rule 11 (a)( 1) and a reasonable amount of attorney fees under Rule
54(e)(3). 19

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court is mindful of the animosity that has attended these proceedings; however, it
remains hopeful that the resolution of this portion of the case will allow the parties to move
forward constructively on the merits of the pending matters. Although there were serious lapses
in judgment in how these matters were initiated, much wisdom was evident in the ultimate
decision by Lewies and Dustin to withdraw their efforts to represent the County in these two
matters. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby rules as follows:
A. Lewies' conduct in filing the petitions against the County, failing to
promptly withdraw as attorney for Petitioners, and initially refusing to allow Hall
to represent the County on these matters, was clearly misguided and amounted to
sanctionable misconduct under Rule 11(a)(l), as interpreted by the Idaho
appellate courts in Campbell and Lester; and
B. Fremont County's request for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART.
The County is hereby awarded $1,185.00 in attorney fees against Karl H. Lewies
personally, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(l) and Rule 54(e).

SO ORDERED this2j_ty of March, 2013.

19

7.9 hours@ $150/hour = $1,185.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM DECISION was this

:Tt4

2 4 -day of March, 2013, sent via US mail to the

following individuals:
Karl H. Lewies
Ryan Dustin
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
22 W. 1stN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. N.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109N. 2nd W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

By:

DATED this

111

2'1 -

day of March, 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, et a/,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioners,

v.

_BO.A@ OF fQJINTYS;QMMISS.JON_!::RS
1)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, eta/, )
)
)
Respondents.

Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581
FINAL JUDGMENT ON
RULE 11 SANCTIONS

-- - ------

)

E.C. GWALTNEY, III, eta/,

)

Petitioners,

)
)
')

v.

)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
)
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, eta/, )
)
Respondents.
)

_____________________________)

On March 29, 2013, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision re: Rule 11 Sanctions. The
issues determined by that ruling having been fully adjudicated, and good cause appearing therefore,

- I'lf IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGEDAND_OECREED thatR.espon,Qent F~ont
County is granted final judgment against attorney Karl H. Lewies, personally, in the amount~....,
$1,185.00.

_ ........~ n.

........ ·

SO ORDERED this 4th day of April, 2013.
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Court intended the certification provision to apply to nonparties, at least where all involvement with the suit has been
severed.") Although this is not a contempt proceeding, the Court believes the circumstances are analogous to those set
forth in Reeves. By not issuing a Rule 54(b) certificate, the Court avoids the potential delay Rule 54(b)(2) may impose.
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Since Lewies is not a party to this action, it is unnecessary for the ourt to issue a Rule 54(b) certificate. See In re
Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 578, 733 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[W]e do not believe that the Supreme
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT ON
RULE 11 SANCTIONS AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION was this 4th day of April, 2013, sent
via US mail to the following individuals:
Karl H. Lewies
Ryan Dustin
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
22 W. 1stN~.---~
St. Anthony, ID 83445

- - - -

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County
c/o County Clerk
151 W. N.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Lynn Rossner, Esq.
109N. 2nd W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

DATED~4"'CZ?~pril,2013 Ad_

B~d&z:>
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DISTR:CT SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho

Filed::.========:;--

Lynn Hossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State Bar No. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

MA,\ y

-

2

')(\1~)

,__

'"'

By:

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
vs
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR )
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD
)
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)

'
Petitioners

Case No. CV-12-580
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF
FINDING OF A PUBLIC ROAD

Comes now Lynn Hossner, attorney for Petitioners, and moves this court order vacation
of that certain order entered by Defendants in the above entitled matter which declared a road
crossing Petitioners' property as a public road.
This motion is based upon the file of the case, Petitioners' Brief which has been filed in
the case and the Affidavit of Lynn Hossner filed simultaneously herewith.
Petitioners seek their attorney fees and costs as prayed for in their original petition filed
herein.
Dated April29, 2013.
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lSTR:CT SEVEN COURT
ty of Fremont State of Idaho

Filed:~==========r--

Lynn Rossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State Bar No. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

MAY - 2

By:-------::-----:---::::-;--;Cern
:::;! jrk

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

,

Petitioners

)
)
)
)

)

)
)
)
vs
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR )
)
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD
)
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)
)
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Fremont

Case No. CV-12-580
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN ROSSNER
FOR DISMISSAL OF ORDER OF
PUBLIC ROAD

)
)
)

Comes now Lynn Rossner, attorney for Petitioners, being first duly sworn, deposes as
follows:

1. I was given a copy of the court's Order Governing Proceedings, dated February 12,
2012 on January 14, 2013. The Order gave Petitioners 35 days to file their brief and Respondent
28 days to respond to Petitioners' brief after service of notice. Shortly thereafter, I was given a
transcript of the proceedings before the Fremont County Commissioners in the case.
2. On February 12, 2013, I filed my Brief in Support of Petitioners' Motion to have the
road designation set aside. I filed a copy with the court and sent a copy to chambers and to Blake
Hall, Esq., attorney for the defendant.
3. On February 15, 2013, this court entered its Order Modifying Briefing Order. That
Order provided that Petitioner must file its brief within 35 days of the date the transcript was
Page 1 of 2
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filed with the court. I had already filed my brief to the Order should not have affected my filing.
4. The February 15, 2013 Order Modifying Briefing Order further provided that
Respondent's brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's brief.
5. I filed Petitioners' briefn February 12, 2013 so Respondent should have filed its
response briefby March 13, 2013.
6. The Order Modifying Briefing filed February 15, may have extended the time for
Respondent's brief by three days which would have required a Responsive briefby March 16,
2013.
7. If the full thirty-five days was to be computed from February 15, 2013, with an
additional 28 days for Respondent's brief, Respondent should have filed its brief by April 19,
2013.
DATED this 25th day of April2013.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Fremont

)
) ss.
)

Lynn Hossner, being first duly sworn, says that he is the attorney for petitioners in the
above entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof, and as to the
matters and things therein alleged, affiant believes th~~

,r

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of April 20.~1···
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Residing at: Ashton, Idaho
Comm. Expues:
.
11/ 14I 17

..··<:)~~~
~

u·;- "••••••••

~ ~1"E 0~ \ ~~

"'' ' '11111111,,,,,,,,. .

Page 2 of 2

Page 196 of 408

•

•

Lynn Rossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State BarNo. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

By:

DISTRICT SEVEN COL'f"H
unty of Fremont State of Idaho
1/ed:
-

~~~
-----;::::---ABBIE MACE, CLERK

[:t:}pt:~y C~L=:i!\

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

,

Petitioners

)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV-12-580
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
vs
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR )
)
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD
)
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)
)
Defendants.

I hereby certify that on April 29th, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of Petitioners'
Motion for Dismissal and Affidavit of Lynn Rossner to:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001
Facsimile (208) 523-7254
Honorable Greg Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Facsimile (208) 356-5425
METHOD OF SERVICE:

[]Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [x] Facsimil~
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State ot Idaho

Flied:..::============;--

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 4380
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

MAY - 2

2013]

"A851~cE, -cL:::t~K
By:
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Real Party in Interest- Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY,EMMAATCHLEY,LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581

)

)
)

vs.

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY
)
MILLER, in his official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

)

E.C. GWALTNEY, III and
LANA K. VARNEY,
Petitioners,
vs.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
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BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP"
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, in his official capacity,
Respondents.

TO:

THE

ABOVE

NAMED

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENTS,

BOARD

OF

COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY ("County"), RONALD "SKIP" HURT, AND
LEROY MILLER, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ., AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named appellant, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., appeals the above-named respondents to

the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment on Rule 11 Sanctions, entered in the
above-entitled action on the day of April4, 2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described
in paragraph 1, above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), Idaho
Appellate Rules.
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues.
a. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV -12580 violated the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)?
b. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV -12581 violated the signature certification requirements of I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l )?
c. Whether the court erred by first awarding attorney's fees to the County based on the
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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prevailing party standard, and subsequently without notice to the parties or
opportunity to object, changing its award of attorney fees into I.R.C.P. sanctions
imposed on appellant, sua sponte?
d. Whether the Court abused its discretion by imposing I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) sanctions
against appellant based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than on the
signing of the petitions for judicial review:
1.

Because appellant filed petitions for judicial review against a "known future
client;"

11. Because appellant did not realize that the "Fremont County voters were
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor
(i.e. appellant) would not be filing new legal actions against the County;"

111. Because, by filing the petitions, appellant "initiated a chain of events that
any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and
animosity from everyone involved; "

iv. Because of appellant's "timing" relative to filing the petitions;
v. Because appellant "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for petitioners;
vi. Because appellant "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents;
v11. Because appellant "failed to understand that his actions would almost
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel;"

viii. Because "appellant should have anticipated that his actions would deprive
his fUture clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of
representation;" and
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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ix. Because the court found appellant's actions "unseemly?"
e. Whether the Court erred in finding that the appellant "had not withdrawn as counsel
for the County, " insofar as appellant at no time represented the County in either CV-

12-580 or CV-12-581?
f.

Whether the court erred in finding that appellant's actions "delayed adjudication of
the petitions for judicial review? "

g. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate " for the County to have
retained private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers
CV-12-580 and CV-12-581, even though the legal question whether the County's
hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho Constitution's "necessity
requirement" had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the
Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the court for its
decision?
h. Whether the Court erred in finding that appellant was unable to "complete " his
representation of petitioners?
1.

Whether Judge Gregory Moeller demonstrated bias against appellant by engaging in
the following actions:
1.

By initiating an ex parte communication with appellant immediately
following the January 22, 2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting
appellant into chambers and proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide
what hill you want to die on." Then, further warning appellant, "This
conversation never happened; "

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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ii. After issuing warnings to appellant, as described above, then changing his
ruling awarding attorney's fees to the County based on the prevailing party
standard into I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) sanctions against appellant, sua sponte,
without notice or opportunity to object;
iii. By disregarding appellant's arguments and allegations of unethical conduct
and improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall,
Esq.; and
iv. By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11
Sanctions against appellant thereby causing damage to appellant's
professional reputation?
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
5. Requested transcripts.
a. A reporter's transcript is requested.
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript: in [ ]hard copy, [ ] electronic format, [X] both:
1.

The entire January 22, 2013 court hearing (motion to disqualify counsel and
motion to withdraw);

n. The entire February 26, 2013, court hearing (objection to attorney's fees);
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:
a. Regarding Case No. CV-12-580:
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

Page 202 of 408

ii. Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel, filed 1-14-2013;
iii. Notice of Appearance Lynn Rossner, Esq., filed 1-14-2013;
tv. Answer to Partial Motion to Dismiss; filed 1-22-2013;
v. Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition for Review, filed 2-122013;
v1. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-192013; and
vii. Notice ofLodging, filed 3-13-2013.
b. Regarding Case No. CV-12-581:
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012;
ii. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-192013; and
iii. Notice ofLodging, filed 3-13-2013.
7. Civil Cases Only.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
a. Exhibits A and B, attached to the Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition
for Review, filed 2-12-2013;
b. Fremont County Official Road Map (2012); and
c. Letter from Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, to Fremont County Board of County Commissioners, dated November 20,
2012, and offered as an exhibit during the court hearing held on 2-26-2013.
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8. I certify:
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set out below:
1.

Name and address: David Marlow, P.O. Box 1671, Idaho Falls, ID 83403;
telephone (208) 317-3400.

b. That the clerk of the district court has been advised that appellant and the reporter,
David Marlow, have agreed that the fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript
will be paid once the transcripts are prepared.
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served under Rule 20,
I.A.R.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Real Party in Interest - Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 2nd day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names
either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand
delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Lynn Rossner, Esq.
ATTORNEY ATLAW
109N. 2ND W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Gregory Moeller, District Judge
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE
151 W. 1stN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
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Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484
Attorney for Respondents

MAY - 8 2013
By:

AS'i:3iE'iv1ACE, CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

I

!Case No. CV-12-580

!

!

iRESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO

!MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
!
!
i

i!

vs.

!

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS i
!
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
!
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
!
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
Opposition to Motion for Dismissal as follows:

SCANNED
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INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss based on alleged non-compliance with
the modified filing dates provided by the Court in its Notice of Lodging. On March 13, 2013,
the Court issued a Notice of Lodging, which identified the relevant dates for responsive briefing
in this matter. Specifically, the Court's relevant dates were based on a relevant date of April 10,
2013, which would have been the date wherein the transcript and record would have been
deemed settled with the Court. From that date, the briefing schedule was calculated. It was
Respondents' belief that the Petitioner would be filing a modified or augmented brief with the
Court once the record had been settled. The date by which the Petitioner's brief would have
been due is May 15, 2013. The Respondents' brief would have been due 28 days following
service of the Petitioner's brief.
In this case, given the belief that Petitioners' would file a supplemental brief or statement
notifying the parties that it's brief had been filed, Respondent's believed that the relevant
response date would be 28 days after service or June 12, 2013 at the latest. Nevertheless, filed
concurrently with the instant opposition is Respondents' brief addressing the substantive issues
raised before the Court. It is well established that the Court should decide a matter on the merits
and not on a technicality.

While Respondents do not believe they have violated the dates

identified in the Notice of Lodging, considering the Respondents' Brief is filed concurrently
herewith, there is no prejudice to the Petitioners and the Court should consider and decide this
matter on the merits.
ARGUMENT
It is well established under Idaho law that whenever possible, a ruling on the merits of an

appeal should be rendered. Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978). "[P]rocedural
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regulations should not be so applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of
causes upon their substantial merits without delay or prejudice." Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117,
121, 247 P.2d 469, 471 (1952). Idaho's rules of civil procedure are to "be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P.
1(a). With respect to appeals to the district court, Rule 83(x) provides "these rules shall be
construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all appeals."
In Bunn v. Bunn, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a district court's dismissal of
an appeal from the magistrate division. The dismissal had been entered because of lack of
diligent prosecution when the appellant failed to timely file a transcript of the magistrate's
proceedings. Determining that the district court abused its discretion, the Court stated:
A "determination" of an action within the meaning of [I.R.C.P.] 1
is meant to be a determination of the controversy on the meritsnot a termination on a procedural technicality which serves
litigants not at all. A determination entails a finding of the facts
and an application of the law in order to resolve the legal rights of
the litigants who hope to resolve their differences in the courts.
The "liberal construction" of the rules required by Rule 1, while it
cannot alter compliance which is mandatory and jurisdictional, will
ordinarily preclude dismissal of an appeal for that which is but
technical noncompliance. This will be especially so where no
prejudice is shown by any delay which may have been occasioned.
Rule 83(s), which governs appeals from magistrate court to district
court, does not require dismissal for failure of an appellant to
punctually take any of the required steps; specifically dismissal is
but a sanction, albeit the ultimate one, for failing to diligently
process an appeal. Judicial discretion, the exercise of which may
result in an appeal's dismissal, must be a sound judicial discretion.
Sound judicial discretion properly exercised will reflect the judicial
policy of this State developed over many years by case law, and
lying within the spirit of liberality mandated by Rule 1.
Id at 712, 587 P.2d at 1247 (emphasis in original). The Bunn court concluded that dismissal for

noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is discretionary, but "[s]ound judicial
discretion properly exercised will reflect the judicial policy of this State ...." Jd
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In the instant matter, Respondents attempted to calendar their responsive briefing
deadlines based on the Court's Notice of Lodging.

Specifically, the Notice stated that the

briefing schedule would commence fourteen days after the settlement of the record and transcript
which would have been April 10, 2013-because no objections to the content of the transcript or
record. From April 10, 2013, the Petitioners' brief was due 35 days following notice that the
transcript and record was lodged with the Court- or May 15, 2013. Respondents were never
informed that no supplemental briefing would be filed nor was a notice ever filed with the Court
that the brief previously filed with the Court would not be altered. Respondents were of the
belief that either a supplemented brief or a notice that the original brief was being adopted would
be provided to Respondents. Respondents could not have known that no supplementation would
be made to Petitioners brief. Without a formal notification that Petitioner's brief was deemed
filed, Respondents would not have commenced calculating their response date.
Based on the language of the Notice of Lodging, "Respondents' brief shall be filed within
28 days after service of Petitioner's brief .... " (Notice of Lodging, p. 2). Without Petitioner's
brief being served on Respondents' within the time period prescribed by the Notice of Lodging
or a notice stating that the previously filed brief would not be supplemented, Respondents had no
way of knowing that no supplementation would be made. The Notice of Lodging would suggest
that supplementation was permissible because the record had not been settled. It was not until
the instant motion was filed that Respondents understood that no supplementation to the
Petitioners' brief would be made. In an effort to comply with the briefing deadlines and avoid
further delay, Respondents' filed concurrently with the instant opposition their Respondents'
Brief. Respondents' brief addresses the substantive issues raised by the appeal and allows the
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Court to made a determination based on factual and substantive issues and not on a mere
technicality. See Bunn v. Bunn, supra.
In this case, there is no prejudice on Petitioner allowing Respondents to file their brief.
In fact, dismissal would be a harsh sanction. In this case, where Respondents believed that a
filing by Petitioner was required based on the plain language of the Notice of Lodging, there has
been no violation of the briefing schedule and the Court should accept the filed Respondents'
Brief and order that Petitioner file a reply brief within 21 days pursuant to the Notice of Lodging.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny Petitioner's
motion to dismiss and allow the instant appeal to proceed with the filing of a reply brief to the
Respondents' Brief within 21 days. Consistent with Idaho law, the Court should allow the
instant matter to be decided on the merits of the case and not on a technicality. Thus, the Court
should deny Petitioners' motion to dismiss.
DATED this

_I_ day ofMay, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _____:z_ day of May, 2013, by the method indicated below:
Lynn Rossner
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

JG]

Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

L:\BGH\7525 -Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pieadings\Defendant's\Dismiss (Opposition).docx
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Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484
Attorney for Respondents

C'"'

c:srF.:::-:,-;- SE'·'EN COURT
oi Fremont State of Idaho
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho,
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this
Opposition to Petition for Review as follows:
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INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a Petition for Judicial Review of the Fremont County Commissioners
adoption of Ordinance No. 2013.01, which adopted the Official Road Map of Fremont County,
Idaho.

The Ordinance is statutorily required and is designed to designate roads within the

County as public roads. The Commissioner's review of the Ordinance No. 2013.01 concerned
all of the roads on the map and their determination was not limited to a specific road. The instant
Petition for Review concerns a public road that commences at 1425 North 3125 East, in Fremont
County and travels one quarter of a mile north over the property of Petitioners, George Ty
Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow (referred to collectively as "Nedrows"). The same road also
proceeds north a quarter of a mile over property belonging to Petitioners Flying "A" Ranch, Inc.,
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Picard and Clay Picard (referred to collectively as "Flying
"A" Ranch"). Ultimately the road reaches U.S. Forest Service land to the south which is blocked
by a gate.
Consistent with Idaho law, the Fremont County Commissioners conducted public
hearings pursuant to authority to ensure the adopted map contained public roads. As required,
the Commissioners conducted a hearing pursuant to notice and ultimately determined that the
subject road was a public road. The findings of the Commissioners were consistent with the
finding that the road was public and their decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion. As such, the Court should uphold the decision of the Commissioners and find that
their determination that the northbound road in dispute is a public R.S. 2477 road and that such
determination was supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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ARGUMENT

A. The Board of County Commissioners Complied With Idaho Code § 40-202(1 ).
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 40-202, Fremont County has an obligation to publish a
map showing the general location of all highways and rights-of-ways within the County. Prior to
2013, Fremont County had not adopted an official map designating highways and public rightsof-way. A "highway" is defined as
[R]oads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or established for the
public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall
include necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways,
embankments, retaining walls, bridges, tunnels, grade separation
structures, roadside improvements, adjacent lands or interests
lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures,
works or fixtures incidental to the preservation or improvement of
the highways. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order
of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a
period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and
kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by
order of a board of commissioners, are highways.
I.C. 40-109(5). The definition of a highway is broad. When initially adopting the official
highway map, the County Commissions are required to "cause a map to be prepared showing the
general location of each highway and public right-of-way in their jurisdiction..." I.C. § 40202(1)(a). Once the map has been prepared, the Commissioners "shall cause notice to be given
of intention to adopt the map as the official map of that system, and shall specify the time and
place at which all interested persons may be heard." I.C. § 40-202(1)(a). Upon appropriate
public notice, the Commissioners are required to "adopt the map, with any changes or revisions
considered by them to be advisable in the public interest, as the official map of the respective

highway system." I.C. ~ 40-202(1)(b) (emphasis added).
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In the instant matter, the official road map at issue does not specifically address a single
road but was the initial adoption of the official map. Because the initial map was being prepared,
the requirements of Idaho Code § 40-202(1) apply. In this case, there is no dispute that a map
was prepared showing the general location of each highway and public right-of-way. Notice of a
public information meeting was disseminated to the public requesting their review of the map
and public comment. (R., p. 1). Three meeting dates were provided to the public to appear and
comment on the proposed map. (R., p. 1). Various individuals provided comments and concerns
about the map, which was considered by the Commissioners. (R., pp. 2-16). On August 20,
2012, the Fremont County Commission held a meeting allowing the public to comment on the
Road Highway map. (R., p. 17). There were some comments on the public nature of some roads
and changes to the map were made pursuant to a full Commission vote. (R., p. 18). The official
minutes also reflect that a public hearing on the Official County Highway Map would be held on
September 27, 2012. (R., p. 18). Notice of the public hearing was also provided. (R., pp. 2122). Multiple citizens appeared at the September 27, 2012 hearing and provided comment to the
Board of Commissioners. Approximately 15 citizens provided commentary at the hearing. (R.,
pp. 26-29). Written commentary was also received and read into the official record. (R., pp. 3051, 53 (pp. 46-51)).
In an October 15, 2012, County Commissioners work meeting, the public comments were
discussed and a determination was made regarding the status of the roads. During that meeting,
the Commissioners adopted some changes via a unanimous vote. (R., p. 58). Following public
hearing, the Commissioners voted to adopt Fremont County Ordinance 2013-01, the Official
Road Map for Fremont County, Idaho. Commissioner Miller and Hurt voted "yes" for the
Ordinance while Commissioner Stoddard voted "no."

(R., p. 64).

Ordinance 2013-01
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specifically stated that an official map of the County is required, that a map was prepared and
that the "Board of County Commissioners deems it to be in the best interest of Fremont County,
Idaho to adopt an Official Road Map for Fremont County, Idaho. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 40202, the County complied with each of the express requirements to adopt a formal road map.
Specifically, a map was prepared, public notice was provided, public commentary was heard and
considered and ultimately the Commissioners adopted the official map that was in the best
interest of the county. All of the requirements for adopting the official road map where met.
In this matter, the petition is not appropriate because the challenge is specific to a single
road and not the entire Official Road Map of Fremont County. The County Commissioners
action did not involve a specific road but rather was the initial adoption of the road map. And as
addressed above, they complied with the express statutory requirements of Idaho Code§ 40-202.
Thus, the Court should dismiss the Petition.
B. The Board Of County Commissioners' Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
Satisfied The Requirements Of Idaho Code § 40-208(7).
Despite clear compliance with the requirements of Idaho Code § 40-202, the
Commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are not:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial information on the whole record; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
I.C. § 40-208(7). Petitioner cannot identify any findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
that violate this standard.
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When adopting the official map of Fremont County, the Commissioners issued Finding
of Facts and Conclusions of Law Re: Official Road Map of Fremont County Idaho. (R., pp. 72-

75). The Commissioners address the statutory requirement for the map and the facts that support
their conclusions. Specifically, the Commissioners state that the Fremont County Public Works
Department identified the road and right-of-ways that were included on a County road map and
researched lTD inventory maps, Forest Service and BLM road maps. (R., p. 72, ~ 5). The Roads
that were deemed to be Fremont County roads satisfied the following criteria:
a. The roads are routinely maintained by the Fremont County Road &
Bridge Department.
b. Documentation showed the roads have been maintained in the past by
the Fremont County Road & Bridge Department.
c. Current or past employees of the Fremont County Road & Bridge
Department testified that they had performed authorized maintenance
on the road.
d. The roads were identified on recorded plats of subdivision as having
been dedicated to the public.
e. The roads were shown on government maps (such as Forest Service,
BLM, State of Idaho) as being public roads.
f. The roads had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and
Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or are the sole or essential
connection to roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads.
(R., pp. 72-73, ~ 6 (emphasis added)). The Commissioners adopted these facts and applied them
when making their Conclusions of Law.
It is important to recognize that the Commissioners did address Petitioners' comments at

the hearing during an October 15, 2012 work meeting. (SeeR., p. 59, CD recording: Discussion
commencing at 5:09 through 9:53). The Commissioners did consider the Nedrow's comments
and agreed that the East-West bound road should be closed.

There is no challenge to the

County's determination on this issue. Rather, the specific challenge is that the northbound road
should be closed. When the Commissioners specifically reviewed this stretch of road, it was
determined that the road was an R.S. 2477 road.

In specifically considering the road, the
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Commissioners reviewed an old Shell Oil map from approximately 1957 that identified the road
as the access to Federal BLM land.
from closing the road.

As an R.S. 2477 road, the Commissioners are prohibited

In their Conclusions of Law, when addressing the roads that were

identified as R. S. 24 77 roads, the Commissions concluded:
Those roads identified in Exhibit "B" as being R.S.-2477 roads are
determined by the Fremont County Board of County
Commissioners as having been asserted under Federal Law R.S.
2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified
in official roads in the Fremont County Public Works office. The
foregoing is supported by substantial and competent evidence
submitted at the public hearing and is found to be in the public
interest.
(R., p. 74,

~

8). Ultimately, the Commissioners decision of maintaining the disputed road as

open is supported by substantial and competent evidence.

The Commissioners specifically

declared that maintaining the road as open was in the public interest. Moreover, their decision of
maintaining the northbound road as open was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion
because there was a clear and articulated basis for maintaining the road as open. Where this
Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Board on questions of fact, the Court should
uphold the Board of County Commissioners' decision to declare the road in question as public
R.S. 2477 road. See Homestead Farms v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofTeton County, 141 Idaho 855, 858,
119 p .3d 630, 633 (2005).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents' respectfully request that the Court uphold its
decision to maintain the Old Yellowstone Mail Route and Snow Creek road as a public road.
Respondents specifically request that the Court find that the Commissioners complied with the
express requirements of Idaho Code § 40-202(1) in adopting an initial official map and that the
roads included on the Official Road Map of Fremont County Idaho are public roads and that
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there is substantial and competent evidence to support the inclusion of the roads, including the
road in question, as public roads in Fremont County, Idaho.
DATED this

L

day of May, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l)lereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _L_ day of May, 2013, by the method indicated below:
Lynn Hossner
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

~Mailing

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

F:\ 7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pieadings\Defendant's\Repondent Brief.docx
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Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone: (208) 522-3001
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484
Attorney for Respondents
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County of Fremont State of Idaho
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MAY - 8 2013
By:

ABSIE MACE,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
: ss.
)

Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record in the above-captioned matter for

Respondents. I am over the age of eighteen and am competent to testify. This affidavit is based
upon my personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated.
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2.

That on or about March 13, 2013, Respondents received the Court's Notice of

Lodging. That the relevant response dates were calendared.
3.

Based on the Court's order, where no objections to the content of the transcript or

record was made, that the record would be deemed settled on April 10, 2013. The briefing
schedule was provided from that date.
4.

Based on the Notice of Lodging, it was Respondents understanding that

Petitioner's brief was to be filed within 35 days of the date wherein the transcript and record
were filed with the Court- or May 15, 2013.
5.

Respondents believed that Petitioner would either file a supplemental brief with

the Court or would file a notice stating that the previously filed "Memorandum in Support of
Petitioners' Petition for Review," which was filed well in advance of the Notice of Lodging,
would not be supplemented. Respondents had no reason to believe that Petitioner would not
supplement their brief based on the new filing dates.
6.

It was not until April 30, 2013 that Respondents received any notification that

Petitioners had no intent to supplement their brief through the filing of the Motion to Dismiss.
Based on that notice, Respondents brief would be due 28 days later, or May 28, 2013.
7.

To avoid further delay in the resolution of this matter, Respondents have filed the

Respondents' Brief concurrently with the instant Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
\\

\\

\\
\\
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
State, this_ day of May, 2013.

No~
.J Ah

ziJ

Residing at:
~,
a~I06
My commission expires: _...t.,__/=2.~6/l._l_...lf
_ _ _ __
7

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
of May, 2013, by the method indicated below:

this~ day

Lynn Rossner
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

[~ailing

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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County of Fremont Sta.te ci l:;ailo
Filed: ~=========::=Ji__

Beck
From:
Sent:
To:

Subject:
Attachments:

supremecourtdocuments@idcourts.net
Thursday, May 09, 2013 01:19 PM
ABBIE MACE, CLERK
khlewies@gmail.com; DMARLOW337@AOL.C MI;tP.bie Mace· Beck Harri f
bghall@nhptlaw.net; gmoeller@co.madison.id.
Deputy Clerk
40987 LEWIES v. BD OF CNTY COMM. FOR FREMONT CNTY (CV2012-580,2012-581)
40987 CC.pdf; 40987 NOA.pdf

FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL. CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT DUE 7-15-13 **0122-13 HEARING; 2-26-13 HEARING**. SEE ATTACHMENT(S). Please Note: All notices from the Supreme
Court will be served via email to the district court clerk, the court reporter, the district judge, and counsel of
record. The Court's email notices to counsel will be sent to the current email address of record according to the
Idaho State Bar. If you would like others to receive additional electronic notices of the proceedings in this
appeal please call the Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 334-2210. Prose without a valid email address will be
served notice via U.S. Mail. Please review the Clerk's Certificate for any errors, if Clerk's Certificate is
attached.
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.W lHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ZuiJ HAy -l A B~; ~HE STATE OF IDAHO, WAND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
Ft. . "A" RANOt, I:NC., an lclahO CWft~ QiUltt
EMMA ATO!li.EY,lAURA P4CWD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TV NEDROW, and DAVID TUK

Case No.

CV-2012..0000580

AJ~UY,

NEDROW,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Petitioners,

and
KARl H. LEWIES,
Real Party in Interest-Appellant,

Suoreme Court No f/IJtliJ .

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity, and
LEROY MILLER, in his official capacity,
Respondents.
E.C. GWALTNEY, Ill and LANA K. VARNEY,
Petitioners,

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of ldatlo,
RONALD "SKI PH HURT, in his official capacity, and
L.iaoY MJ,U.ER, in his official capacity,

APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FREMONT COUNTY.
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORY W. MOELLER PRESIDING

CASE NUMBER FROM COURT:
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT:
APPEALED BY:
APPEALED AGAINST:
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED:

CV-2012-0000580
Final Judgment on Rule 11 Sanctions
Lynn Hossner, Charles A. Homer
Blake Hall
Karl H. Lewies, Real Party in Interest
Board of County Commissioners, eta I
May 2, 2013
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED:
N/A
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAl FilED:
N/A
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED:
N/A
APPELLATE FEE PAID:
YES
RESPONDENT OR CROss-RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD FILED:
N/A
TRANSCRIPT FILED:
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED? YES
DISTRICT COURT REPORTER:
DAVID MARLOW
Dated this 3rd day of May, 2013

ABBIE MACE
Clerk of the District Court
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

r
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 4380
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 41h N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:~=====::;--

ZOIJ flAY -1 A 8: 3q

MAY - 2 2013
ABSH(~:,ce. CLERK
Br.--------~~--~~~~
Deputy Clerk

Real Party in Interest- Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENrH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Petitioners,

vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
RONALD~~~KJP"
subdivision of the state of

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-580
Case No. CV-12-581

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Suoreme C.oun No!:iOf/$7 .
NOTICE OF APPEAL

:MILLER, in his official capacity,
Respondents.

E.C. GWAL1NEY, ill and
LANA K. VARNEY,
Petitioners,
vs.
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1

. . . . . . . . . .l
',

¥..J''""
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(

(

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP"
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, in his official capacity,

TilE

ABOVE

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

>

R~n&m~.

TO:

'

NAMED

RESPONDENTS,

BOARD

OF

COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY ("County''), RONALD ''SKIP'' HURT, AND
LEROY MILLER, AND THE PARTY'S,,AffORNE.:Y'i' ~~:-¥'HALL, ESQ.;-AND'fHE--'
CLERK OF TIIE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TIIAT:
l. The above-named appellant, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., appeals the above-named ~~
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment on Rule II Sanctions, entered in the
above-entitled action on the day of April4, 2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described
in paragraph l, above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), Idaho

Appellate Rules.
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues.

a. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV-12580 violated the signature certification requirements ofi.R.C.P. ll(a)(1)?
b. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV-12581violated the signature certification requirements ofi.R.C.P. ll(a)(l)?
c. Whether the court erred by first awarding attorney's fees to the C01mty based on the
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2
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prevailing party standard, and subsequently without notice to the parties or
opportunity to object, changing its award of attorney fees into I.RC.P. sanctions

imposed on appellant, sua sponte?
d. Whether the Court abused its discretion by imposing I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) sanctions
against appellant based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than on the

signing of the petitions for judicial review:
i. Because appellant filed petitions for judicial review against a "known future

client;"
ii. Because appellant <lid not realize that the "Fremont County voters were

entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor
(i.e. appellant) would not be filing new legal actions against the County/,

iii. Because, by filing the petitions, appellant "illilitlted-a ,chtJiii ofevents that
any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and
animosityfrom everyone involved; ,

iv. Because of appellant's "timing" relative to filing the petitions;

. . . ........... ······--·····~· v. BecayseaweJlant ''delayedin.w..iLhlirmfiflg as counsel" for petitionem;
vi. Because appellant "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents;
vii. Because appellant ''failed to understand that his actions would almost

immediately deprive petitioners oflegal counsel; "
viii. Because "appellant should have anticipated that his actions would deprive

his future clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of
representation;" and

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3
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ix. Because the court found appellant's actions "unseemly?"
e. Whether the Court erred in finding that the appellant "had not withdrawn as counsel

for the County, " insofar as appellant at no time represented the County in either CV12-580 or CV..;12-581?

f.

Whether the court erred in finding that appellant's actions ..delayed adjudication of

the petitions for judicial review?"

g. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have
retained private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers
CV-12-580 and CV-12-581, even though the legal question whether the County's
hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho Constitution's "necessity

requirement" had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the

Prosecuting Attorney, and therefete; was not a questkta·.r.smnted to the court for its
decision?
h. Whether the Court erred in finding that appellant was unable to "complete, his

representation of petitioners?

_~----·------~.L Wbetherltvlae CJmaory Mqellc tfrmoostretrd m. apimt ap,pdhmt py mpgins in
the following actions:
1.

By initiating an ex parte communication with appellant immediately
following the January 22, 2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting
appellant into chambers and proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide

what hill you want to die on. " Then. further warning appellant, "This
conversation never happened; "

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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ii. After issuing warnings to appellant, as described above, then changing his
ruling awarding attorney's fees to the Cmmty based on the prevailing party
standard into I.R.C.P. ll(aXl) sanctions against appellant, sua sponte,
without notice or opportwrity to object;

iii. By disregarding appellant's argwnents and allegations of unethical conduct
. and improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall,

Esq.; and
iv. By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11
4''

''"'

"'Y"""h'"'

Sanctions against appellant thereby causing damage to appellant's
professional reputation?

4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5. :RJeq~~~pts.
n---'.
. •

a A reporter's transcript is requested.
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript: in [ ]hard copy, [ ] electronic fonnat, [X] both:

i. The entire Januaty 22, 2013 court h~ ~otion to di!J.•~!fy counsel an~~mm
motion to withdraw);
ii. The entire February 26, 2013, court hearing (objection to attorney's fees);

6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:

a. Regarding Case No. CV-12-580:
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012;
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(

ii. Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel, filed 1-14-2013;
iii. Notice of Appearance Lynn Hossner, Esq., filed 1-14-2013;

iv. Answer to Partial Motion to Dismiss; filed 1-22-2013;
v. Memorandmn In Support of Petitioners' Petition for Review, filed 2-122013;
vi. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-192013; and
vii. Notice of Lodging, filed 3-13-2013.
b. Regarding Case No. CV-12-581:
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012;
ii. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-19-

2013;and
iii. Notice of Lodging, filed 3-13-2013.
7. Civil Cases Only. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
a Exhibits A and B, att.acl!~~L!Q the Memorand~ In S1;1PP2rt of Petitioners' Petition""""

for Review, filed 2-12-2013;
b. Fremont County Official Road Map (2012); and
c. Letter from Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting

Attorney, to Fremont County Board of County Commissioners, dated November 20,
2012, and offered as an exhibit during the court hearing held on 2-26-2013.
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8. I certify:
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set out below:
i. Name and address: David Marlow, P.O. Box 1671, Idaho Falls, ID 83403;

telephone (208) 317-3400.
b. That the clerk of the district court has been advised that appellant and the reporter,

David Marlow, have agreed that the fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript
will be paid once the transcripts are prepared.
c.

That the eStimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's record has been paid.

d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served under Rule 20,

I.A.R.
DATED this 2nd day ofMay, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Real Party in Interest- AppeU~n,_t_ _ _ _ _ __
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certi.(y that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 2nd day ofMay, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names
either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand
delivering. or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TIJCKER
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

Esq.----· - ATIORNEY ATLAW
l09N.2NDW.
St. Anthony, ID 83445
LynnHossner~

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOWEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Gregory Moeller, District Judge
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE
151 W.1stN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
. ··· -· [X] u.s~ Mail· - -· ·:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ]Facsimile

[ ] U.S. Mail

[X] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013.

I~,J~·

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:r=========::::;--

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 4380
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
T: (208) 372-1700
F: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

1 MAY

I 3 2013

Real Party in Interest- Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,

)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
and
)
)
KARL H. LEWIES,
)
)
Real Party in Interest-Appellant
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
)
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" )
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY
)
MILLER, in his official capacity,
)
)
Respondents.
)

TO:

THE

ABOVE

NAMED

Case No. CV-12-580
AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

RESPONDENTS,

BOARD

OF

COUNTY
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COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY ("County"), RONALD "SKIP" HURT, AND
LEROY MILLER, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEY, BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ., AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named appellant, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., ("Lewies") appeals the above-named
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment on Rule 11 Sanctions,
entered in the above-entitled action on the day of April 4, 2013, District Judge Gregory
Moeller presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described
in paragraph 1, above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(1), Idaho
Appellate Rules.
3. Preliminary Statement oflssues.
a. Whether the Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) sanctions
against Lewies based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of
Rule 11 's signature certification requirements:

i. Because Lewies filed the petition for judicial review against a "known
future client; "

ii. Because Lewies did not realize that the "Fremont County voters were
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor
(i.e. Lewies) would not be filing new legal actions against the County;"

iii. Because, by filing the petition, Lewies "initiated a chain of events that any
reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and
animosity from everyone involved; "
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IV.

Because ofLewies' "timing" relative to filing the petition;

v. Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for petitioners;
vi. Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents;
vn. Because Lewies "failed to understand that his actions would almost
immediately deprive petitioners oflegal counsel;"
viii. Because "Lewies should have anticipated that his actions would deprive his
future

clients,

the County and the

board of commissioners,

of

representation;" and
IX.

Because the court found Lewies' actions "unseemly."

b. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by Lewies in case number CV-12-580
violated the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)?
c. Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel for
the County" insofar as Lewies never represented the County in case number CV -12580 in the first instance?
d. Whether the court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delayed adjudication of the
petition for judicial review? "
e. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have
retained private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case number
CV-12-580 even though the legal question whether the County's hiring of private
counsel in violation of the Idaho Constitution's "necessity requirement" had been
voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, and
therefore, was not a question presented to the court for its decision?
f.

Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his
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representation of petitioners?
g. Whether Judge Gregory Moeller demonstrated bias or prejudice against Lewies by
engaging in the following actions:
i. By initiating an ex parte communication with Lewies immediately following
the January 22, 2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting Lewies into
chambers and proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide what hill you

want to die on. " Then, further warning Lewies, "This conversation never
happened; "
n. After issuing warnings to Lewies, as described above, then changing his
award of attorney's fees to the County based on the prevailing party standard
under I.C. § 12-117 into I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies sua

sponte;
iii. By disregarding Lewies' arguments and allegations of unethical conduct and
improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq.;
and
iv. By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11
Sanctions against Lewies thereby causing damage to Lewies' professional
reputation?
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
5. Requested transcripts.
a. A reporter's transcript is requested.
b. The Lewies requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript: in [ ]hard copy, [ ] electronic format, [X] both:
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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1.

The entire January 22, 2013 court hearing (motion to disqualify counsel and
motion to withdraw);

ii. The entire February 26,2013, court hearing (objection to attorney's fees);
6. Lewies requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to
those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:
a. Regarding Case No. CV-12-580:
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012;
n. Motion to Disqualify Counsel, filed 01-07-2013;
iii. Motion to Withdraw, filed 01-07-2013;
iv. Affidavit ofKarl H. Lewies, filed 01-07-2013;
v. Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel, filed 01-14-2013;
vi. Notice of Appearance Lynn Rossner, Esq., filed 01-14-2013;
vn. Answer to Partial Motion to Dismiss; filed 01-22-2013;
viii. Objection to Attorney's Fees, filed 01-31-2013;
ix. Order on Motions; filed 02-04-2013;
x. Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition for Review, filed 02-12-

2013;
xi. Notice of Withdrawal ofMotion to Represent Fremont County, filed 02-19-

2013;
xii. Notice ofLodging, filed 03-13-2013;
xiii. Memorandum Decision Re: Rule 11 Sanctions, filed 03-29-2013;
xiv. Judgment- Final Judgment On Rule 11 Sanctions; filed 04-04-2013;
xv. Motion for Dismissal of Finding of a Public Road; filed 05-02-2013;
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5
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xvi. Affidavit of Lynn Rossner, Esq. for Dismissal of Order of Public Road, filed
05-02-2013.
7. Civil Cases Only. Lewies requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
a. Exhibits A and B, attached to the Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition
for Review, filed 02-12-2013;
b. Fremont County Official Road Map (2012); and
c. Letter from Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, to Fremont County Board of County Commissioners, dated November 20,
2012, and offered as an exhibit during the court hearing held on 02-26-2013.
8. I certify:
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set out below:
i. Name and address: David Marlow, P.O. Box 1671, Idaho Falls, ID 83403;
telephone (208) 317-3400.
b. That the clerk of the district court has been advised that Lewies and the reporter,
David Marlow, have agreed that the fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript
will be paid once the transcripts are prepared.
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served under Rule 20,

I.A.R.
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DATED this 13th day ofMay, 2013.

;c::r/_/~

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Y
Real Party in Interest - Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 13th day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses

below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon,
or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Lynn Rossner, Esq.
ATTORNEY ATLAW
109N. 2ND W.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Gregory Moeller, District Judge
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE
151 W. l 5tN.
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

DATED this 13th day of May, 2013.

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
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DISTRiCT SEVEN COURT

County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:

Lynn Hossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State BarNo. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

I

M/1Y 1 7

I

~3

_,....

I

A831E~E,

I

syJ

Attorney for Petitioners

L

CLERK
Deputy Clerk

I
I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUD~CIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW and DAVID TUK NEDROW,
,
Petitioners

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs

)

I

)

I

)

I

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR
)
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)

Defendants.

I

CasjNo. CV-12-580
CERlTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

I
I
I

I

)

I

)

I

)

I

II
I

I hereby certify that on May 16, 2013, I served a true and forrect copy of Petitioners'
Responsive Memorandum to:

[

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001
Facsimile (208) 523-7254

\
1

\
1

Honorable Greg Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Facsimile (208) 356-5425 .

I

METHOD OF SERVICE:
[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [x ] Facsimile

~··~

'Ey.;iossne~

.~
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Dif) rHiCT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho
Fiied :~==============]-

Lynn Rossner
Attorney at Law
Idaho State Bar No. 1074
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782

MAY 1 7
~ MACE, CLERK

By: __1;3.IJ.&J...l..l-----;=:-::-:::-.-:::-:-::::i~
Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVIDTUK NEDROW,
'
Petitioners

)
)
)
)

)
)

)
)
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR )
)
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
)
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD
)
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and
)
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity,
)
Defendants.
)

vs

Case No. CV-12-580
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO MEMORANDUM OF
DEFENDANTS

Comes now Lynn Rossner, attorney for Petitioners, and in response to Defendants'
Memorandum in opposition to Petitioners' Petition For Judicial Review of the proceedings of the
Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, hereinafter termed "the Board,"
hereby submits the following.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants claim the roads in question are R.S. 2477 roads and are thereby public roads.
Defendants made their determination with no evidence at the hearings or in the transcript of the
proceedings that indicates the roads in question were 1) established prior to the removal of the
land from the public domain, 2) that the roads were established in Idaho by use as such for five
years. 3) that it was shown that the local government accepted the roads from the federal
government while the lands were in the public domain.
Page 1 of 8
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ARGUMENT.

The Supreme Court of the State ofldaho has held that the county, in a road validation
proceeding, must have substantial and competent evidence before a road is classified as a
public road. Clifford Gali v. Idaho Countv, 146 Idaho 155. (Idaho 2008), 191 P3rd 234; Sopatvk
v. Lemhi Countv, 151 Idaho 809 (Idaho 2011), 264 P3rd 916; Farrell v. Board of Commissioners
of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378 (Idaho 2002), 64 P3rd, 311. The requirement for designation of
an R.S. 2477 road are as follows:
1) If the right of a party is affected, a decision of the board must be supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
2) The road must have been established prior to the lands removal from the public
domain.
3) Roads may also be established in Idaho by use as such for five years. Kirk v. Schultz,
63 Idaho 278, 284. The use must be regular public use and not casual or desultory use. Kirk, 63
Idaho at 282-283.
4) To be classified an R.S. 2477 road, it must be shown that the local government
accepted the road from the federal government.
Revised Statute 24 77 is found in Section 8 of the Mining Law of 1866 which granted
states and territories unrestricted rights-of-way over federal lands that had no existing
reservations or private entities. The Idaho case of Farrell v. Board of Commissioners of Lemhi
County, 138 Idaho 378 (Idaho 2002), 64 P3rd, 311 is the leading case on R.S. 2477 roads in
Idaho and I quote. "The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that the right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."
43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). To be valid it must be shown that the local
government accepted the road from the federal government. This Court explained in Kirk v.
Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 119 P .2d 266, 268 (1941 ), that in order for there to be an acceptance of a
congressional grant of a right-of-way for a public highway under this statute, "there must be
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either use by the public for such a period of time, and under such conditions as to establish a
highway under the laws of this State; or there must be some positive act or acts on the part of the
proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to the
particular highway in question." Under R.S. 2477 a public road maybe created under the state
road creation statute or where there is a positive act of acceptance by the local government. The
Kirk case is not explicit as to whether the second approach is independent of the state statute or if
both ofthe two requirements for R.S. 2477 roads are reiterations of the requirements as already
found in the state statute. The difference is important since the second method requiring any
"positive act" is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute.
Considering the language in Kirk it appears that there are two separate methods and that a
positive act of acceptance need not be coextensive with the road creation statute."
In the Farrell case, the court held an "R.S. 2477" road was created because "The Board of
County Commissioners' minutes stated in 1901 that "be it resolved by the Board that the
dedication of same [Indian Creek Road] be and the same is hereby accepted, and it is hereby
ordered that said above described road be added to and made a part of Road District No. I and
said road with plat as presented be recorded as provided by law. The petition from the miners is
pasted in the old leather-bound County book, and the minutes are there as well. There was a
clear manifestation of an intent to accept the road."
No evidence was presented in the case at bar that Fremont County ever did a "positive
act" to accept the road before it passed Ordinance No. 203.01 on October 29, 2012. Likewise,
there was no evidence presented that "there was use by the public for such a period of time, and
under such conditions as to establish a highway under the laws of this State." Also, there was no
evidence that the road was ever maintained by Fremont County, and in fact, at page 27 of the
transcript of testimony at the public hearings. Tuk Nedrow testified "The road going north on his
property has never had any county equipment on it either. These roads go through their farms
and stated that these roads do not lead to anything."
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There was no evidence presented which established that the roads in question were in
existence prior to the time over which the road traveled became private property. The hearing
exhibits which were relied upon consisted of 1) A Fremont County Official Road Map dated
2012. 2) A West Rattlesnake FB38 map dated July 11, 2001. 3) An exhibit marked as Exhibit
"A" which is an undated map showing sections, townships and ranges with no reference to roads.
4) A document which is entitled "REQUEST FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND ASSERTION
OF RIGHTS OF WAY UNDER FEDERAL LAW R.S. 2477 AND IDAHO CODE SECTION
40-204A which purports to identify R.S. 2477 roads in Fremont County, Idaho. That exhibit
refers to three maps dated between 1951 and 1993. The exhibit states "The above referenced
right of way have been public from the time of construction and first use." (There is no
indication of the time of construction and first use contained in the document). Further, the
Exhibit goes on to state that "No R.S. 2477 right of way, route, or site with the route to it in this
affidavit shall be considered in any manner as any form of proof of a right of way through any
private lands at the date and time of recording this affidavit in county records or elsewhere."
This Exhibit was recorded with the Fremont County Recorder on March 6, 2007. 5) Exhibit "B"
is an undated map showing various roads in Township 10 North, Range 41, E.,B.M.
There is no indication in the Exhibits as to when the roads or trails were established,
whether the lands were private at the time the roads and trails were established and whether there
was any action which acknowledged these roads or trails as R.S. 2477 roads while the lands were
public lands.
I

THE OLD YELLOWSTONE MAIL ROUTE ROAD AND SNOW CREEK ROAD
The county map showing the roads which were proposed to be accepted as public roads,
is an undated map attached as an exhibit to the transcript of the proceedings. The map contains a
road which has been designated by various witnesses as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road
and Snow Creek road, ("the Subject Road"). This road travels through property belonging to
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Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard and Nedrow. The Subject road starts four miles West of
Ashton, Idaho and one mile north. The road commences on the north side of an existing Fremont
county Road at 1425 North 3125 East and travels North through the NW1/4SW1/4 of Section
20, Township 9 N., R. 42 E.,B.M which belongs to Nedrows. The "REQUEST FOR
ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND ASSERTION OF RIGHTS OF WAY UNDER FEDERAL LAW
R.S. 2477 AND IDAHO CODE SECTION 40-204A, hereinafter referred to as REQUEST, does
not identify any road traveling through the NW114SW1/4 of Section 20, Township 9 N., R. 42
E.,B.M which belongs to Petitioners, Nedrow. (See para. 247, p. 20, REQUEST). The
Defendants' declared this section of the Old Yellowstone Mail Route as a public road. There
was no evidence presented at any of the hearings that this particular stretch of road was in
existence prior to 1976, that it was a highway as required by R.S. 24 77, that this particular stretch
of road was a traveled road or that there was an acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority as
required by Farrell prior to its passage over private property.
The road continues North through the SW1/4SW1/4 of Section 20, Township 9 North,
Range 42 E.B.M. which belongs to Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard. The road than proceeds
North through the NW1/4NW114 of Section 20, Township 9 North, Range 42 E.,B.M. and thence
North through the Sl/2SW1/4 Section 17, Township 9 North, Range 42 E.,B.M. which belongs
to the United States government. The road then proceeds North along the West Section line of
the Wll/2NW1/4 of Section 17, Township 9 North, Range 42, E.B.M., thence North through the
Wl/2SE1/4 of Section 8, Township 9 North, Range 42, E.,B.M which also belongs to
Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard.
The REQUEST, which is part ofthe transcript, indicated that there was a "highway"
through the Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard property described above. There is no
identification of this road as being in existence prior to the above described property becoming
private property or before 1976 when R.S.2477 was repealed. There was no evidence presented
that it was a traveled road or that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority
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as required by Farrell to make it an R.S. 2477 road.
After the road leaves the Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard property on the North, it
continues North through Sections 8 and 5 of Township 9 North, Range 42 E.,B.M., which
belongs to Harrigfeld. The U.S. Forest has the road blocked from the point where it enters its
property on the North section line of the Harrigfeld property. The REQUEST does not describe
an R.S. 2477 road as traveling through Sections 8 and five of Township 9 N., R. 42 E.,B.M
which belongs to Harrigfelds. (See para. 24 7, p. 20, REQUEST). There is no identification of
this road as being in existence prior to the property being in private hands or before 1976 when
R.S. 2477 was repealed. No evidence was presented that this particular stretch was a traveled
road or that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority as required by
Farrell.
Defendants acknowledge that the U.S. Forest Service has blocked the road between its
property and the Harrigfeld property. If the road through the Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard,
Nedrow property is an R.S. 2477 road, there is no access from the North through the U.S.
Government property or the Harrigfeld property nor from the South through the Nedrow
property. Thus, if it is a public road, it is isolated with no access. Clearly there never was an
intention to create a public road under R.S. 2477 with no access to it either from the North or
South. Without evidence that the road was established prior to 1976 across the Nedrow,
Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard property, and was, that it was "used by the public for such a
period of time, and under such conditions as to establish a highway under the laws of this State,
or there was some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities which clearly
manifested an intention to accept such grant with respect to the particular highway in question."
Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 119 P.2d 266, 268 (1941 ), the road cannot be a public road under
R.S.2477.
There is no evidence that the road was created by a common law dedication or that there
was a filing and recording of a plat or map to indicate the intent on the part of the owner to make
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a donation to the public. There is no evidenced that the property was purchased by specific
reference to a plat which indicated the road was public.

II
UNNAMED TRAIL LOCATED IN SECTION 15, T. 9 N. R. 42 E.,B.M.
The county map which outlined the roads which were proposed to be accepted as public
roads is undated. The map contains a road, which is described as located in Section 15,
Township 9 N., Range 42 E.,B.M. and is described as Number 247 on the REQUEST. The road
described is wholly contained within property belonging to Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard.
There was no testimony presented as to whether or not this road was a traveled road for
five years and became a public road because of that fact. Further, there was no evidence
presented that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority as required by
Farrell to make it an R.S. 2477 road. Thus, the road could not be classified a public road under
either legal requirement nor was substantial and competent evidence presented.
CONCLUSION

The standard is clear. As stated in Clifford Gali v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155. (Idaho
2008), 191 P3rd 234; Sopatvk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809 (Idaho 2011), 264 P3rd 916;
Farrell v. Board of Commissioners ofLemhi County, 138 Idaho 378 (Idaho 2002), 64 P3rd, 311,
in order to meet the requirements of an R.S. 2477 road Fremont County must determine:
1) If the right of a party is affected, a decision of the board must be supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
2) The roads must have been established prior to the lands removal from the public
domain.
3) If the Roads were established in Idaho by use as such for five years, Kirk v. Schultz,
63 Idaho 278, 284, the use must be regular public use and not casual or desultory use. Kirk.
4) There was no evidence presented, let alone the evidence being substantial and
competent, that either of the two roads were in existence prior to the above described property
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becoming private property or before 1976 when R.S.2477 was repealed.
5) There was no evidence presented that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance
by an authority as required by Farrell to make the roads R.S. 2477 roads.
Because of the lack of substantial and competent evidence of compliance with the law,
the defendants' decision must be overturned.
DATED this 16th day of May 2013.

LYNNH SNER
Attorney for Petitioners -'
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It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 40987 and appeal No. 41132 shall be
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 40987, but all documents filed shall bear
both docket numbers.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with a
copy of this Order. It is noted that the Reporter's Transcripts requested in the consolidated cases
have previously been prepared and filed with the District Court.
DATED this 25TH day of June 2013.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
District Court Judge
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Leroy Miller and their attorney of record, Blake G. Hall, Esq.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Petitioners will bring up for hearing their Notice of Appeal on
August 27, 2013 at 3:000:p.m. at the Fremont County Courthouse, St. Anthony, Idaho.
Dated this 3rd day of August 2013.
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The Real Party In Interest - Appellant, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies"), submits this brief in
support ofhis appeal from the final decision of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
in and for Fremont County (the "Court").

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature ofthe Case
The Court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Lewies, sua sponte, because the presiding judge
found it "unseemly" that Lewies, as a prosecuting attorney- elect for Fremont County, would
file petitions for judicial review against the board of county commissioners for Fremont County
("Commissioners"), a known future client. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 23-25; p. 5, lines1-2; p. 5,lines
23-25; p. 6, lines 22-23; p. 9, lines 8-9; and R. 182 at 188.) Although Judge Moeller found no
ethical or legal violations (R. 182 at 188), he believed Lewies had filed the petitions because of a
"political grudge" 1 against the Commissioners. As the Court itself said to Lewies, "This may
sound like a rhetorical question, but it really isn't a rhetorical question. What were you thinking
filing these Petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were elected to be Fremont
County Prosecuting Attorney?" (Transcript p. 4, lines 23-25; and p. 5, lines 1-2)

B. Statement of Facts
On November 20, 2012, Lewies was contacted by a private client, Mr. Clen Atchley,
owner of Flying "A" Ranch, who requested Lewies' assistance on an urgent legal matter. Mr.
1

See R.182 at 189, footnote 14, where Judge Moeller writes that, "the Court merely advised [Lewies] to avoid
allowing a political grudge (emphasis added) to interfere with his professional judgment."
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Atchley explained that the Commissioners had recently adopted an official county road map (the
"Map") depicting a private ranch road owned by Atchley, and others, as a Fremont County
public road. (R. 65). In reviewing the Map, Lewies discovered that another private road
belonging to family friend, Mr. Eugene Gwaltney, III, was also depicted as a Fremont County
public road. (R. 65). Atchley and Gwaltney, respectively, requested Lewies file petitions for
judicial review to preserve and protect their legal rights; and Lewies agreed to do so, with the
caveat that he would have to withdraw from representing Atchley and Gwaltney soon after filing
their petitions because he was the prosecuting attorney - elect for Fremont County and would be
sworn-in to office as Fremont County's prosecuting attorney in mid-January, 2013 thereby
giving rise to an actual conflict of interest on that date.

Lewies accepted the limited

representation (R. 65) and on November 23, 2012, filed two petitions for judicial review
concerning the Map, one for Flying "A" Ranch, et. a!. (R. 8) and the other for Gwaltney, et. a!.
(R. 256). On December 5, 2012, presiding district judge, Gregory W. Moeller, issued his Orders
Governing Procedure on Review. (R. 15 and R. 263).
On January 7, 2013, in his final week as deputy prosecuting attorney for Fremont
3

County, 2 Blake G. Hall, Esq. ("Hall"), filed motions to disqualify Lewies (R. 18 and R. 271);
2

Blake G. Hall, Esq., was serving his final week as deputy prosecuting attorney for Joette C. Lookabaugh, Esq., the
lame-duck Fremont County prosecuting attorney who had recently lost her bid for re-election to Lewies, her political
opponent, by a margin of 65% to 35%. As District Judge Gregory W. Moeller, himself, stated, "[A]nd, again, I
understand that there's been acts ofpettiness between these parties on other matters at other times, but there needs
to come a time when that ends and I'm going to do what I can to see that it ends in this case ... " (Transcript p. 34,
lines 15-19).
3

Lewies argued that, "I believe that Blake Hall filed his motion to disqualify me for an improper purpose, to
harass me." (R.64 at 65, ~ 10). As evidence of this, Lewies pointed out to the Court that, "Mr. Hall failed to make
any good faith effort to corifer or attempt to confer with me" before filing his motions to disqualifY. "And Your
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and also on that same day, Lewies filed motions to withdraw from representation in both cases.
(R. 32 and R. 266). On January 14, 2013, pursuant to a stipulation for substitution of counsel,
W. Lynn Rossner, Esq., substituted for Lewies as petitioners' counsel in Case No. CV-12-580.
(R. 42). On January 22, 2013, the Court conducted a hearing on Hall's motions to disqualify
Lewies and also on Lewies' motions to withdraw. Initially, the Court "allowed Mr. Lewies to

withdraw" (Transcript p. 24, lines 12-13 ); but later reversed itself, instead ruling that it, "bars
Mr. Lewies from further representing Petitioners or Respondents" (R. 106,

~

1); but then, even

later, it its Memorandum Decision took a different and most unusual posture that it had,

"effectively grant[ed] both the motion to disqualify and the motion to withdraw." (R. 184). The
Court also ordered Lewies to personally pay $1,185.00 in attorney's fees for Hall's work on the
motions to disqualify. (R. 182 at 191).
On January 30, 2013, Hall filed his affidavit of attorney's fees (R. 50) and the next day
Lewies filed his objection to attorney's fees. (R. 54).

On February 26, 2013, the Court

conducted a hearing on its award of attorney's fees. (Transcript, p. 40). On March 29, 2013, the
Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: Rule 11 Sanctions ("Memorandum Decision"). (R.
182). On April4, 2013, the Court entered its final judgment re: Rule 11 sanctions ("Judgment").
(R. 194). On May 2, 2013, Lewies filed a notice of appeal (R. 200); and on May 13,2013 Lewies

Honor, this would have saved you all this hassle if [Hall] picked up the phone and said, 'Hey, Karl, looks like
you've got a conflict on the horizon there, what are you going to do, are you going to hang onto those private clients
and try to play both sides of this game?' I'd say absolutely not. In fact, I've made it clear to my clients on the day I
accepted representation I'm going to have to withdraw ... Jf that call had been made, Your Honor, and under the
Rule I I of the Rules of Civil Procedure that sort of a reasonable inquiry is to be made before filing Motions. I mean,
you know, you have to inquire ... there is a standard for a reasonable inquiry before filing documents, Rule 11. "

(Transcript p. 61, lines 15-25; p. 64, lines 18-21; and p.65, lines 7-8).
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filed an amended notice of appeal in CV-12-580 (R. 236) and a notice of appeal in CV-12-581.
(R. 325).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against
Lewies based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule 11 's signature
certification requirements:
(a.) Because Lewies filed the petition for judicial review against a "known future

client;"
(b.) Because Lewies did not realize that the "Fremont County voters were entitled

to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor (i.e. Lewies) would
not be filing new legal actions against the County; "
(c.) Because, by filing the petition, Lewies "initiated a chain of events that any

reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity
from everyone involved; "
(d.) Because ofLewies' "timing" relative to filing the petition;
(e.) Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for petitioners;
(f.) Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents;
(g.)

Because Lewies ''failed to understand that his actions would almost

immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel;
(h.) Because "Lewies should have anticipated that his actions would deprive his
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fUture clients, the County and the board of commissioners, ofrepresentation;" and
(i.) Because the court found Lewies' actions "unseemly."

2. Whether the petitions for judicial review filed by Lewies in either case number CV-12580 or CV-12-581violated the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)?
3. Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel for the
County" insofar as Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV-12-580 or CV-

12-581in the first instance?
4. Whether the court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delayed adjudication of the
petitions for judicial review? "

5. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained
private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12581 even though the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation of
the Idaho Constitution's "necessity requirement" had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the
Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the court for its
decision?
6.

Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his

representation of petitioners?
7. Whether Judge Gregory W. Moeller demonstrated bias or prejudice against Lewies by
engaging in the following actions:
(a.) By initiating an ex parte communication with Lewies immediately following the
January 22,2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting Lewies into chambers and
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proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide what hill you want to die on." Then,
further warning Lewies, "This conversation never happened; "
(b.) After issuing warnings to Lewies, as described above, then changing his award
of attorney's fees to the County based on the prevailing party standard under I. C. §
12-117 into I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) sanctions against Lewies sua sponte;
(c.) By disregarding Lewies' arguments and allegations of unethical conduct and
improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq.; and
(d.) By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11
Sanctions against Lewies thereby causing damage to Lewies' professional reputation?

III. ARGUMENT
A. Scope of Review on Appeal.
The abuse of discretion standard is used to review the award of sanctions under I.R.C.P.
11(a)(1). Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Company, 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d
993 (Idaho 1990). The sequence of inquiry is: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley v.
Idaho Power, supra, (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
Idaho's adoption of amended Rule 11, containing language identical to the Federal Rule,
presumably carries with it the interpretation placed upon that language by the federal courts.
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Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,785 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1990). Both amended rules require
that pleadings, motions and other papers meet certain criteria, and failure to comply may result in
the imposition of sanctions. I.R.C.P. 11, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions. Every pleading,
motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one (1) licensed attorney of record ofthe state ofldaho, in the attorney's individual name,
whose address shall be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the
party's address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or
other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. (emphasis added) If a
pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
A trial court's decision to impose sanctions under Rule 11 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359
(1990). As to fact findings, the trial court abuses its discretion when its findings are clearly
erroneous. Ibid. As to questions of law, the trial court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets
or misapplies the law. Id.
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Federal court decisions regarding Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 hold that the "bad faith" standard is
no longer applicable. Rather, the federal courts apply an objective standard of "reasonableness
under the circumstances." Durrant v. Christensen, supra, (citations omitted). In Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
subjective bad faith in not an element to be proved under Rule 11, but sanctions shall be assessed
if the pleading is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation. In Eastway
Construction Com. v. City ofNew York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1985) the circuit court of appeals
held that "the language of Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on
each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is
signed ... A showing of subjective bad faith is no longer required to trigger the sanctions imposed
by the rule." Durrant, supra, (citing Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir.
1986), and Eastway Construction Com. v. City ofNew York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1985)).
In light of the federal decisions interpreting language that is identical to that contained in
the Idaho version of Rule 11, the Idaho Supreme Court held that reasonableness under the
circumstances, and a duty to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing an action, is the
appropriate standard to apply. A showing of subjective bad faith is no longer necessary for the
imposition of sanctions. Durrant, supra.

B. The Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies
based on extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule 11 signature certification requirements.
The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings. CO Intern. Co. Inc. v. Rochem Intern.
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Inc., USA, 659 FJd 53, 62, (1st Cir. 2011). Rule 11 does not apply to misconduct unrelated to
signed motions, pleadings or other papers. See, e.g., Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 626-27 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 245 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[N]o matter how vexatious

or disruptive counsel's conduct was during trial, Rule 11 cannot reach such misconduct. ");
Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT LLC, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Rule 11 does

not ... authorize sanctions for merely frustrating conduct."). Rule 11 does not apply to attorney
conduct that does not involve the filing or other presentation of a paper to the court. Ibid. It is not
an all-purpose tool for regulating party or lawyer conduct. See Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT
LLC, supra. Whether a lawyer has satisfied Rule 11 is measured on an objective basis. See
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 111 S.Ct. 922,
112 L.Ed. 2d 1140 (1991).
In Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Company, supra, citing Durrant v.
Christensen, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in interpreting Rule 11 the federal courts have
focused on "an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability
of a pleading before it is signed." The Idaho Supreme Court held that, "reasonableness under the
circumstances, and a duty to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing an action, is the appropriate
standard to apply." Ibid.
In the instant case, the Court provided a litany of reasons (R. 182 at 188) why it imposed
Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies, however, as the discussion below reveals, each and every reason
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dealt with extraneous conduct,4 rather than the actual petitions themselves and whether they
comported with the signature certification requirements of Rule 11.
First, the Court reasoned that, " ... Lewies 'filing of the petitions against a known, future

client was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system." (R. 182 at 188). Judge
Moeller made it very clear that he strongly disagreed (R. 106,

~

1) with Lewies' decision to accept

representation of private clients and proceed to file petitions for judicial review on their behalf
against the Commissioners given that Lewies would be sworn-in as Fremont County prosecuting
attorney about two months after filing the petitions, and would therefore, become the legal advisor
for the Commissioners. However, even if Judge Moeller disagreed with Lewies' actions, he cited
no legal authority whatsoever in his Memorandum Decision that would prohibit Lewies, or any
other attorney for that matter, from filing a legal action against a known future client. 5 Certainly,
Rule 11 contains no such "known future client" prohibition. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11
on such grounds, the Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its
discretion.
Second, the Court reasoned that, "Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that the

4
The extraneous conduct that Judge Moeller concerned himself with centered around his unfounded and highly
subjective belief that Lewies' motives for filing the petitions were improper and somehow related to a "political
grudge" against the Commissioners. (See, e.g., R. 182 at 189, fn. 14)

Indeed, at the direction of Judge Moeller, Lewies contacted Idaho State Bar counsel, Brad Andrews, to obtain his
opinion on the whether a prosecutor-elect violates the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, if he files a lawsuit
against the board of county commissioners that he will be representing in the future. Mr. Andrews informed Lewies
that the "bright-line" test for determining whether a conflict of interest existed was the date on which the prosecutorelect was officially sworn-in. Mr. Andrews reasoned that, until the prosecutor-elect is sworn-in, he does not
represent the county commissioners. (See, Transcript p. 52, lines 21-25; p. 53, lines 1-21; and p. 54, lines 1-7)
5
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person they had just elected as County prosecutor (i.e. Lewies) would not be filing new legal actions
against the County." (R. 182 at 188). However, even if the Court from its vantage point in

neighboring Madison County, had special insights into what Fremont County voters were expecting
from their prosecutor-elect,6 and even if Judge Moeller personally and strongly disagreed with
Lewies' actions, he cited no legal authority that requires a prosecutor-elect to satisfy voters'
expectations (let alone satisfy the Court's own subjective notions of such voter expectations).
Certainly, Rule 11 contains no such "voter satisfaction" requirement. By sanctioning Lewies under
Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and in doing so, abused its
discretion.
Third, the Court reasoned that Lewies, "initiated a chain of events that any reasonable
attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity from everyone involved " (R.

182 at 188). However, even if the Court had been correct that Lewies created "mistrust and
animosity from everyone involved" by filing the petitions, it cited no legal authority that obligated

Lewies to refrain from creating such subjective emotional states. Certainly, Rule 11 imposes no
such "emotionally-based" requirement. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the
Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion.
6

In fact, voters greatly appreciated Lewies' earlier efforts to reign-in the Commissioners when they illegally
approved a controversial gravel pit in the county. Lewies sued the Commissioners in Fremont County Case No.
CV-2011-215 alleging, inter alia, bias, conflicts of interest, and ex parte communications. Judge Gregory W.
Moeller issued his decision in the case just two weeks before the 2012 primary election for prosecuting attorney
(and it was widely publicized in the area press) finding for Lewies' clients and writing that the Commissioners,
" ... created an atmosphere that erodes public confidence in the justice of the proceedings below ... the Court must
conclude that due process demands a higher level offairness, impartiality, and transparency than the record below
demonstrates." Lewies' campaign slogan was "RESTORE PUBLIC TRUST," and voters elected him by a landslide
margin. For the Court now to say voters expected Lewies would not sue the same Commissioners he had
successfully sued before does not reflect actual voting results. Actual voting results supported Lewies' legal action
against the Commissioners in the gravel pit matter.
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Fourth, the Court reasoned that, "The court also finds that the timing ofLewies 'filing of the
petitions, coupled with his subsequent delay in withdrawing as counsel for petitioners and the
county, constitutes the type oflitigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectifY." (R. 182 at 188)
However, even if Lewies had timed his filings, and even if he delayed in seeking to withdraw as
counsel for petitioners, the Court cited no legal authority that prohibited Lewies from timing his
filings or requiring his earlier withdrawal. Certainly, there is nothing in Rule 11 that prohibited
Lewies from "timing" his filings, and nothing that governs when Lewies was required to seek
withdrawal from representation. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court
either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion.
Fifth, the Court reasoned that Lewies, ''failed to understand that his actions would almost
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel." (R. 182 at 188) 7 However, even ifthe Court had
been correct regarding what Lewies understood, or failed to understand, it cited no legal or ethical
violation by Lewies. Certainly, nothing in Rule 11 required Lewies to understand that his actions
may deprive his clients of legal counsel. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the
Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion.
Sixth, the Court reasoned that, "Lewies should have anticipated that his actions would
The Court's premise that Lewies' filing of the petitions for judicial review would "immediately deprive his clients
of legal counsel" is false. Indeed, petitioners Flying "A" Ranch, et. al., obtained substitute counsel, W. Lynn
Rossner, Esq., on January 14, 2013; and the petitioners Gwaltney, et. a!., obtained substitute counsel, Charles A.
Homer, Esq., sometime before February 26, 2013, according to representations made to the Court by Hall. (See,
Transcript, p. 77, lines 2-9 (MR. HALL: "!can represent to the Court that Mr. Homer did contact me and said that
he anticipated representing his client [Gwaltney, et. a!.} in the future, but was still in the process of reviewing the
record and so forth and had said that based upon his very initial impression, that he thought there might be a way to
dismiss the petition and resolve the matter in some other fashion."); p. 79, lines 23-25; p. 80, lines 1-2; and p. 81,
lines 1-2). On June 11, 2013, Homer filed his notice of appearance on behalf of petitioners Gwaltney, et. al. (R.
355)
7
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deprive his future clients, the County and the board of commissioners, ofrepresentation." (R. 182 at
188). 8 However, even if the Court had been correct regarding what Lewies should have anticipated,
it cited no legal or ethical violations.

Certainly, Rule 11 contains no "anticipation requirement."

By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the
law, and by doing so, abused its discretion.
Finally, and seemingly most importantly to presiding Judge Moeller, the Court found
Lewies' actions "unseemly." (Transcript p. 6, lines 22-23; and p. 9, lines 8-9). 9

10

However, even if

the Court was correct that something about Lewies' decision to file the petitions was unseemly, it
cited no legal or ethical violations by Lewies.

Seemliness, or good taste, carmot be judicially

determined by application of any objective standard. Afterall, like good art, good taste is a highly
subjective matter. Certainly, Rule 11 does not require that papers be "seemly."

By sanctioning

Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and
by doing so, abused its discretion.
In summary, the Court applied a "subjective bad faith" test to Lewies' extraneous conduct,
rather than applying the appropriate legal analysis - an objective standard - to the petitions
themselves. The Court subjectively concluded that Lewies was motivated to file the petitions due to
8

The Court's premise that Lewies' filing of the petitions for judicial review would "deprive his future clients, the
County and the board of commissioners, of representation" is false. The County and the board of commissioners
were from the outset, and at all relevant times during the pendency of the petitions, ably represented by Blake G.
Hall, Esq. (Transcript p. 1, lines 22-24).
9

THE COURT: "[T]his just doesn't seem, for lack of a better word, seemly to the Court ... " (Transcript p. 9, lines 89).
10

"Seemly" is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (5 1h Ed., 2011), as
"conforming to standards of conduct and good taste; of pleasing appearance."
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a political grudge - a bad faith motive; and that it was "interfering with Lewies' professional
judgment." (R. 189, fn. 14) However, the "bad faith" standard is no longer applicable. Rather,
courts apply an objective standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances" Durrant v.
Christensen, supra, (citations omitted).

The Court should have examined Rule 11 sanctions

in light of the foregoing federal and state authorities and determined whether Lewies made a proper
investigation upon reasonable inquiry into the factual basis and legal basis for the petitions. See,
e.g., Durrant, supra. The Court's imposition of sanctions without finding a lack of reasonable

inquiry was not an adequate analysis under Rule 11. Hanf v. Svringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364,
816 P.2d 320 (1991). Without such a determination, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Ibid

C. The petitions filed by Lewies in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 did not violate
the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(l).
A Rule 11 violation occurs at the time the offending paper is signed and submitted to the
court. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Com., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed. 2d 359
(1990). A good explanation of Rule 11 's signature certification requirements is found in an article
entitled, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 -A Closer Look, by Judge William Schwarzer,
United States District Judge, Northern District of California. In that article, Judge Schwarzer wrote
the following:
The certification which results from the attorney's signature of the paper is directed
at the three substantive prongs of the rule: its factual basis, its legal basis, and its
legitimate purpose .... With respect to the first prong, the signature certifies that the
lawyer 'has read the [paper]***that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact***' If the rule is to
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have meaning, those facts must consist of admissible evidence or at least be
calculated to lead to such evidence. They need not be undisputed or indisputable but
they must be sufficiently substantial to support a reasonable belief in the existence of
a factual basis for the paper. Suspicion, rumor or surmise will not do.
104 F.R.D. 181, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look,
Shwarzer, William W., (1985).
With respect to the second prong of Rule 11- its legal basis- Judge Schwarzer wrote,
"where an action is patently unmeritorious as a matter of law, sanctions are
appropriate ... To test compliance with the rule, as some courts have done, by
reference to whether bad faith has been shown is inconsistent with its text and
purpose ... Reasonable belief that a paper is 'warranted by law' should therefore be
treated as an objective standard turning on the facts and circumstances of the case,
not on the attorney's state of mind."
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11, supra.
Judge Schwarzer's analysis continued as follows,
"The first two prongs of the rule ... are directed at the merits: in substance they are
aimed at frivolous papers. The third prong is directed at papers which, though not
necessarily frivolous, are found to be interposed for an improper purpose ... .In
considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need
not delve into the attorney's subjective intent .. .If a court were to entertain inquiries
into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially harmful
consequences, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling
advocacy ... Finally, a bad faith test would make courts more reluctant to impose
sanctions for fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith finding .. .If a reasonably
clear legal justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no
improper purpose can be found and sanctions are inappropriate."
Ibid.
In the instant case, the Court's subjective bad faith analysis was as follows:
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"Lewies' filing of the petitions against a known future client was a significant
offense against the integrity of the judicial system. Fremont County voters were
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as county prosecutor would
not be filing new legal actions against the county on behalf of private
individuals ... By so doing, Lewies initiated a chain of events that any reasonable
attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity from everyone
involved- greatly undermining public confidence in the outcome of both cases ... .It
is simply unfathomable to the Court how Lewies could have failed to understand
that his actions would almost immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel since
he would have to immediately withdraw before he was sworn-in. Likewise, Lewies
should have anticipated that his actions would deprive his future clients, the county
and the board of commissioners, of representation since they would be
understandably uncomfortable having Lewies or his deputies defend them in legal
matters he initiated against them. Therefore, the Court concludes that Lewies'
decision to sign and file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected
the integrity of the judicial process."
(R. 182 at 188).
The Court undertook no objective inquiry into whether Lewies "made a proper investigation
upon reasonable inquiry." Durrant, supra. It did not inquire into any of the three prongs of Rule 11:
it did not inquire into the factual basis of the petitions; it did not inquire into the legal basis of the
petitions; and it did not inquire into whether the petitions were filed for any objective improper
purposes. See, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11, supra.

Accordingly, the Court's

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Hanf v. Svringa Realty, supra.

D. Attorney's fees as Rule 11 sanctions.
Rule 11 is a sanctions statute and not a fee shifting provision. Fee awards under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 are limited to fees "directly resulting from the violation." See Skidmore Energy, Inc. v.
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KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2006).

A court must be careful to trace fees to the violation

and not include in the sanction fees that the party incurred with respect to matters not in violation of
Rule 11. Ibid. Like the federal rule, Idaho's Rule 11 limits sanctions to those reasonable expenses
incurred "because of' the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper. 11
In the instant case, however, the Court awarded attorney's fees to Fremont County not

because of Lewies' filing petitions in violation of Rule 11, but for hours its counsel, Hall, spent
working on motions to disqualify Lewies. As presiding Judge Moeller, stated,
"The Court also believes that Mr. Hall, who was acting as a Deputy Prosecutor at the
time he filed it, was justified in bringing the Motion to DisqualifY (emphasis added),
that he shouldn't have had to file that Motion, but it was necessitated by Mr. Lewies
failing to recuse himself or -how would we properly put it - withdraw from the case
in a timely manner. So, therefore, the Court finds that the County does have a right
to seek attorney's fees."

(Transcript p. 32, lines 22-25,· and p. 33, lines 1-4)
By ordering Lewies to pay attorney's fees as a sanction under Rule 11 for time Hall spent on
motions to disqualify Lewies alleging conflicts-of-interest under I.R.P.C. 1.7 (not "because of" any
violation of Rule 11 's signature certification requirements), 12 the Court either misinterpreted or
misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion.

The Court's award of attorney's fees as

a sanction against Lewies for violating Rule 11 cannot be sustained.

II

I.R.C.P. 11

12

The motions to disqualify filed by Hall against Lewies alleged no Rule 11 violations whatsoever, only a future
conflict-of-interest. The motions were not filed "because of' any Rule 11 violation. (R. 18).
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E. The Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel tor the County"
because Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV-12-580 or CV-12-581.
In imposing Rule 11 sanctions, the Court stated," ... the Court concludes that Lewies' filing
of these petitions was clearly misguided and failure to withdraw as counsel for both parties
amounted to litigative misconduct." (R. 182 at 187). The Court also stated, "[Lewies] initially
refused to withdraw as counsel for the County." (R. 182 at 189).
The undisputed facts are, however, that Lewies never represented the county in either of the
cases.

From the moment the petitions were filed, and at all relevant times thereafter, Hall

represented the county and the Court was fully aware of such representation, as the following
exchange shows:
THE COURT: Then we have Mr. Blake Hall present, who has appeared on behalf
of Fremont County Commissioners.
(Transcript, p. 1, lines 22-24).

***

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

MR. LEWIES: I won't be representing the county at all. I don't intend to represent
Fremont County on these, or the petitioners. I'll just stay clear out of all of it is my
idea.
THE COURT: So you basically concurred with the motion that was filed by Mr.
Hall then, that pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, you can't represent the
county?
MR. LEWIES: I would agree that that's true.
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 18-25; and p. 4, line 1).
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Then, during its February 26, 2013 hearing, the Court again indicated on the record that it
fully understood that Mr. Hall, and not Mr. Lewies, was representing Fremont County, as follows:
THE COURT: We have Mr. Lewies appearing on behalf of himself on an attorney's
fees issue, and we have Mr. Blake Hall appearing on behalf of the Fremont County
Commissioners, who have retained him on some issues related to these cases.
(Transcript, p. 40, lines 19-23.)

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

I

I

From the outset, the Court possessed full knowledge that Hall, not Lewies, was representing
Fremont County. Accordingly, it was a plain factual error for the Court to conclude that Lewies
"initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the County," inasmuch as he never represented the
County at any time. As such, the Court abused its discretion.

F. The court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delaved adjudication o[the petitions (or
judicial review. "

In imposing Rule 11 sanctions, the Court reasoned, "Here, Lewies' actions have directly
delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review because the Court has been required to
spend over two months dealing with issues related to representation, rather than hearing the merits
of the petitions."

13

(R. 182 at 188).

However, the record is clear. Lewies did not, and in fact, could not have caused any delay
because unless and until the transcript and record of proceedings was settled under I.R. C.P. 84G),
13

It should noted that the Court wanted to "get to the merits" of the petitions. This admission by the Court is proof
positive that the petitions were factually based, had legal basis, and were not filed for improper purposes. If the
Court wanted to get to the merits, then it abused its discretion by ruling that the petitions violated Rule 11 's
signature certification requirements. If the petitions violated Rule 11, then the Court should have dismissed them.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 25
Page 279 of 408

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

;
I
I
I

I
I
I

and then lodged under I.R.C.P. 84(k), the Court could not possibly have proceeded to hear the
merits. In fact, by virtue of the Court's own Orders Governing Procedure on Appeal 14 (R. 15 and R.
263) petitioners' briefs were due "within 35 days of the date on which notice that the transcript and
record have been filed ... " Three months later, the Notice of Lodging of the record was filed 15
(R.178), thus triggering the 35 day time period in which petitioners' had to file their briefs
(accordingly, petitioners' briefs were due April 17, 2013). Respondent's then had 28 days after
service of petitioners' briefs to file their briefs (accordingly, respondent's briefs were due on May
15, 2013).

Finally, petitioners' reply briefs were due 21 days after service of respondent's briefs

(accordingly, petitioners' reply briefs were due on June 5, 2013). So, the Court could not have
proceeded to hear the merits until sometime after June 5, 2013.

By contrast, Lewies sought

permission to withdraw a full five months before that date. 16

It was not Lewies' actions that delayed the Court in getting to the merits, rather, it was the
Court's own handling of the competing motions to withdraw and to disqualify that caused delay.

14

Orders Governing Procedure on Appeal were filed on December 3, 2012.

15

Notice of Lodging for both cases was filed on March 13, 2013.

16

Lewies' motions to withdraw were filed on January 7, 2013.

17

17

The Court should have found that no actual case or controversy existed since Hall's motions to disqualify, and
Lewies' motions to withdraw, were filed on the same day. The Court could easily have granted Lewies' motions to
withdraw and denied Hall's motions to disqualify. Lewies would have been out of the cases on January 7th, and that
would have quickly resolved the matter. As Lewies argued to the Court, "Now, Mr. Hall's motion to disqualify then
became moot, and that's a legal doctrine, on the same day it was filed because I filed my own motion to withdraw.
Now, what's the reason to press on with a motion to disqualify when the attorney you're seeking to disqualify has
said wait a minute, I want out of it, I want to withdraw? Isn't the motion to disqualify moot? I would argue yes."
(Transcript p. 67, lines 22-25; and p.68, lines 1-4) Instead, the Court chose to conduct a hearing on the competing
motions on January 22, 2013. Then, it awarded attorney's fees to Hall for having to file his motions to disqualify
Lewies. Then, the Court conducted another hearing on attorney's fees on February 26, 2013. Then, it converted its
award of attorneys fees into Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies, sua sponte, in its Memorandum Decision issued on
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G. The Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained private
legal counsel, Blake G. HalL Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581
because the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation ofthe Idaho
Constitution's necessity requirement had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the
Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the Court for its decision.
In Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984), the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized that while the elements of an actual or justiciable controversy are not
subject to a mechanical standard, the United States Supreme Court aptly summarized the pivotal
elements of a justiciable controversy in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57
S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).
"A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial
determination .... A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot.. ..
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.... It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts."
300 U.S. at 240-41, 57 S.Ct. at 464 (citations omitted). See also Sanchez v. City of
Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322,481 P.2d 401 (1971); Cummings Construction Co. v. School
District No.9, 242 Or. 106,408 P.2d 80 (1965).
We believe this federal standard provides a concise guideline for our analysis, and therefore,
we will apply these criteria in conjunction with pertinent Idaho case law cited infra. Harris v. Cassia
March 29, 2013, nearly three full months after Lewies filed his motions to withdraw.
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County, supra.
In the case at bar, the Court improperly decided a question that was not before it. In its
Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled that, "Although contested by Lewies, the Court deems
appropriate the decision by the county to retain Hall, its former civil deputy, to defend it in these
cases." (R.182 at 189) However, just a month earlier, during its February 26, 2013 hearing on the
petitions, the Court represented to the parties that the question whether Hall had been properly hired
by Fremont County had been withdrawn by the prosecuting attorney's office, and as such, the Court
was relieved from having to decide a "very tough question. " 18 The exchange was as follows:
THE COURT: On the first issue, the Court notes that on February 19th of 2012
[2013], Mr. Dustin filed a document with the Court informing it that his office was
withdrawing and allowing Mr. Hall to represent Fremont County on these matters,
representing the Board of County Commissioners on both the Flying A Ranch case
and on the Gwaltney case. The Court sees that as a good development. It's going to
get us straight to the merits 19 instead of worrying about who's representing who.
And as I read Mr. Dustin's Notice, I think that brings that issue to an end. Are
there any matters related to that that we need to still address? (Emphasis added).
MR. DUSTIN: Not unless the Court has any questions, Your Honor.
MR. HALL: We don't believe that there's anything further, Your Honor, I think
that resolves the matter.
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. I would let Mr. Dustin know, I did read your
document very carefully. I think it contains some very good legal analysis and I
think certainly the Court would have had a very tough question before it if I'd had
18

This is the phrase Judge Moeller used to describe the legal question raised by the Office of the Fremont County
Prosecuting Attorney concerning whether the Commissioners' decision to retain Hall, as private counsel, satisfied
the "necessity requirement" under Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Idaho Constitution.
19

Once again, the Court is found undercutting its own position on Rule II sanctions. Why was the Court so anxious
to "get straight to the merits" if the petitions violated Rule II 's certification requirement?

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 28
Page 282 of 408

I
I
I

to rule on that. I think ultimately, though, you made a wise decision. I think some
things, as with all things in life, we sometimes have to decide what hill we want to
die on and I'm not sure that's the hill any of us wanted to die on, so I am glad we got
that issue behind us. (Emphasis added)
(Transcript p. 41, lines 6-14; and p. 42, lines 1-3)

I
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If, as Judge Moeller himself stated, "/think certainly the Court would have had a very tough

question before it

if I'd had to

withdrawn question?

rule on that, " then on what grounds did he proceed to rule on the

Although the question whether "necessity" existed for the Commissioners'

hiring of Hall was certainly an important legal question for the Office of the Fremont County
Prosecuting Attomey, 20 and the people of Fremont County, it was rendered moot when deputy
prosecuting attorney, Dustin, filed his notice informing the Court that his office had decided to
withdraw the question. (R. 145) The parties, and presiding Judge Moeller, all agreed on the record
that the matter had been resolved. No case or controversy existed. The question was no longer
justiciable.
The Court rendered an opinion on a highly sensitive, but nevertheless, moot issue. Greater
judicial restraint may have been the better course in light of the recent controversies surrounding the
case of Kline v. Power County Board of Commissioners, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 401122012.

20

As the elected prosecuting attorney for Fremont County, Lewies explained to the Court that, "I have a duty under
the Idaho Code to prosecute and defend all cases in which my client, Fremont County, not the Board of
Commissioners but the County, is a party. I thought I had an ethical obligation to assert my duties to represent and
defend the County in these matters." (Transcript p. 60, lines 3-8)
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H. The Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his representation of

petitioners.
The Court ruled that, "Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that he
would be unable to see either case through to completion -this is undisputed." (R. 182 at 189)
"Completed," as explained by the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct, means when the
"agreed-upon assistance has been concluded." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.16, Comment 1.
In the instant case, before ever accepting representation of petitioners, Lewies explained to
Flying "A" Ranch, et. a!. and Gwaltney, et. a!., that since he was going to be officially sworn-in as
Fremont County's prosecuting attorney in mid-January 2013, he would have to withdraw from
representing them at that time.

Lewies went on to explain that in consideration of the rapidly

approaching statutory deadline for filing petitions for judicial review, he could proceed to file
petitions to preserve legal rights, but would have to withdraw relatively soon thereafter. (Transcript
p. 56, lines 17-25; p.57, lines 1-5) Both sets of clients agreed to Lewies' limited representation. (R.
64 at 65, ~~ 4 and 5)
If the Court believed that "complete" means that Lewies had to see the petitions through to
ultimate conclusion, including any appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court, then it had a mistaken
understanding of the term.

Attorneys and their clients are free to agree between and among

themselves for limited representation; representation that will be deemed "complete" at some
juncture short of final judgment on appeal.
Further, unless and until an actual case or controversy was presented to the Court on the
question whether Lewies had completed his limited representation of petitioners, the Court should
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have refrained from issuing an opinion on the matter. For the Court to have rendered its opinion on
a legal question that was not before it, was improper. The opinion was rendered without the Court
hearing evidence on the issue and without allowing Lewies to present oral argument. The Court
ruled without any factual basis, or alternatively, it ruled based on plain factual error regarding the
true nature ofLewies' agreed-upon limited representation.
Accordingly, the Court abused its discretion.

I. Judge Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies by engaging in the

following actions:
a.) Ex parte communication.
Canon 3(7) provides in relevant part, that, "A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex

parte communications ... " except where authorized by law. 21
In the instant case, immediately following the Court's January 22, 2013 hearing on the
petitions, Judge Moeller invited Lewies into his chambers and proceeded to explain that he was
aware there was some bad blood between Lewies and Hall;22 that he wanted it to end; and that he
was going to see to it that it "ends in this case.'m

21

Judge Moeller warned Lewies, "You have to

I.C.J.C. Canon 3(7).

The bad blood stemmed from the 2012 primary election campaign for Fremont County prosecuting attorney where
Lewies defeated Hall's boss, prosecuting attorney Joette Lookabaugh, by a landslide margin of65% to 35%.
22

23

Judge Moeller said in open court, "And this whole process that we're going through, I think illustrates the folly of
beginning this case the way it was begun because basically we're spinning our wheels on issues that aren't serving
either the Respondents or the Petitioners in this case and, again, I understand that there's been acts of pettiness
between these parties on other matters at other times, but there needs to come a time when that ends and I'm
going to do what I can to see that it ends in this case (emphasis added) because I think there are important issues
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decide what hill you want to die on. " (R. 64 at 65

~ 11 i

4

Then, as Lewies was leaving chambers,

Judge Moeller issued another warning to him, saying, "This conversation never happened "(Ibid.)
Indeed, in his Memorandum Decision, Judge Moeller admits that an ex parte

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

communication with Lewies took place in his chambers, and further admits that, "the Court merely

advised [Lewies] to avoid allowing a political grudge to inteifere with his professional
judgment." (R. 189, fn. 14) Although Judge Moeller maintains, "The Court initiated this
conversation after consulting Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(D), which provides, in
part: 'Judges are encouraged to bring instances of unprofessional conduct by judges or lawyers to
their attention in order to provide them opportunities to correct their errors without disciplinary
proceedings; .... ,"'the fact is he did not identify any specific instance of unprofessional conduct
and he identified no violation of the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct. Rather, he warned
Lewies to end what he subjectively believed was a "political grudge."25 Judge Moeller
admittedly believed Lewies was "provoking"26 the Commissioners by filing the petitions. Yet,
all throughout the proceedings, Judge Moeller repeatedly acknowledged the importance of the
merits of the petitions by saying the following things:

that Mr. Gwaltney and Varney and Flying A Ranch and Fremont County have in this case and they're being
completely covered by the smoke of these other issues. " (See, e.g., Transcript p. 34, lines 10-22)
24

Judge Moeller used the exact same phraseology when addressing deputy prosecuting attorney, Mr. Dustin, as
follows: "I think ultimately, though, you made a wise decision. I think some things, as with all things in life, we
sometimes have to decide what hill we want to die on and I'm not sure that's the hill any of us wanted to die on, so
I am glad we got that issue behind us." (See, e.g., Transcript p. 42, lines 3-8)
25

R. 182 at 189, footnote 14.

26

Judge Moeller wrote in his Memorandum Decision that, "Any existing bad feelings between Lewies and the
Commissioners would only be escalated by such provocative conduct. " (R. 182 at 190)
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"So let's take up the representation issues first before we proceed to the merits of
the other issues before the Court ... " (Transcript p. 2, lines 8-1 0)

***

"I think there are important issues that Mr. Gwaltney and Varney and Flying "A"
Ranch and Fremont County have in this case and they're being completely
covered by the smoke of these other issues." (Transcript p. 34, lines 19-22)

***
"On the first issue, the Court notes that on February 19th of 2012, Mr. Dustin has
filed a document with the Court informing it that his office was withdrawing and
allowing Mr. Hall to represent Fremont County on these matters, representing the
Board of County Commissioners on both the Flying "A" Ranch case and on the
Gwaltney case. The Court sees that as a good development. It's going to let us get
straight to the merits instead of worrying about who's representing who."
(Transcript p. 41, lines 5-14)

***
"Here, Lewies' actions have directly delayed adjudication of the petitions for
judicial review because the Court has been required to spend over two months
dealing with issues related to representation, rather than hearing the merits of
the petitions." (R. 182 at 188).
Judge Moeller's open acknowledgement that the petitions contained "important issues"
cannot be reconciled with his ex parte warning to Lewies not to let a "political grudge" interfere
with his professional judgment and to end his provocative conduct. If the petitions contained
important issues, and if Judge Moeller wanted to "get straight to the merits," then his ex parte
warning for Lewies to "decide what hill you want to die on" (i.e. end his political grudge against
the Commissioners) showed bias or prejudice against Lewies.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 33
Page 287 of 408

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Why did Judge Moeller feel it necessary to warn Lewies to "end it" if the petitions had
merit?

b.) Converting an award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions, sua sponte.
The Court demonstrated bias or prejudice27 against Lewies by engaging in the following
sequence of actions: First, it awarded attorney's fees to the County for having to bring motions to
disqualify Lewies? 8 Second, Judge Moeller initiated an ex parte communication with Lewies by
inviting him into chambers and proceeding to warn him about "deciding what hill he wanted to die
on." Third, the Court, sua sponte, converted its earlier award of attorney's fees to the County on
grounds that it had to file motions to disqualify Lewies, into Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies.
What caused the Court to convert a routine award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions?
The Court never explained its reasoning on this point. The only intervening event between the initial
award of attorney's fees and the conversion into Rule 11 sanctions, was the Court's ex parte
warning to Lewies to decide what hill to die on.

Afterall, as the Court in the instant case

acknowledged, "The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for which attorneys
fees may be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) are not reasons that will
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l )." (R. 182 at 186)
27

I.C.J.C. Canon 3(B)(6).

28

"The Court also believes that Mr. Hall, who was acting as a Deputy Prosecutor at the time he filed it, was justified
in bringing the Motion to Disqualify, that he shouldn't have had to file that Motion, but it was necessitated by Mr.
Lewies failing to recuse himself or -- how would we properly put it -- withdraw from the case in a timely manner.
So, therefore, the Court fmds that the County does have a right to seek attorney's fees." (Transcript p. 32, lines 2125; and p. 33, lines 1-4) Accordingly, in its Order on Motions, the Court ruled that, " ... the County is entitled to
recover its attorney fees incurred in filing the motion to withdraw [disqualify]." (R. 106, ~ 3)
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It reasonably appears, then, that because Lewies did not heed the Court's warning to end his
"political grudge" and his "provocative conduct," the Court decided to make good on its threat: It
converted a routine award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions against Lewes and issued a
scathing Memorandum Decision (R. 182) 29 denouncing Lewies for, committing a "serious offense

against the judicial system" and other grave misdeeds. In other words, the Court caused Lewies to
"die on that hill."

c.) Disregarding allegations of Hall's unethical and improper conduct..
First, the Court wholly disregarded Lewies' argument that Hall should have conducted a
reasonable inquiry into the facts prior to filing motions to disqualify Lewies. In Court, Lewies
argued as follows,
MR. LEWIES: Furthermore, before filing his Motion to Disqualify me, Mr. Hall
failed to make any good faith effort to confer or attempt to confer with me.
And, Your Honor, this would have saved you all this hassle if he'd picked up the
phone and said, hey, Karl, looks like you've got a conflict on the horizon there,
what are you going to do, are you going to hang onto those private clients and try
to play both sides of this game? I'd say absolutely not. In fact, I've made it clear to
my client on the day I accepted representation I'm going to have to withdraw.
(Transcript p. 61, lines 15-25)

***
MR. LEWIES: All I wanted to say here is that if Mr. Hall as an attorney for Fremont
County had called me a private attorney and said, hey, private attorney, once you
become a public attorney are you planning to continue to represent the private
parties? If that call had been made, Your Honor, and under Rule 11 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure that sort of a reasonable inquiry is to be made before filing Motions.
29

Substantial portions of Judge Moeller's Memorandum Decision were published in two major Eastern Idaho
newspapers: the Idaho Falls Post-Register and the Rexburg Standard-Journal. As a result of those publications,
Lewies' professional reputation and personal standing in his community have suffered damages.
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I mean, you know, you have to inquire.
THE COURT: Well, I know the Rules for Discovery have a meet and confer
requirement. Is there a meet and confer -- I understand your argument that perhaps
Mr. Lee (sic) should have called you first and asked you, are you going to withdraw
or not?
MR. LEWIES: Yeah.
THE COURT: I think that's a valid argument, but there isn't a legal requirement for a
meet and confer on an issue like this, is there?
MR. LEWIES: I'm not saying a meet and confer, but there is a standard for a
reasonable inquiry before filing documents, Rule 11.
THE COURT: So Counsel had an obligation to call you and say you can't be serious
about this?
MR. LEWIES: Huh? I'm sorry?
THE COURT: So Counsel had an obligation to call you and say are you going to do
something to withdraw or not? Is that-- I understand that you're suggesting he should
have done that and I think that's a fair argumentMR. LEWIES: I think that would have been reasonable (Transcript p. 64, lines 13-25; and p. 65, lines 1-18)
Why didn't the Court address Hall's alleged violation of Rule 11? Why didn't it even
mention it in its Memorandum Decision?
Second, the Court disregarded Lewies' claim that Hall violated I.R.P.C. 1.11, as follows:
MR. LEWIES: However, the truth ofthe matter, Your Honor, is that on or
about November 20, 2012, while still employed as Fremont County's Deputy
Prosecutor and in apparent violation of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct
J.JJ(d)(2)(2) that prohibits attorneys who are currently serving as public employees
from ... negotiating for private employment with any person who is involved as a
party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially ....
Mr. Hall offered in writing to Fremont County on Fremont County letterhead
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and signed in his capacity as, quote, Chief Civil Prosecuting Attorney-Chief Civil
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, he offered to, quote, contract with the County at a
discounted rate of$150 per hour for my time. And here's a copy of that letter if you
want to see it.
So he was negotiating private employment with his own client. ...
(Transcript p. 69, lines 24-25; and p. 70, lines 1-18)
Why didn't the Court make mention of Hall's alleged violation of Idaho's ethics rules by
negotiating for his private employment with his own public client, Fremont County? Was not that
conduct worth mentioning in its Memorandum Decision?
Finally, the Court disregarded Lewies' claim that Hall violated I.R.P.C. 3.3, as follows:
MR. LEWIES: The point I really want to make is he's not billing $225 as he said in
his sworn Affidavit, he's billing $150. And there it is in his own writing. Maybe he
didn't think I'd discover that. Now, in his reply brief, Mr. Hall represents to the Court
that. .. the contract between Mr. Hall and the County does not identify a specified
hourly rate for services, but we now know the truth of the matter. Mr. Hall himself
has specified the rate in the contract he proposed with the County, and that specified
rate is $150 per hour. It appears to me, Your Honor, that Mr. Hall's run afoul of yet
another ethical rule, and that would be Rule 3.3 that provides, quote, a lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal. He says he's billing $225,
that's not the case, he got a contract for $150.
(Transcript p. 70, lines 19-25; and p. 71, lines 1-10)
MR. LEWIES: Now, finally, Your Honor, it appears to me that Mr. Hall's engaged
in an effort to deliberately overbill me here. Assuming Mr. Hall billed his eight
hours, total of eight hours here, at his contracted rate of $150 an hour, that would
have been $1,200, but in his sworn Affidavit he claims eight hours at $225 an hour,
that's $75 an hour more than his own contracted rate. So he's claiming $1,777.50,
that's an overbilling of $575, Your Honor, that I think is a knowing and deliberate
overbilling and I, frankly, think dishonest conduct.
(Transcript p. 74, lines 1-11)
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Why did the Court wholly disregard each and every one ofLewies' allegations of unethical
conduct by Hall? Were the allegations unfounded? The Court did not say so. It made not even the
slightest mention of any of the allegations in its Memorandum Decision. But it wrote at length
publically condemning Lewies for all sorts of serious offenses against the integrity of the judicial
system.
Based on these facts, it reasonably appears that the Court was biased or prejudiced against
Lewies, and as such, was not and acting fairly and impartially towards him.

d.) Issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision denouncing Lewies.
Canon 3(B)(5) provides that, "A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to .. .lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity ... " 30
However, in seeming disregard of Canon 3, Judge Moeller seemed to go out of his way to
write a blistering decision that was not only highly critical of Lewies' decision to file petitions for
judicial review against the Commissioners, it also denounced Lewies personally. As published in
both local area newspapers, the Idaho Falls Post-Register and the Rexburg Standard-Journal, Judge
Moeller wrote the following about Lewies: "Lewies' filing of the petitions against a known future
client was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system;" "Lewies irritated a chain
of events that any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity
from everyone involved- greatly undermining public confidence in the outcome of both cases;" "It
30

I.C.J.C. Canon 3(B)(5).

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 38
Page 292 of 408

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

is simply unfathomable to the Court how Lewies could have failed to understand that his actions
would almost immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel;" "Likewise, Lewies should have
anticipated that his actions would deprive his future clients, the County and the Board of
Commissioners of representation; "Lewies' decision to sign and file the petitions was clearly
misguided and adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process;" With the application of
wisdom and common sense, one could have reasonably predicted that such conduct would meet
with the stem disapproval of Mr. Lewies' future clients, the County and Commissioners, as well as
the Court, whose duty it is to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process." (R. 182, Memorandum
Decision)
Since publication of Judge Moeller's decision in the area newspapers, Lewies has suffered
damage to his professional reputation and personal standing in the community. Can it be said that
Judge Moeller's decision was dignified and courteous?
Since the decision went public, several area attorneys have approached Lewies deriding him
about, "How much Judge Moeller likes you." As a direct result of his decision, there is now a
belief among members of the local area bar, that Judge Moeller has a personal dislike ofLewies.
Judge Moeller's withering public denunciation of Lewies was undeserving under the
circumstances and did not serve the people of Eastern Idaho well.

I
I
I
I
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that the lower Court
failed to conduct an adequate analysis under Rule 11 before imposing sanctions on Lewies, and
therefore, such sanctions cannot be sustained. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that
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the petitions filed by Lewies did not violate Rule 11 signature certification requirements; that the
lower Court's imposition of attorney's fees as a Rule 11 sanction was improper and cannot be
sustained; that the lower Court erred in finding that Lewies (a) had not withdrawn as counsel for
the county; (b) delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review; (c) deeming it
appropriate for the Commissioners to have retained Hall as private counsel; (d) finding that
Lewies was unable to complete his representation of petitioners; and that presiding Judge
Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies.
Submitted this 21st day of August, 2013

;G::rr/.~

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Real Party in Interest - Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a two true and correct copies ofthe foregoing REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST - APPELLANT'S BRIEF has this 21st day of August, 2013, been served upon
the individuals listed below by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, with proper postage
thereon, and addressed as follows:
Hon. Gregory W. Moeller
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE
151 W. 15tN.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL, ANGELL, STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
W. Lynn Rossner, Esq.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
109 N. 2nd West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDI IA-nD S~~
THE STATE OF IDAHO COUNTY OFF Me:lN
DISTRICT COURT
.:,':: L------~r::-~~·
IIW:--.J:;;t:;{..~~~·

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESIDING JUDGE:
DATE:
ATTORNEYS PRESENT:
COURT REPORTER:
CLERK:

304

305

307

310

313

LAW AND MOTION
GREGORY W. MOELLER
~BGUST 27,2013
\.:.J

12.- 58D

DAVE MARLOW
DEBORAH MACE

FLYING A RANCH ETAL VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS.
MR STARNS IS PRESENT FOR RESPONDANTS
MR ROSSNER IS PRESENT FOR PETITIONER.
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED ALL BRIEFS.
MR HOSSNER ON MOTION. TIMELY FILING. ASKS THE COURT
TO ENTER A JUDGMENT. THE COURT COMMENTS ON ORDER
GOVERNING PROCEDURE AND THE COURT DID ORDER AN
ORDER MODIFYING BRIEFING SCHEDULE.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON UNDERSTANDING OF RESPONDANTS
POSITION.
MR HOSSNER COMMENTS ON FILING HIS BRIEF IN FEBRUARY.
MR ROSSNER STATES HE DID NOT GET MODIFIED ORDER.
MR STARNS ON ARGUMENT. STATES THE COURTS ORDER WAS
CLEAR. COMMENTS ON MATTERS NEEDING RESOLVED ON THE
MERITS. COMMENTS ON IRCP 1.
STATES NO PREJUDICE DID OCCUR.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON BOTH PARTIES ACTED IN GOOD FAITH
THE COURT FEELS A MIS UNDERSTANDING DID OCCUR.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON RULE 84. DOES NOT FEEL ANY BAD
FAITH OCCURRED.
WILL DENY MOTION AND WILL DECIDE CASE ON THE MERITS.
WILL MOVE TO ORAL ARGUMENT.
MRHOSSNER WILL PROCEED FIRST.
MR HOSSNER MAY HAVE 30 MINUTES FOR AGRUMENT.
COMMENTS ON IC42-02. MR HOSSNER COMMENTS ON MAP.

SCANNED
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324
329

333

336
337

342

345

358

406

•

THE COURT DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS A FULL RECORD. DOES NOT
HAVE MAP.
THE COURT ASKS AS TO SUPREMACY LAW ISSUE. MR HOSSNER
RESPONDS.
THE COURT EXPRESSES CONCERN AS TO FINDINGS OF FACTS
PAGE 73,74. DOES NOT SEE EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCIAL AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. ASKS MR HOSSNER IF HE IS A WARE OF
SOMETHING IN THE RECORD THE COURT IS MISSING. MR HOSSNER
STATES NONE IS IN RECORD.
COMMENTS ON RS ROAD. STEPS TAKEN TO DETERMINE THAT WERE
NOT TAKEN BY COMMISSIONERS. HAS TAKEN AWAY SUSBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE LAND OWNER.
MR ROSSNER ASKS FOR THIS MATTER TO BE DISMISSED.
THE COURT ASKS MR ROSSNER AS TO BEING SPECIFIC TO ALL
FINDINGS OR JUST MR ROSSNER'S CLIENT.
MR STARNS WANTS TO STRESS THIS IS NOT A ROAD VALIDATION
PROCEEDING. COMMENTS ON 42-4A. HOW DOES THE COUNTY
ADOPT AN OFFICIAL MAP.
HAS TO HAVE PREPARATION OF THE MAP. COMPLIED WITH 40-402
THE COURT ASKS AS TO EAST WEST ROAD DESIGNATION, BUT
NORTH ROAD WAS THE ROAD IN CONTRAVERSY. MR STARNS DOES
NOT THINK THAT IS ACCURATE. ASKS AGAIN AS TO NORTH ROAD
NOT BEING ON THE MAP.
MR STARNS FEELS THAT IT WAS.
PETITIONERS WERE AWARE AND DID SHOW UP FOR HEARING AND
KNEW WHAT THEY WERE ARGUING.
THE COURT COMMENTS ON FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, REFERS
TO PAGE 73. IS ROAD IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 12B.
ASKS WHERE THEN WAS ROAD IDENT. IN 12B ADDRESSED. MR
STARNS STATES IN PARAGRAPH 8. MR STARNS DOES NOT FEEL
WHAT THE COURT IS ASKING HAS BEEN MADE PART OF THE
RECORD.
ADOPTION OF AN OFFICIAL MAP PROCEEDING IS DIFF THAN
ROAD VALIDATION PROCEEDING.
THE COURT ASKS AS TO PREJUDICE. MR STARNS COMMENTS ON
4202. FEELS MR HOSSNER HAS MIS READ.
MR STARNS REF. TO PARAGRAPH 3. IS IMPORTANT. COMMENTS
ON 40-4201. NOTHING IN THE RECORD WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT COMM DID NOT COMPLY.
MR HOSSNER STATES THE COMMISSIONERS MISSED THE MARK
MUST SET OUT PUBLIC ROADS ON THE MAP. THE COURT ASKS
MR HOSSNER IF IT IS NOT A PUBLIC ROAD WHAT IS IT. MR HOSSNER
STATES IT IS A TRAIL.
MR HOSSNER REFERS TO THE NEXT TO THE LAST PAGE OF HIS
BRIEF. REFERS TO SECTION 15,9AND 42.
THE COURT WILL TAKE THE MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT
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THE COURT DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS BEEN PRESENTED WITH A
FULL COPY OF THE RECORD. ASKS MR STARNS TO LEAVE HIS
COPY OF THE RECORD.
PAGE 72 IS START OF RECORD EX. B. CLERK TO FIND ORIGINALS
OR MAKE COPIES
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

Supreme Court Docket No. 409872013 (41132-2013)
Case No. CV-2012-580
(CV2012-581)

and

.-. ·; .•.: ... ·. '< ... _. . .·
,:

KARL H. LEWIES,
Real Party in Interest Appellant

i

I.. --.

1.·

I

....
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..

_
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--

-. ·-
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seP 1 9 2013

__9,;

vs.

~

.•

..,..

...

--~'"_

~-----~

II

J

•. I

BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually
and in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,

. ··-··_j

Respondents.
E. C. GWALTNEY, III AND LANA K.
VARNEY,
Petitioners,

v
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
Supreme Court Docket No. 40987corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
2013 (41132-2013)
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Case No. CV-2012-580
Petitioners,
(CV2012-581)
and
KARL H. LEWIES,
Real Party in InterestAppellant

I

-1

I
I
I
I
I
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vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision ofthe state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually
and in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.
E. C. GWALTNEY, III AND LANA K.
VARNEY,
Petitioners,
v

BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
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subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually
and in his official capacity, and LEROY
MILLER, individually and in his official
capacity,
Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont
Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge, Presiding.
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC.
343 E 4th N, Suite 125
Rexburg, ID 83440
Telephone: (208) 372-1700
Facsimile: (208) 372-1701
khlewies@gmail.com

Attorney for Real Party in InterestAppellant
W. Lynn Hossner, Esq.
ATTORNEY ATLAW
109 N 2nd West
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Telephone: (208) 624-3782
Facsimile: (208) 624-3783

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Nathan R. Stames, Esq.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 522-3003
Facsimile: (208) 656-7108
bgh@hasattomeys.com

Attorneys for Respondents
Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN &
CRAPO
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorney for Petitioners Flying A Ranch
Attorney for Petitioners Gwaltney
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 23, 2012, attorney Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") filed two
separate petitions seeking judicial review of decisions made by the Board of
Commissioners for Fremont County ("the Commissioners" or "the County"). 1 (R.
8-14). These petitions were filed on behalf of two separate groups of petitioners
(referred to collectively as the "Petitions"):
A. Case No. CV-12-580 was filed on behalf of
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Clen
Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay
Pickard , George Ty Nedrow, and David Tuk
Nedrow (collectively referred to as "Flying 'A'
Ranch"); and
B. Case No. CV-12-581 was filed on behalf ofE.C.
Gwaltney, ill and Lana K.Varney (collectively
referred to as "Gwaltney").

Both Petitions named Fremont County and two of the County Commissioners
(Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller) in both their official and individual
capacities. Lewies defeated the incumbent Fremont County prosecutor in the
primary election on May 15, 2012, and then ran unopposed in the general election.
At the time of filing, Lewies was the prosecutor-elect for Fremont County, having
Lewies filed two separate petitions for judicial review: Petition for Judicial
Review (November 23, 2012) (CV-12-580); and Petition for Judicial Review
(November 23, 2012) (CV-12-581). Only the Petition for Judicial Review for
CV-12-580 is included in the record. (SeeR. 8-14).
1

1
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been duly elected in the general election held November 6, 2012. Lewies had not
yet taken office when he filed the petitions; he was sworn-in on January 14, 2013.
On January 2, 2013, the County, through its then deputy prosecuting
attorney, at the insistence of the County Commissioners, set a hearing for a
motion to disqualify Lewies from representing the Petitioners and the County in
these matters. On January 7, 2013, the County filed a motion to disqualify and
requested attorney fees. A motion for partial dismissal was likewise filed seeking
to dismiss each of the named County Commissioners in their individual
capacities. In response to the motion to disqualify, Lewies filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel for Petitioners later that day. Lewies filed an affidavit
acknowledging, "a conflict of interest will arise in connection with my continued
representation of Petitioners in this case." (R. 31 ). 2 While recognizing the
inherent conflict of interest in representing the Petitioners, Lewies did not
withdraw his claim to represent the County on these matters.
On January 11, 2013, the County filed a substitution of counsel, advising
the district court that the County had retained the law firm of Nelson Hall Parry
Tucker, P .A. to defend it in aforementioned Petitioners for Judicial Review given
the inherent conflict of interest Lewies had from his prior representation of
2

At oral argument Lewies conceded that he had forgotten to withdraw and was
reminded of this obligation upon the County's filing ofthe motion to disqualify.

2
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Petitioners. On January 14, 2013, Lewies and Lynn Hossner ("Hossner")
stipulated to the substitution of Hossner for Lewies in representing Flying "A"
Ranch. (R. 42-43). Hossner continues to represent Flying "A" Ranch in the
proceedings.
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013 on the County's motion to
disqualify and Lewies' motion to withdraw. A motion for partial dismissal of the
two County Commissioners individually named was also taken up at the hearing.
The Court dismissed the individually named Commissioners. The district court
has previously summarized that hearing as follows:
The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had failed to withdraw voluntarily
until the County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity
he had just recently been elected to represent on behalf of clients
he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed the delay to an
oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was
violated. He claimed that his clients were operating under time
constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed that he
should no longer represent his former clients or the County on
these matters in the future.
(R. 104-1 07). Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Nelson Hall Parry Tucker,

P .A. to file any motions or argue on behalf of the County. At the oral argument,
counsel for the County noted that he was an acting deputy prosecutor for the
County when the motions were filed and that his firm was now acting under a
contract with the County Commissioners. The district court took care to
3
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emphasize that Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County of legal
counsel in this matter. Lewies contended, under objection, however, that his
newly appointed deputy prosecutor, Billie Siddoway, could take over Lewies'
representation of the County on these discrete matters.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court barred Lewies from
representing either his former clients (Petitioners) or his new client (the County)
in the identified matters, thereby effectively granting both the motion to disqualifY
and the motion to withdraw. The Court further concluded:
... the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against
Mr. Lewies personally, but not against his clients, the Petitioners.
Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate supporting
documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to appear
for purposes of contesting the attorney fees only.
(R. 106). The Court further permitted Lewies' newly appointed deputy, Billie
Siddoway ("Siddoway"), 14 days to file a brief explaining why the Fremont
County Prosecutor's Office should be allowed to continue representing the County
on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing. (R.
106).
Consistent with the district court's order, Siddoway filed a Notice of

Conflict ofInterest on February 6, 2013. (R. 71-73). Siddoway was "terminated"
by Lewies four days later for filing the Notice of Conflict ofInterest against his
4
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wishes, despite Lewies being barred from representation of either Petitioners or
the County. (R. 100-103). Lewies then appointed Ryan Dustin ("Dustin") to
serve as his deputy prosecutor on February 11, 2013. Lewies then filed a motion
for extension of time, under objection from the County, for briefing the issue of
Lewies' deputy prosecuting attorney being permitted to represent the County. A
hearing on the motion was held on February 15, 2013. At the hearing, the district
court granted the extension on the express condition that both Lewies and Dustin
visit with counsel from the Idaho State Bar ("Bar Counsel") about the ethical
ramifications of Lewies conduct in these matters. Shortly after the hearing, Dustin
filed a notice with the district court that his office was withdrawing from
representation of the County on the two petitions. (R. 145-149).
The County subsequently filed a timely affidavit of attorney's fees and
Lewies filed an objection. Oral argument took place on February 26, 2013. The
district court subsequently issued its Memorandum Decision re: Sanctions
("Memorandum Decision") on March 29, 2013. The district court ruled that
Lewies had violated rule 11(a)(l), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure and that Fremont
County was entitled to an attorney fee award in the amount of $1,185.00 against
Lewies personally. The instant appeal was subsequently filed by Lewies.

5
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A.

Rule 11 Sanctions are Left to the Sound Discretion of the Court

Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 can only be used where a filing

I
I
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violates the signature requirements ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1).
However, Lewies' reading of Rule ll(a)(l) is misplaced and fails to consider the
Idaho Supreme Court's express language allowing Rule 11 to be awarded as a
sanction for "misguided filings" and "litigative misconduct."
Rule 11, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one (1) licensed attorney of record of the state of
Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose
address shall be stated before the same may be filed.
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state
the party's address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate that the attorney or party has read the
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
6
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promptly after the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, "[t]he intent ofthe rule is to grant
courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete pleadin& abuses or other

tvoes ofliti&ative misconduct." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 650, 115
P .3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). Rule 11 is appropriately used as a
"management tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish and deter
specific frivolous and other mis&uided fllin&s." Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho
937, 940, 120 P.3d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Campbell v. Kildew, 141
Idaho 640, 650, 115 P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). A Rule 11 sanction
is appropriately imposed where the district court is considering only the
"attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers." Riggins
v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). Thus, Idaho law is

clear that Rule 11 is not simply limited to sanction an attorney who signs a
frivolous or unmeritorious pleading. Rather, Rule 11 can permissively be used to
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sanction an attorney for "litigative misconduct" or for the filing of "misguided
filings."
Initially, Judge Moeller, recognized that the imposition of sanctions was
subject to an abuse of discretion standard. (R. 185). Specifically, the district
court recognized that it acted within its discretion where it "considers whether it
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." See Lamar Corp. v. City

ofTwin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40, 981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999). (R. 185).
Accordingly, where Judge Moeller recognized the issue of Rule 11 sanctions as
discretionary, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and reached a decision
through the exercise of reason, the Rule 11 sanction against Lewies should be
upheld. In this case, it is clear from the plain language of the Memorandum
Decision, and discussed more fully below, that Judge Moeller did not abuse his
discretion when imposing Rule 11 sanctions.
The Memorandum Decision meticulously addresses the procedural history
that precipitated the lower courts decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Guiding
the lower court's reasoning behind imposing sanctions on Lewies was the well-
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established Idaho law that Rule 11 may be used as a management tool to
addressed litigative misconduct and misguided filings.
Lewies focuses on seven phrases from the Memorandum Decision3, that
were taken out of context and fail to consider the court's reasoning in toto. A
reading of the Memorandum Decision where Lewies pulls his specific quotes was
crafted with the "totality of the circumstances" of the litigation in mind. (R. 187).
While the Court noted his concerns about Lewies conduct, he unequivocally
stated in reference to his comments on the advisability of filing the petitions,
"such matters are not questions typically answered by this court." (R. 187).
Rather, as the court clearly recognized, its sanctioning authority was reviewed
"pursuant to its 'court management' role and act using its inherent discretion to
ensure that the adjudication is fair to all sides." (R. 187).
The court further recognized that ethical rules were not a consideration in
sanctioning Lewies, and the court viewed Lewies conduct in the broad picture of
the "integrity of the judicial process." (R. 188). It was with this consideration
that the district court found that the integrity of the judicial process (litigative
misconduct) was harmed by Lewies failure to identify the significant conflict
issues that would inevitable be created by Lewies' filings:
3

The seven quotes focused on are specifically identified in Appellant's Brief
between pages 16 and 19.
9
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The Court finds that regardless of the ethical
ramifications, Lewies' filings of the petitions
against a known, future client was a significant
offense against the integrity of the judicial system.
Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that
the person they had just elected as County
prosecutor would not be filing new legal actions
against the County on behalf of private individuals.
Similarly, the Commissioners had every reason to
be concerned when they were sued in both their
official and personal capacities by the incoming
county attorney. By so doing, Lewies initiated a
chain of events that any reasonable attorney should
have anticipated would create mistrust and
animosity from everyone involved-greatly
undermining public confidence in the outcome of
both cases.

(R. 188 (emphasis in original)).
Ultimately, the district court correctly concluded "Lewies' decision to sign and
file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected the integrity of the
judicial process." (R. 188). The district court again noted that it was its duty to
"safeguard the integrity of the judicial process" and was the very "type of
litigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectify." (R. 188). The district
court continued, "Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that
he would be unable [sic] to see either case through to completion-this is
undisputed. Even if the Petitioners were acting under time constraints, that does
not justify Lewies acting in an ethically questionable manner." (R. 188). As such,
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the district court appropriately recognized that the filing of the Petitions would
instantaneously cause problems for both the Petitioners and the County. The
district court was further concerned with Lewies failure to timely file a motion to
withdraw that would have allowed the Petitioners to have immediate
representation as the matter progressed through the appeals process. Further, any
suggestion by Lewies that he completed his representation of Petitioners is devoid
of verifiable facts in the record. It is merely supposition and reliance on Lewies
representations only that the full representation was limited to filing the Petitions.
Rather, the fact that immediate withdrawal was not performed at least causes a
question about the actual scope of representation and Lewies ability to
appropriately represent the petitioners.
The district court at the January 22, 2013 hearing specifically addressed
his concern for the ramifications Lewies conduct would have on the County:
I don't think Mr. Hall should have had to file a
Motion in January of 2013 to bring this issue to the
Court's attention. I think this should have been
brought to the Court's attention earlier by Mr.
Lewies himself and even if the Court were to find
that the questionable decision to file this after the
election wasn't inappropriate, even if I were to
agree with Mr. Lewies on that, certainly the Petition
should have been followed with an immediate
substitution of counsel indicating the new attorneys
for the Petitioners were appearing. This puts the
County in unfair jeopardy and uncertainty, it put the
11
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Petitioners in a certain level of jeopardy, as well as
there was uncertainty about their future
representation. Now, granted, this didn't occur
during a critical phase of these proceedings because
we're still preparing the transcript and the record,
but nevertheless, there are strategic decisions that
are made in cases like this that require someone to
have counsel that can act without conflict and I
think Mr. Lewies' actions put everybody in a certain
degree of jeopardy. I certainly think Mr. Hall was
justified in bringing his Motion when he did in the
manner that which you did.
(Tr. 23:13-24:11).
Lewies' reading of Rule 11 is overly simplistic and ignores the explicit
requirement that an attorney who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an
improper purpose. The lower court explicitly detailed the improper purpose and
appropriately employed its power to manage its docket. The district court's
decision and the underlying rationale for imposing Rule 11 sanctions was within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and reached through an exercise of reason.
As such, this Court should uphold the district courts imposition of sanctions
against Lewies.

B.

Lewies Disputed Hall's Continued Representation of the County

Which Unnecessarily Prolonged This Litigation and the Cost to the County.
Lewies contends that the Court abused its discretion by suggesting that
Lewies "initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the County." Lewies'
12
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contention is taken out of context and clearly designed to misstate the district
courts understanding of Lewies' representation in the Petitions. In fact, it is clear
from the January 22,2013 hearing transcript that Lewies did not believe the
County Commissioners had made the necessary findings to hire Nelson Hall Parry
Tucker to represent the County on the Petitions. Lewies specifically stated on the
record that he did not believe Nelson Hall Parry Tucker should represent the
County:
Well, Your Honor, I'd like to note for the record
that I don't believe Mr. Hall is properly here
representing Fremont County because the Idaho
Constitution required the County Commissioners
make a public finding of necessity before retaining
their own private counsel.
I've reviewed the Minutes of the County
Commissioners. I've had my Deputy, Billie
Siddoway, review the Minutes of the County
Commissioners and we find no finding of
necessity(Tr. 16:13-22 (emphasis added)). At the hearing, Lewies continued to maintain
that his office could represent the County and he was involved in crafting this
argument.
Moreover, it is undisputed that Lewies' continued instance on who could
properly represent the County caused a delay in this matter. As a result ofLewies'
position, additional briefing was necessary and further hearings were required.
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This procedural argument pursued by Lewies undoubtedly caused a delay
in the adjudication of the Petitions. As the court noted at the January 22, 2013
hearing, "Now, granted, this didn't occur during a critical phase of these
proceedings because we're still preparing the transcript and the record, but
nevertheless, there are strategic decisions that are made in cases like this that
require someone to have counsel that can act without conflict and I think Mr.
Lewies' actions put everybody in a certain degree of jeopardy." (Tr. 24:2-9).
There were legitimate concerns that invariably caused the district court concern
about who would be representing the County and this had a delay on the
proceedings-especially because the briefing schedule had to be adjusted. (R.
142-143).
To suggest that the district court did not understand Lewies' role in
representing the County is a liberal restatement of the procedural history in this
matter. Moreover, as discussed more fully above, the district court clearly
understood Lewies' role and the significant difficulties imposed both on the
respondents and the County. It is clear from the record that the district court
understood Lewies' role and there was no abuse of his discretion in its findings.
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c.

Lewies Has Waived Any Argument Challenging the County Retaining

Private Legal Counsel.
Lewies continues to argue that the County could not retain private legal
counsel. Lewies does not have standing to pursue this issue and further, the
Fremont County Deputy Prosecutors Siddoway and Dustin both confirmed that
there was no continued challenge by their office of the County's retaining Nelson
Hall Parry Tucker as private legal counsel in defending against the Petitions.
It is unclear what Lewies is attempting to argue because his own office has

previously conceded that they would be withdrawing this issue. Once directed by
the district court to provide information on whether Lewies' office could represent
the County given the circumstances of the Petitions, Siddoway filed a Notice of
Conflict ofInterest on February 6, 2013, stating:
I respectfully submit this notice in response to the
Court's request for briefing of January 22, 2013. A
conflict of interest under Rule 1. 7 of the Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct prevents me from
taking a position adverse to the decision of the
Fremont County Commission to retain outside
counsel in this matter. I have provided legal advice
to the Fremont County Commission on the matter of
retaining outside counsel and, while I do not
represent the County in this matter, I consider the
County to be a "current client" as that term is used
in Rule 1.7.
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(R. 72). Subsequently, following a motion to extend the briefing schedule filed by
Lewies' office, on February 19,2013, Lewies' office filed a Notice of Withdrawal

ofMotion to Represent Fremont County. (R. 145-149). The Fremont County
Prosecutor's office unequivocally stated with regard to representation ofthe
County as follows: "Upon further review of all aspects of the unique facts peculiar
to this particular situation and for the considerations states, the Fremont County
Prosecutor's Office withdraws its motion to represent Fremont County in these
petitions for judicial review." (R. 149).
Lewies has waived any argument that outside legal counsel's continued
representation of the County is inappropriate. In fact, the Court's comment that
"deem[ ed] it appropriate" for the County to have retained private legal counsel is
consistent with the filings by the Fremont County Prosecutor's Office. Finally,
the Memorandum Decision was filed well after Lewies' office conceded it could
not represent the County on the Petitions. Accordingly, any argument on outside
legal counsel's continued representation is irrelevant, moot, and has been waived
byLewies.

16

Page 321 of 408

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

D.

There Is No Evidence Of Bias Or Prejudice By Judge Moeller.
1.

Lewies Has Waived Any Argument of Bias By Failing to File a

Motion to Disqualify.
Lewies' suggestion that Judge Moeller was biased and/or prejudiced
against Lewies has been waived because Lewies did not file a motion to disqualify
Judge Moeller pursuant to Rule 40(d)(2), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure.
Specifically, Rule 40(d)(2)(A) states that "any party to an action may disqualify a
judge or magistrate for cause from presiding in any action upon any of the
following grounds: ... 4. That the iudge or magistrate is biased or preiudiced
for or against any party or the case in the action." (Emphasis added). Had Lewies
legitimately believed Judge Moeller was biased or prejudiced against him, his
appropriate remedy was to file a Motion for Disqualification for Cause. Lewies
did not pursue this remedy and any claims are now waived.
2.

The Ex Parte Communication was Appropriate and Does Not

Exhibit Bias or Prejudice.
Lewies alleges Judge Moeller was biased and/or prejudiced against him
for two reasons (1) there was an ex parte communication, and (2) the award of
Rule 11 sanctions was awarded sua sponte. However, neither argument is
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•

supported by competent evidence in the record to support Lewies' claim of bias or
prejudice.

•

Lewies argues that the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(B)(7)
was violated by Judge Moeller when an ex parte communication occurred in

•

chambers following the January 22,2013 hearing. 4 Cannon 3(B)(7) states in

•

relevant part as follows:

•

A judge shall accord to every person who has a
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's
lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A
judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications, or consider other communications
made to the judge outside the presence of the parties

•
•

concerning a nending or impending proceeding

except that:

•

(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte
communications for scheduling, administrative
purposes or emergencies that do not deal with

•

substantive matters or issues on the merits are
authorized; provided the iudge reasonably
believes that no partv will gain a procedural or
tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte
communication.

•
•

I.C.J.C, Cannon 3(B)(7)(a) (emphasis added) .

•

•
•

4

Of note, the County was unaware that there was ever any ex parte
communication until a passing comment was made at the February 26, 2013
hearing. The district court further addressed the communication in his written
Memorandum Decision.
18
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Lewies summarizes his recollection of the communication that occurred
on January 22, 2013 following the hearing. However, it is clear from the record
and Lewies' affidavit that the ex parte communication did not involve any
substantive issues. Lewies suggests, despite no evidence to support this
statement, that Judge Moeller stated that Lewies had "to decide what hill you want
to die on." (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). However, the affidavit ofLewies describes
the interaction quite differently, "following the court hearing on these matters held
January 22,2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller, invited me into his chambers
and told me he was aware of the ongoing bitter personal disputes among my
predecessor-in-office, Joette Lookabaugh and her deputy prosecutor, Blake Hall,
and myself. Judge Moeller advised me that everyone would be better off if the
disputes ended." (R. 65-66).
In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Moeller took exception to Lewies'
description of the communication:
The Court disagrees with Lewies' account of the
conversation that took place after the hearing on
January 22, 2013, because he appears to imply the
Court was critical of the County Commissioners and
Hall. While the Court acknowledges that it briefly
met with Lewies in chambers following the January
22, 2013 hearing, the Court merely advised him to
avoid allowing a political grudge to interfere
with his professional judgment. The merits of
the cases were not discussed. The Court initiated
19
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this conversation after consulting Idaho Code of
Judicial Conduct. Cannon 3(D), which provides.
in part: "Judges are encourae;ed to brine;
instances of unprofessional conduct by jude;es or
lawyers to their attention in order to provide
them opportunities to correct their errors
without disciplinary proceedine;s; ..."
(R. 189, fu. 14 (emphasis added)). The district court did not violate Cannon
3(B)(7) because there was no discussion of substantive issues. Furthermore, the
communication was specifically initiated for a proper purpose, to highlight
potential unprofessional conduct and allow Lewies to correct his errors.
Additionally, as noted by Judge Moeller, the conversation did not address
substantive issues of the Petitions, and in fact, substitute counsel was involved by
that time representing the petitioners interests. Thus, the merits of the cases are
being dually considered by the district court without consideration of Lewies'
involvement in the adjudication of the Petitions. In sum, the conversation was
appropriate and covered an issue that was appropriate, within the bounds of a
judge's role, and had no bearing on the adjudication of the Petitions.
Accordingly, there was no bias or prejudice exhibited by the ex parte
communication on January 22, 2013.
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3.

The District Court's Rule 11 Sanction Did Not Demonstrate

Bias or Prejudice.
Lewies suggests that Judge Moeller exhibited bias or prejudice because the
court sua sponte awarded fees pursuant to Rule 11, Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 11 specifically permits a sua sponte award under the Rule: "[i]f a
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction... " I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l)
(emphasis added). Thus, a sua sponte award is not inappropriate.
The district court further explained its rationale in awarding fees as a
sanction pursuant to Rule 11 in the Memorandum Decision. The district court
explained it's reasoning as follows:
At the conclusion of the January 22, 2013 hearing,
the Court invited the County to submit an affidavit
setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in
seeking Lewies' disqualification. Although much
of the oral argument and briefing has since focused
on a prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54(e)
and LC. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that
such an effort is misplaced. The Idaho Supreme
Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for which
attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to I. C. § 12121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are not reasons that will
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P.
11(a)(1)." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho
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Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 96, 803 P.2d 993, 1002
(1991).
Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court
appears to more closely fall under the provisions of
Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 186). The Court did state in a footnote, however, that "[i]n the event I.R.C.P.
54(e) and I.C. § 12-121 were controlling, the Court notes that the record would
support findings that the County was the prevailing party and that both petitions
were brought and pursued unreasonably." (R. 186, fn. 11). The district court
clearly articulated the rationale for awarding fees pursuant to Rule 11, also noting
that an analysis under Rule 54(e) and§ 12-121 would also lead to the same result.
Ultimately, Lewies' argument of bias and/or prejudice is premised entirely
on supposition and a very liberal account of the procedural history of this matter.
Lewies takes numerous statements out of context in an effort to argue bias. This
tactic is improper and ignores the factual record before this Court. There is no
evidence that the award of Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte was improper or the
result of bias or prejudice. The district court acted appropriately and within its
discretion.

E.

There Was No Unethical Or Improper Conduct By Mr. Hall
Lewies inappropriately suggests that Mr. Hall somehow engaged in

improper or unethical conduct by not reaching out to Lewies before filing the
22
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motion for disqualification. This tactic appeaers to be a continued attempt by
Lewies to impugn Mr. Hall and further distract the Court from Lewies improper
conduct that warranted sanctions. Lewie~ improperly suggests there were three
violations by Hall regarding his representation ofthe County: (1) failure to contact
Lewies prior to filing the Motion for Disqualification; (2) improperly discussing
continued representation of the County on the Petitions; and (3) claiming an
hourly rate of $225 per hour for work. Each of these allegations is baseless and
unsupported by the record before the Court.

1.

There Was No Requirement to Notify Lewies of the Motion

For Disqualification Prior to Filing.
Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 requires a telephone call to
opposing counsel prior to filing a motion. Absent in Rule 11 is any language
suggesting that an attorney is required to contact another attorney before filing a
motion. Rather, the plain language of Rule 11 states "that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ... " I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). The
only requirement is that the motion be grounded in fact and that the signing
attorney has made an inquiry that the facts support the motion. In this case, the
facts unequivocally support the filing of the Motion for Disqualification. (R. 18-
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22). This fact is evidenced both by the filing by Lewies seeking withdrawal from
the case (R. 30-33) and the district courts position that the County had acted
appropriately. Specifically, the district court stated at the January 22, 2013
hearing, "I don't think Mr. Hall should have had to file a Motion in January of
2013 to bring this issue to the Court's attention. . .. I certainly think Mr. Hall was
justified in bringing his Motion when he did in the manner that which you did."
(Tr. 23:13-24:11). In its written Memorandum Decision, the district court
specifically stated ''the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the County
to remind him [Lewies] ofhis legal and ethical duties before filing the motion for
disqualification. There is no requirement in Rule 11 to contact opposing counsel
prior to filing and the Court implicitly found that the filing was appropriate and in
all likelihood "may have actually prevented Lewies from suffering the ethical
consequences of failing to withdraw sooner." (R. 189).

2.

The County Appropriately Hired Nelson Hall Parry Tucker.

Lewies argues that Hall was precluded from continuing to work for the
County once the County recognized Lewies would inevitably have a conflict of
interest in further representation of the County on the Petitions. Lewies argues
that Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii), Idaho Rules ofProfessional Conduct, was somehow
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violated by the County requesting that Hall continue to represent the County in
defending against the Petition. Rule 1.11 (d) states as follows:
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently
serving as a public officer or employee:
(1) is subject to Rules 1. 7 and 1.9; and

(2) shall not:
(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially while in private practice or
nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government
agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or
(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who
is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which
the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that
a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative
officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as
permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in
Rule 1.12(b).
I.R.P. C. 1.11 (d). Rule 1.11 (d) is specifically designed to ensure that a lawyer
does not seek employment where from a party where confidential or other
information may be obtained. This is specifically noted from the importance
placed on Rules 1.7 (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients) and 1.9 (Duties to
Former Clients). A lawyer owes both current and former clients certain
obligations of confidentiality and Rule 1.11 is intended to ensure a lawyer does
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not abuse those obligations. The comments to Rule 1.11 further reiterate the
intent of Rule 1.11 :
The Rule represents a balancing of interests. ON one hand, where
the successive clients are a government agency and another client,
public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in
that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client.
A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other
client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional
functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage
could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential
government information about the client's adversary obtainable
only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand,
the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a
government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit
transfer of employment to and from the government.
I.R.P.C. 1.11, Cmt. 4. It is clear that there was nothing improper with the County,
recognizing the inherent conflict of interest with Lewies, would seek alternative
representation of Hall. The County recognized that Hall had knowledge of the
proceedings and was in the best position to advocate for their interests. Rule 1.11
does not address a current governmental employee continuing representation of
the governmental entity in a private capacity. It is simply a continued
representation of the governmental on the same matters and no special benefits or
advantages would be provided to the County. To suggest that there was any
violation of Rule 1.11 is patently false and inconsistent with the clear intent of
Rule 1.11.
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3.

There Were No False Statements Made To The District Court.

Lewies erroneously suggests that the rate of $225 was inappropriate.
Lewies claims that the affidavit states that Hall's hourly rate was $225 per hour
was somehow false because Hall agreed to represent the County at $150 per hour
for his work as private legal counsel. These accusations are patently false and
fails to recognize that Hall was a salaried employee at the time the motion for
disqualification was made. Further, Hall specifically stated his position on the
sanction of Lewies:
... quite frankly, I don't have any skin in this fight. If you award
attorney's fees, it doesn't go to Blake Hall, it goes to the County.
The reason I say I don't have any skin in this fight is I get paid
either way. It's the County-! have not been harmed, it is the
County that has been harmed by the circumstances that we're
dealing with and so I just don't want anyone to come across or feel
that there's something personal in this fashion on this issue,
because certainly from my vantage point there never been anything
personal and I just don't take the practice personally.
(Tr. 45: 10-21 ). Hall clearly articulated that he had no personal animosity towards
Lewies and that any attorney fee award would go directly to the County.
When the affidavit of costs and fees was prepared, the law requires that a
reasonable attorney fee be used. Mr. Hall's normal and customary hourly rate at
the time was $225 per hour for private work. This is an accurate and truthful
statement of Hall's hourly rate and were "reasonable and similar to, or less than,
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those charged by attorneys with comparable experience and expertise in the
vicinity ofFremont County, Idaho." (R. 52). Lewies reference to the $150 per
hour billable rate was an unrelated contractual agreement between the County and
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. for legal work to be performed once Lewies took
office. At the time the motion for disqualification was prepared, Mr. Hall was
still a salaried employee of the County and was not operating under the agreement
for $150 per hour. As is customary, an attorney is entitled to agree to a lesser
hourly rate than his customary hourly rate. It is important to note, however, that
the district court did lower the rate from $225 to $150 per hour in calculating the
final attorney fee award. However, in this case, the work performed related to the
preparation and filing of the Motion for Disqualification was accurate reflection of
Hall's billing rate. The contracted rate really had not bearing on the rate for which
work was performed while employed by the County. Thus, there is not evidence
of any false statements being made by Hall.
Ultimately, Lewies has frivolously and improperly raised these issues
regarding Mr. Hall in an effort to assail Mr. Hall's character. This issue has never
been raised by Lewies in any pleading and no hearing was ever held on this matter
either. The County has never really had the ability to address Lewies erroneous
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statements. Lewies conduct is inappropriate and should not be condoned by this
Court.

F.

The County Is Entitled To Attorneys' Fees on Appeal
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, the County seeks an award of

attorney fees in accordance with Idaho Code Section 12-11 7. Section 12-117
provides for a municipality to recover attorney fees when "the party against whom
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Under
the statutes, the County is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal
inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without
foundation.
Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to
make a legitimate showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Bowles v. Pro
Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). In this case, there is no
legitimate argument that the trial court misapplied the law. Lewies simply takes
numerous statements out of context to suggest that the Rule 11 sanction was
inappropriate. Lewies' arguments fail to consider the plain standard of abuse of
discretion and the totality of the Memorandum Decision that clearly articulates the
basis for the Rule 11 sanction. As a result of Lewies frivolous and unwarranted
filing, the County has been forced to expend significant costs and fees in
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defendant against Lewies questionable conduct. Accordingly, the County requests
an award of attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Idaho
Supreme Court find that the district court appropriately acted within the bounds of
its discretion and exercised reason when it sanctioned Mr. Lewies. The
Respondents respectfully request that this Court find that the sanction in the
amount of$1,185.00 against Lewies personally was appropriate and that Lewies
be required to pay said amount. These Respondents further request an award of
costs and fees incurred in filing and arguing this appeal before this Honorable
court.
Dated this _jz day of September, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon
day of September, 2013, by the method indicated below:
the following this

__a_

Honorable Gregory W. Moeller
FREMONT COUNTY COURTHOUSE
151 W J51 N
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC
343 E. 41h N., Suite #125
Rexburg, ID 83440

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[)4' Overnight Mail
[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
Overnight Mail

D4

W. Lynn Rossner, Esq.
Attorney at Law
109 N 2ndw
St. Anthony, ID 83445

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
~ Overnight Mail

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[]Fax
~ Overnight Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD,
CLARY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,
v.

FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV-2012-580

DECISION ON REVIEW

)
)
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the District Court on a petition for judicial review filed by
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Clay Pickard, Laura Pickard, George Ty
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow ("Petitioners"). Petitioners seek judicial review of the Fremont
County Board of Commissioners' ("the County" or "the Board") decision to adopt Fremont
County Ordinance No. 2013-01, which created an official road map of Fremont County ("the
Official Road Map"). This map designated a road that crosses Petitioners' lands ("the Old
Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek Road" or "the North Road") as a public right-ofway. Petitioners allege that the Board failed to make any factual determinations regarding
whether the North Road was public or private before designating it as public on the Official
Road Map. Accordingly, Petitioners contend that the Board engaged in unlawful procedure,
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or abused its discretion. Petitioners also seek injunctive
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relief from any public or private use and/or maintenance of the North Road that may result
through reliance upon the Official Road Map. Finally, Petitioners seek attorney fees and costs.
Following briefing, oral argument took place on August 27, 2013, after which the Court
took the matter under advisement.

II. FACTUALBACKGROUND
In preparing to adopt an official county road map pursuant to Idaho Code§ 40-202
(20 11 ), 1 the Fremont County Board of Commissioners (''the Board") gave public notice that
"[a]fter months of research [it was] close to establishing the official County road map" and
solicited public comments? The Board received written comments and held three "public
information hearings" in July of2012 to further identify public roadways. 3 All then-identified
roads were presented on maps available at the public hearings and on the Fremont County
website. 4 "After the public information hearings, Fremont County Public Works staff reviewed
the comments for validity and applicability." 5 The maps were then adjusted accordingly. 6
On September 11 and 18, 2012, the Board published notice in the Standard Journal, the
local newspaper of record, that a public hearing was scheduled for September 27, 2012. 7 The
purpose of the public hearing was "to take public comments on the proposed official County
Road Map(s)." 8 At the hearing, Commission Chairman Ron "Skip" Hurt further explained, "So
tonight it's kind of a culmination of about two years of research that Betty Davis, who works in
[the] Public Works Department[,] has done."9 He later added, "So we feel like we've gone over
these [maps] pretty carefully and tonight what we want to hear from you is if there's anything on
these maps that you think is not designated correctly, something that we missed or something
that's private which should be public or that should be private." 10

1
The Court recognizes that the current version of Title 40 has been amended. Unless it indicates otherwise, the
Court will cite the sections as they appeared during the times relevant to this matter.
z R., p. I.
3 !d.
4
R., p. 73.
5 !d.
6 !d.
7
R., p. 22.
8
R.,p.21. !d. atp.4:12-17.
9
R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 4:18-20.
10
/d. atp. 5:12-17.
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Ty and Tuk Nedrow attended the Public Hearing.ll During the public comments, Ty
Nedrow stated that two roads on the proposed County map were incorrectly designated as county
roads. 12 He referred to these roads as the "East Road" and the "North Road." Tuk Nedrow
stated that no County equipment had ever been on either road and that the County had never
maintained the North Road. 13 Tuk and Ty Nedrow claimed that both roads lead to nowhere.

14

Concerning the East Road, Ty Nedrow said that it went through his field and that fishermen
occasionally got stuck in it while attempting to get to a nearby reservoir.

15

Concerning the North

Road, Tuk Nedrow explained, "It goes through a quarter mile of our property and a quarter mile
of Mr. [Achtley's] and it goes through a half a mile ofBLM and then hits the Forest Service
[road] .... " 16 Ty Nedrow also explained that although the North Road was referred to as the
"mail route," his grandpa had told him that it was a shortcut and had never been used for
carrying mail or passengers but only for stage coaches returning from West Yellowstone without
cargo; the lava rock grates on the road broke many wheels. 17 He also explained that the North
Road was gated on his property and that it was also gated before it reached Mr. Atchley's
property. 18
A discussion arose during the Public Hearing as to whether the North Road was an R.S.
24 77 road, which was explained to be a road in use before 197 5 that could not be taken from the
public. 19 Recognizing that certain roads might be R.S. 2477 roads, Chairman Hurt indicated that
the Board had "60 days after this hearing to make a decision, and ... we may have to collect
more information. We may have to have another public hearing .... " 20
About two weeks later, on October 15, 2012, the Board held a meeting where it
considered the content of the proposed County map in light ofthe public comments.

21

The

Board brought up Ty and Tuk Nedrow's objections concerning the East Road and the North
R., pp. 23-24.
R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 20 12), p. 4:18-20.
13
/d. atpp. 21:16-18; 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14.
14
/d. at pp. 15:19-20,21:16-18,21:25-22:3.
15
/d. at p. 15:16-21.
16
!d. at p. 22:3-10.
17
/d. at pp. 16:22-17:20.
18
/d. at p. 18:15-18.
19
Jd. at 18:22-19:23. In reality, R.S.-2477 was repealed in 1976, and any "rights created under it are valid ifthey
existed before October 21, 1976." Farrell v. Bd. ofComm'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378, 384,64 P.3d 304, 310
(2002), overruled on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (20 12).
20
R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 20:7-20:17
21
R., pp. 57-58.
II

12
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Road and agreed that the East Road should be closed to the public, recognizing the issues Ty
Nedrow had raised during the Public Hearing. 22 However, it decided to leave the North Road
designated as a public road. An unidentified woman present at the meeting informed the Board
that "an old Shell Oil map on the Internet" seemed to show that people were being directed down
the North Road as far back as 1956. 23 The Shell Oil map was apparently not presented at the
meeting and does not appear anywhere in the record? 4 The Board then concluded that "any
roads [used] prior to [1976] cannot be closed. They fall under this RS-2477 that ifthey were
ever used as public roads then public domain takes precedence."25 In other words, the Board
concluded that because the North Road had been "ascertained a 2477 road," it would be
designated on the Official Road Map as a public road? 6
At an October 29,2012 meeting, the Board voted and approved by a two-to-one vote the
Official Road Map, 27 which was published as Ordinance No. 2013-01. 28 The Official Road Map
lists the East Road as one of various "Private Roads" and the North Road as a "County Dirt
Road."29 The Board's findings of fact state that the "[r]oads [in the Official Road Map] were
identified as Fremont County roads based on" several criteria, one of which was that "[t]he roads
had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or are the
sole essential connection roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads." 30 In its conclusions oflaw, the
22

R., p. 59 (audio CD recording), 5:09-9:53. All future references to this audio recording are contained within this
timeframe. Regarding the East Road, the Board stated that people were "going up and getting stuff." I d. It did not
specifically mention, as discussed earlier, that Ty Nedrow expressed concern during the Public Hearing that the East
Road went through his field and that many fishermen got stuck in it while attempting to get to a reservoir. R., p. 53,
Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21.
23
R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). The audio recording does not clearly state whether this comment was directed at
the North Road or the East Road; however, in the context of the discussion, the Court concludes that the comment
concerned the North Road. I d. Also, the audio recording does not clearly identify the woman speaking, but those
present at the meeting were "Commissioners Skip Hurt, Lee Miller, Jordon Stoddard," "Clerk Abbie Mace, Deputy
Clerk Laura Singleton, Public Works Director Marla Vik, Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh, Greg Newkirk,
and Debbie Davis." R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21.
24
The Court is mindful that Respondent's attorneys have alleged in their brief that "the Commissioners reviewed"
the map in question. Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7. However, the recorded transcript does not confirm this assertion
and the record does not indicate the Mr. Hall or Mr. Starnes were present at the meeting.
25
R., p. 59 (audio CD recording).
26 Jd.
27
R., p. 64.
28
R., p. 66.
29
R., p. 93.
30
R., pp. 72-73, ~ 6. Paragraph 6 ofthe Findings of Fact begins: "Roads were identified as Fremont County roads
based on the following criteria: ... " !d. This language suggests that the roads met all six listed criteria; however,
this would be problematic since the North Road seems to have been asserted as meeting only the last of the six
criterion, which concerns R.S. 2477 roads. Therefore, the Court interprets this list to suggest that roads met at least
one of the listed criteria.
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Board stated that "[a]ll roads identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined by the
Fremont County Board of Commissioners to be County roads, either paved, gravel or
unimproved (dirt); and are not recorded in the Board of Commissioners' official minutes as
vacated or abandoned; and are routinely maintained by the County."31 The Board more
specifically stated that "[a]ll roads identified in [the Official Road Map] as being R.S.-2477
roads are determined by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners as having been asserted
under Federal Law R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in
official records in the Fremont County Public Works office."32 The Board also stated that "[a]ll
roads found on the Official Fremont County Road Map constitutes public notice that evidence
has been presented to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners that the roads may qualify as
a public right-of-way." 33 It also clarified, "Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County
Road Map does not constitute validation or abandonment of any road. " 34

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Decisions made by a board of county or highway district commissioners in an
abandonment, vacation or validation proceeding are subject to judicial review pursuant to I. C. §
40-208." Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Bd. ofComm 'rs ofTeton Cnty., 141 Idaho 855, 858, 119
P.3d 630, 633 (2005). In such cases, the court conducts a review without a jury and is confined
to the record. I.C. § 40-208(6). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
governing board regarding the weight ofthe information on questions of fact. I.C. § 40-208(7).
In the case at bar, Petitioners do not challenge a decision regarding an abandonment,
vacation, or validation proceeding, but rather the Board's decision to place a disputed road on an
official county highway map in a§ 40-202 proceeding. In Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 858,
119 P.3d at 633, the Supreme Court stated:
[S]ince I.C. § 40-202 is contained in the section of the Code relating to general
provisions for the establishment and maintenance of the state and county highway
system, including procedures required for abandonment, vacation or validation of
highways, it is logical that the statutorily mandated standard of review under § 40208 should apply to § 40-202 decisions.

31

R., p. 74.
!d.
33
R., pp. 74-75, ~ 9 (emphasis added).
34 Jd.
32
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Under this code section, the reviewing court may affirm a board's decision or remand the case
for further proceedings. I.C. § 40-208(7). Additionally,
[t]he Court may reverse or modify the [Board's] decision if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the [Board's] findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
information on the whole record; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

!d.
Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by competent and substantial evidence
even though conflicting evidence exists. Wulffv. Sun Valley Co., 127 Idaho 71, 73-74, 896 P.2d
979, 981-82 (1995). "Substantial and competent evidence is 'relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion."' Huffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d
1244, 1246 (2006) (quoting Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 211, 217
(2000)). "Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal."

Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634 (citing Love v. Board of County Comm 'rs
of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 559, 671 P.2d 471,472 (1983)). Accordingly, this Court can
freely review any question oflaw, but it will not substitute its own judgment for the Board's as
to the weight afforded the evidence on a question of fact.

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW
Petitioners present the following issues on review for consideration by the Court:
1. Did the Board give proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map (Fremont
County Ordinance No. 2013-01)?
2. Did the Board make proper factual determinations in support of adopting the Official
Road Map (Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01)?
3. By failing to make proper factual determinations, did the Board engage in unlawful
procedure, act arbitrarily and capriciously, or abuse its discretion when it placed the North Road
on the Official Road Map?
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V. DISCUSSION
A.

The Board gave proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map.

"Idaho Code § 40-202 provides the manner in which a board of county commissioners or
highway district designates public highways and rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho
at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. This "initial selection of the county highway system and highway
district system" requires that the "board of county or highway or district commissioners" take
several actions. I.C. § 40-202(1). These are: 1) prepare a map "showing the general location of
each highway and public right-or-way in their jurisdiction;" 2) give notice of its "intention to
adopt the map as the official map of that system;" and 3) "specify the time and place [for a
public hearing] at which all interested persons may be heard" regarding the adoption of the
proposed map. !d.
Although Petitioners have asserted that the Board did not provide proper notice, they
have failed to articulate the nature of the deficiency. The Court finds that the Board has fulfilled
the three requirements of I. C. § 40-202(1 ). Specifically, it prepared a map facially complying
with the statute, indicated its intent to adopt the proposed County map, and published proper
notice of the time and place of the public hearing on that map in the Standard Journal on
September 11 and 18, 2012. Petitioners have failed to point to any procedural deficiency in the
manner in which the Board conducted its adoption of the disputed ordinance. Therefore, the
Court must conclude as a matter of law that the Board has fully complied with the notice
requirements of I. C. § 40-202(1 ).

B.
The Board failed to make adequate factual determinations before adopting
the Official Road Map.
Idaho Code § 40-202(1) also requires that "[a]fter the hearing, the commissioners shall
adopt the map, with any changes or revisions considered by them to be advisable in the public
interest, as the official map of the respective highway system." !d. Petitioners claim that before
adopting the map, the Board failed to make proper factual determinations regarding the public or
private status of the North Road. They contend that the North Road is not an R.S. 2477 road and
that the Board is required to prove such status.
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Although the process outlined in I.C. § 40-202(1)-iffollowed properly-results in an
official county map of roads, it "does not also serve to adjudicate the public status of any roads
within the county or create new public highways or rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141
Idaho at 859-60, 119 P.3d at 634-35. 35 Thus, when adopting an initial county map of roads, the
Board neither validates nor vacates roads as R.S. 2477 or other roads. Rather, the Board makes
"a determination that a particular roadway occupies the status, in fact, of a public highway or
right-of-way." Jd. at 861. Therefore, the process for establishing an R.S. 2477 road is relevant
to the extent that the Board could reasonably find, based on the evidence before it, that the North
Road was, in fact, an R.S. 2477 road and therefore a public right-of-way.
Under United States Revised Statute 2477, a state government entity can grant public
status to a road on public lands. The Idaho Supreme Court explained this process:
The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that "[t]he right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is
hereby granted." 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). While this statute has
been repealed, otherwise valid leases, permits, patents and similar rights created
under it are valid if they existed before October 21, 1976. Pub.L. 94-579, § 706(a)
(1976).

Farrell v. Bd. ofComm 'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d 304, 310 (2002), overruled
on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012).
Concerning this "freezing" ofR.S. 2477 rights as they existed in 1976, the lOth Circuit stated:
The difficulty is in knowing what [valid and existing rights] means. Unlike any
other federal land statute of which we are aware, the establishment ofR.S. 2477
rights of way required no administrative formalities: no entry, no application, no
license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public
acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right was vested. As
the Supreme Court of Utah noted 75 years ago, R.S. 2477 '"was a standing offer
of a free right of way over the public domain,"' and the grant may be accepted
"without formal action by public authorities." Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646,648 (1929), (quoting Streeter v. Stalnaker, Ql
Neb. 205, 85 N.W. 47,48 (1901)). In its Report to Congress on R.S. 2477: The
History and Management of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way Claims on Federal and
35

It is worth noting that the Idaho Legislature has revised I.C. § 40-202 in what appears to be approval of the
Homestead Farms decision. Subsection 8 now states in relevant part:
The purpose of this official map is to put the public on notice of those highways and public rightsof-way that the board of county or highway district commissioners considers to be public. The
inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way from such a map does not, in itself,
constitute a legal determination of the public status of such highway or public right-of-way. Any
person may challenge, at any time, the inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way
from such map by initiating proceedings as described in section 40-208(7), Idaho Code.
Idaho Code Ann.§ 40-202 (2013).
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Other Lands 1 (June 1993), the Department ofthe Interior explained that R.S.
24 77 highways "were constructed without any approval from the federal
government and with no documentation of the public land records, so there are
few official records documenting the right-of-way or indicating that a highway
was constructed on federal land under this authority."

In short, identifying valid R.S. 2477 roads is a difficult and controversial matter. Indeed,
it appears nothing has been done legislatively on the federal level to clarify the process:
Despite decades of litigation over R.S. 2477 roads, Congress has not spoken to the
issue by amending FLPMA [which repealed R. S. 24 77 in 197 6] and providing a
statutory framework to help courts resolve the discrepancies between the statutes;
nor has it delegated authority to federal management agencies to promulgate
regulations guiding their administration ofR.S. 2477 claims. In fact, Congress has
actually prohibited the BLM from adopting regulations establishing a framework
for agency adjudication ofR.S. 2477 claims. There is also no legislative history of
R.S. 2477 that might provide informal guidance to litigants.
Hillary M. Hoffmann, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness Society v. Kane County
Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating A Right-of-Way Claim Under Revised Statute
2477, 18 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 3, 9-10 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

Without guidance from the federal government, "[ s]tate law governs the manner in which a road
on federal property becomes public under R.S. 2477." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809,
814,264 P.3d 916,921 (2011) (citing Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 160, 191 P.3d 233,
238 (2008)); accord Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1974);
United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 503,505 (lOth Cir.1949); Smith v. Mitchell, 21 Wash. 536,

540, 58 P. 667, 668 (1899) ("[Under R.S. 2477,] a highway may be established across or upon
such public lands in any of the ways recognized by the law of the state in which such lands are
located .... ").
In Idaho, a valid and existing R.S. 2477 road exists if"the local government accepted the
road from the federal government." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310. This acceptance
can occur in two ways: "through a positive act of acceptance by the local government or
compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time." Galli, 146 Idaho at 159, 191
P.3d at 237 (explaining Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310). A positive act of acceptance
"is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute[s]." Farrell, 138
Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Also, the Supreme Court has stated:
No R.S. 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed from the
public domain. However, if an R.S. 2477 road is established prior to the land
exiting the public domain, regardless if it is officially recognized or not, then that
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grant remains effective even though the land which the road traverses is now
private property.

!d.
Due to the difficulty in granting and/or adjudicating R.S. 2477 roads, it is understandable
that some states, like Idaho, have procedures for state public officials to identify pubic rights-ofway on maps, including those that may be R.S. 2477 roads, short of adjudication. This is a less
formal process with often non-binding results. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 72-3-105 (West)
("Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the class D roads within its
boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976 [the date that R.S. 24 77 was
repealed] .... The county shall provide a copy of any map ... to the department. ... The
department is not responsible for the validity of any class D road . ... ")(emphasis added).
In Idaho, when mapping an initial selection of the county highway system, a board is
required to show by the record that-before adopting the Official Road Map--it considered
objections, provided evidence, and made findings concerning the public status of roads contained
therein. Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 861, 119 P.3d at 637. The evidence provided must be
substantial and competent; in other words, it must support whatever factual findings made before
concluding that the road in question is an R.S. 2477 road. As explained above, in Idaho, an R.S.
2477 road must be established prior to the land exiting the public domain and prior to October
21, 1976. If a road is so established but not yet officially recognized, the original grant remains
effective even after the land is privately acquired, regardless of the date of acquisition.
In the case at bar, the Board met together after the Public Hearing and discussed whether
the North Road was established prior to 1976. Although Ty Nedrow had testified at the Public
Hearing that the North Road had been a shortcut used for empty stage coaches returning from
West Yellowstone, the record establishes that the Board did not consider his testimony and made
no factual determination regarding it. Instead, the Board and those present focused mainly on
the statement of an unidentified woman present at the meeting: "I actually came across an old
Shell Oil map on the Internet that, by looking at it, it looks like that that's actually the way back
in 1956 they were trying to route people." 36 The Board accepted this interpretation ofthe map,
even though it apparently never actually saw a copy of the referenced map. Additionally, the
record contains neither a copy of the map nor further mention of where to locate the map.
36

R., p. 59 (audio CD recording).
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Therefore, this Court has no way of confirming that (1) the map actually existed, (2) the
unidentified speaker's interpretation of the map was correct, and (3) the map provided the Board
with substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support its factual determination that the
North Road had been established prior to 1976. Ultimately, this Court cannot properly evaluate
the Board's conclusion that the North Road had been "ascertained a 2477 road" and should be
designated on the Official Road Map as a public road. 37
The Court is mindful that the Board neither attempted to adjudicate the North Road as an
R.S. 2477 road, nor was it not required to do so. See Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859-60,
119 P.3d at 634-35. However, the evidence before the Board in the record must at a minimum
support its determination that the North Road qualifies for R.S. 2477 status. See !d. at 861, 119
P.3d at 636. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Board's findings and
conclusions on this issue.
Even assuming that the Board properly considered Ty Nedrow's testimony and that this,
in conjunction with the "old Shell Oil map," somehow provided substantial and competent
evidence to support the Board's determination that the North Road was in use and established
prior to October 21, 1976, nothing in the record establishes that this occurred before the North
Road left the public domain. This is an additional requirement before an R.S. 2477 road can be
established. The record only shows that Petitioners currently own the land around the North
Road. Although Ty Nedrow said that the North Road had been used for stagecoaches,
suggesting a strong possibility that the road was used and established prior to it being privately
owned, nowhere in the record does the Board address or make findings regarding this necessary
element of an R.S. 2477 road. In sum, the Board did not, before adopting the Official Road Map,
make adequate factual determinations that the North Road was established prior to the land
exiting the public domain and prior to October 21, 1976. Thus, its inclusion in the Official Road
Map as a public road was clearly erroneous. I.C. § 40-208(7)(e).
The Court recognizes that when it sits in an appellate capacity, it should not "search the
record for error." Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004).
Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, and to assist the parties on remand, the Court
believes it is appropriate to note that other factual findings of the Board are problematic. 38 For

37

38

!d.
These matters did not provide the basis for the Court's decision.
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example, the Official Road Map appears to list the North Road as a "County Dirt Road," not as
an R.S. 2477 road. 39 However, in its conclusions oflaw, the Board stated that "[a]ll roads
identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined ... to be County roads, either paved, gravel
or unimproved (dirt); ... and are routinely maintained by the County."

40

While the North Road

appears to be listed as a "County Dirt Road," there is no factual support in the record for finding
that that the North Road is routinely maintained by the County. On the contrary, Tuk Nedrow
stated at the Public Hearing that the County had never placed equipment on or maintained the
North Road. 41 Even if the Board had depicted the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road on the
official map, rather than as a "County Dirt Road," it specifically stated that "[a]ll roads identified
in [the Official Road Map] as ... R.S.-2477 roads ... hav[e] been asserted under Federal Law
R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in official records in the
Fremont County Public Works office."42 The record is devoid of any official record that
identifies the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road.

C.
The record establishes that the Board's decision designating the North Road
on the Official Road Map as an R.S. 2477 Road was clearly erroneous and it acted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.
"An action is capricious if it was done without a rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was
done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining
principles." Am. Lung Ass 'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep 't ofAgric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130
P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Board's decision that the North
Road was an R.S. 2477 road appears from the record to be based entirely upon an interpretation
of an alleged map found on the Internet that the Board itself failed to examine or include in the
record for the Court to examine. Also, although the Board concluded that the North Road was
routinely maintained by the County, it neither provided support for this conclusion nor addressed
the oral testimony claiming the contrary. Moreover, it did not consider or make factual
determinations regarding when the North Road left the public domain. Therefore, the Board's
decision was clearly erroneous because it lacked adequate factual support from reliable,

39

40

41
42

R.,
R.,
R.,
R.,

p. 93.
p. 74.
p. 59 (audio CD recording), pp. 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14.
p. 74.
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probative, and substantial evidence. Additionally, the decision to rely upon the limited evidence
set forth in the record was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of its discretion.

D.

Petitioners are not entitled to attorney fees or costs.

Petitioners failed to provide a legal basis for awarding attorney fees and/or costs in their
brief on appeal. Nevertheless, the Court notes that under I.C. § 12-117, a court is not allowed to
"award attorney fees in an appeal from an administrative decision." Smith v. Washington Cnty.,
150 Idaho 388, 391,247 P.3d 615,618 (2010). Petitioners also request attorney fees under I.C. §
12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e). "Attorney fees are not available to a party on appeal from an agency
decision under [I.C. § 12-121]" because it pertains to civil actions. Staff of Idaho Real Estate

Comm'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630,637,22 P.3d 105, 112 (2001). Idaho Rule ofCivil
Procedure 54( e) also pertains to civil actions and is, therefore, inapplicable to this case. Lastly,
Petitioners have failed to articulate a legal basis for an award of costs under I.R.C.P. 84.

VII. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record below and the applicable laws and standards, the Court finds
that the Findings and Conclusions issued by the Board in support of County Ordinance No.
2013-01 on October 29, 2012 violate I.C. §§ 40-202 or 40-208. Therefore, the portions of
County Ordinance No. 2013-01 declaring the North Road to be a public right-of-way (either as
an R.S. 2477 Road or as a County Dirt Road) are hereby VACATED. This matter shall be
REMANDED to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to properly consider the status of
the North Road and issue a new County Map in a manner consistent with this opinion.
In light ofthis decision, Petitioners' request for injunctive relief has been rendered moot.
However, if the County or members of the general public attempt to maintain and/or use the
North Road in reliance on the current Official Road Map and/or County Ordinance No. 2013-01,
Petitioners' claim for injunctive relief would at that time become ripe for adjudication.
Finally, Petitioners' demand for attorney fees is DENIED. Petitioners, as prevailing
parties, may request recovery of their costs, provided they can articulate a legal basis for such an
award under I.R.C.P. 84 or other applicable rules.
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.•

SO ORDERED this

~

Jfl:_ day of October, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECISION ON
REVIEW was this
day of October, 2013, served upon the following individuals via U.S.
Mail:

/5

Lynn Hossner
Attorney at Law
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake G. Hall, esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Fremont County Board of Commissioners
151 West 1st North
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
By:

~::....______ _

TJ,f1~ Clerk
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The Real Party In Interest - Appellant, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies"), submits this reply
brief in support of his appeal from the final decision of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District in and for Fremont County (the "Court").

!.ARGUMENT
A. Scope of Review on Appeal.
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority on this issue. (Cf Appellant's
Brief, pp. 12-14)

B. The Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies

based on extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule II signature certification requirements.
Respondents' main argument on this issue is that Rule 11 allows courts to impose sanctions
for "misguided filings" and "litigative misconduct. " (Respondents' Brief, p. 6)

However,

Respondents fail to identifY what those terms actually mean. Further, they fail to identifY what
conduct, if any, Lewies engaged in that fell within the meaning of those terms.
For guidance on what the terms mean, the case of Conley v. Looney, 117 Idaho 627, 63031,790 P.2d 920,923-24 (Ct. App. 1989) proves helpful. In Conley, the court wrote as follows:
"This Court recently decided that I.R.C.P. 11 sanctions should not be applied to
make a 'lump-sum compensatory attorney fee award.' Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho
22,773 P.2d 290 (Ct.App.l989). The Kent court further stated that '[i]n our view,
Rule 1l(a)(l) is not a broad compensatory law. It is a court management tool. The
power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 6

Page 356 of 408

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

overall course of a lawsuit.' Id at 23, 773 P.2d at 291. Here, it is impossible to
determine from the record whether or not the I.R.C.P. 11 sanction was imposed
for particular litigative misconduct (the filing offrivolous motions) (or as a broad
form of compensation in the form of an award of attorney fees incurred to defend
the entire action." (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, in Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 23, 773 P.2d 290,291 (Ct. App. 1989), the
court wrote concerning Rule 11 as follows:
"This rule authorizes sanctions (including attorney fees) for pleadings which are
not 'well grounded in fact,' which are not 'warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,' or
which are 'interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause
urmecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.' In our view, Rule
ll(a)(1) is not a broad compensatory law. It is a court management tool. The
power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the
overall course of a lawsuit."
According to the above authorities, litigative misconduct means "filing frivolous motions."
In the instant case the Court determined that Lewies' petitions were far from frivolous. As Judge
Moeller said, they contained "important issues" and he wanted to "get straight to the merits."
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 33)
Respondents' also argue that in imposing Rule 11 sanctions the Court applied a totality of
the circumstances test to Lewies' conduct and "viewed Lewies' conduct in the broad picture of the
'integrity of the judicial process;"' and that "the integrity of the judicial process (litigative
misconduct) was harmed by Lewies' failure to identifY the significant conflict issues that would
inevitable [sic] be created by Lewies' filings." (Respondents' Brief, p. 9)

They then cite the

Court's decision language as follows, "Lewies' filings of the petitions against a known, future client
was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system." (Id., p. I 0)
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Respondents' are contending that Rule II sanctions were appropriate because given the
totality of the circumstances Lewies failed to identifY significant conflict issues (pertaining to a

"known,future client") and that such failure harmed the integrity of the judicial process. However,
as previously explained in Appellant's Brief at page 16, nothing in Rule II prohibits an attorney
from filing a well-grounded legal action against a known, future client. Further, the Court cited no
authority that prohibits such a filing. Rather, conflicts of interest are matters governed by the Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct - they are ethical concerns. Running afoul of an ethics rule is not
tantamount to filing papers for an improper purpose subjecting one to sanctions under Rule 11. 1
Next, the notion that filing well-grounded petitions against a known, future client constituted
an improper purpose under Rule II because doing so "harmed the integrity of the judicial process"
is without merit. The Court clearly believed the petitions contained "important issues "2 so the bare
fact that they were filed against a known future client cannot support imposition of Rule II
sanctions.

Under Rule II 's analytical framework, since the Court openly acknowledged the

importance of the merits of the petitions,3 it could not subsequently find that they had been filed for
any improper purpose. As explained by Judge William Schwarzer, " .. .If a reasonably clear legal
justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no improper purpose can be found
and sanctions are inappropriate." Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II - A Closer Look,
Shwarzer, William W., 104

F.R.D. 181 (1985).

1

In the instant case, no ethical violations were found. (R. 188)

2

Appellant's Brief, p. 33.

3

See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-33.
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Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies for filing petitions that admittedly contained
"important issues" was an abuse of discretion.
Also of substantial significance in determining whether the Court improperly considered
extrinsic factors in imposing Rule 11 sanctions was the Court's opening question put to Lewies,
"What were you thinking filing these petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were
elected to be Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney?"

4

The judge improperly delved into Lewies'

subjective intent. As a direct result of the Court's foray into state of mind, the following harmful
5

consequences warned of by Judge Shwarzer actually ensued: (l) satellite litigation was spawned
(i.e. this appeal); (2) advocacy was chilled (i.e. a private practice attorney, once elected to public
office albeit not yet sworn-in, can no longer zealously represent6 his private clients); and (3) Lewies
was stigmatized by the bad faith finding (i.e. publication of the finding in regional newspapers
resulting in damage to Lewies' professional reputation and community standing).
Rather than venturing into the subjective realm of states of mind to discern why Lewies filed
the petitions, the Court should have objectively examined Rule II sanctions in light of existing
4

See, Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

"In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need not delve into the attorney's
subjective intent...Ifa court were to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially
harmful consequences, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling advocacy ... Finally, a bad
faith test would make courts more reluctant to impose sanctions for fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith fmding."
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II -A Closer Look, Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985)
5

6

I.R.P.C. 1.3, comment I, provides in relevant part, as follows: "A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a

client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical

measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." Comment 2 to I.R.P.C.
1.3, provides in relevant part, "A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time ... ; in
extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed."
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federal and state authorities and determined whether Lewies had made a proper investigation upon
reasonable inquiry into the factual basis and legal basis for the petitions. Durrant v. Christensen,
117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1990).

By inquiring into Lewies' state of mind and

apparently concluding that he harbored some sort of political grudge against the County
Commissioners that served as a bad faith motive for filing petitions against them, the Court
ventured far beyond any actual evidence before it, and far beyond Rule 11 's objective standard.
Imposition of sanctions without finding a lack of reasonable inquiry was not an adequate
analysis under Rule 11. Hanfv. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 816 P.2d 320 (1991). Without
such a determination, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Ibid.
C. The petitions filed by Lewies in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 did not violate
the signature certification requirements ofi.R.C.P. ll(a)(l).
Respondents argue that "Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 can only be used where a
filing violates the signature certification requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l)."
(Respondents' Brief, p. 6) They also argue that "Lewies' reading of Rule 11 is overly simplistic and
ignores the explicit requirement that an attorney who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an
improper purpose." (Ibid., p. 12)
Contrary to Respondents' understanding, the fact is that a Rule 11 violation occurs at the
time the offending paper is signed and submitted to the court. Cooter & Gel! v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed. 2d 359 (1990).

"The certification which results

from the attorney's signature of the paper is directed at the three substantive prongs of the rule: its
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factual basis, its legal basis, and its legitimate purpose .... " (Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21, citing
Sanctions Under the New Federal Ru1e 11- A Closer Look, Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181
(1985)) However, in the instant case, the Court failed to inquire into any of the three prongs. It
made no inquiry into the factual basis of the petitions, it made no inquiry into the legal basis of the
petitions, and it made no objective inquiry into the legitimate purposes of the petitions.
Accordingly, the Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained.

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-22)

D. Attorney's fees as Rule 11 sanctions.
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority to refute Lewies' contention that Rule
11 is a sanctions statute and not a fee shifting provision. By ordering Lewies to pay attorney's fees
for time Hall spent on motions to disqualify him, but then converting such fee award into Rule 11
sanctions, sua sponte (without any motion or argument from Hall), was an abuse of discretion. (See,
Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23)

E. The Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel {Or the County"
because Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV -12-580 or CV-12-581.
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority to refute Lewies' contention that he
never represented the County in these proceedings, but that from the very outset, Hall did. (See,
Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25) In fact, Hall still does.
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F. The court erred in finding that Lcwies' actions "delayed adiudication o(the petitions for
iudicial review. "

Respondents argue that "Lewies did not believe the county commissioners had made the
necessary findings to hire Nelson Hall Parry & Tucker to represent the County on the petitions."
(Respondents' Brief, p. 13) Respondents' further argue that "Lewies' continued instance [sic] on
who could properly represent the County caused a delay in this matter. ... additional briefing was
necessary and further hearings were required." (Ibid., p. 13)
Lewies agrees that he did not believe the county commissioners had made the requisite
constitutional finding of necessity to hire Hall and that the "necessity issue" required briefing and
hearings. However, such in-court activity can provide no basis for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15) Indeed, Judge Moeller, himself, found the necessity issue to be a "very
tough question" and he was relieved the question had been voluntarily withdrawn by the Office of

the Prosecuting Attorney so he did not have to decide the question. (Ibid., pp. 28-29)
Because there was a reasonably clear legal justification for raising the constitutional
necessity issue, and because it was raised in-court, the Court could not find that any paper had been
filed for any improper purposes that could justifY imposition of Rule II sanctions.

G. The Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained private
legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581
because the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho
Constitution's necessity requirement had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the
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Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the Court for its decision.
Respondents have misunderstood the argument advanced by Lewies on this issue. In their
brief Respondents write that "Lewies continues to argue that the County could not retain private
legal counsel." (Respondents' Brief, p. 15) That misses the point. Lewies is not arguing whether or
not the County could retain private legal counsel. Indeed, Lewies' deputy prosecuting attorney
withdrew that legal question. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-29) Rather, Lewies is arguing that "the
Court improperly decided a question that was not before it." (Ibid., p. 28)
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority on the actual issue presented on
appeal.

H. The Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his representation of

petitioners.
Respondents argue that any suggestion by Lewies that he completed his representation of
petitioners is "devoid of verifiable facts in the record." (Respondents' Brief, p. 11) However,
Respondents' have seemingly overlooked Lewies' undisputed oral representations made to the
Court, and his undisputed affidavit contained in the record, showing that his representation of
petitioners was limited

7

to drafting and timely filing petitions for judicial review in order to

preserve and protect his clients' legal rights relative to their private roads. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30)
More to the point, though, Respondents' have submitted no argument or authority to refute

7

I.R.C.P. 1.2(c), provides, "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under
the circumstances and the client gives informed consent." Comment 6 to the rule, provides in relevant part that, "A
limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation."
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the issue actually presented on appeal: that "unless and until an actual case or controversy was
presented to the Court on the question whether Lewies had completed his limited representation of
petitioners, the Court should have refrained from issuing an opinion on the matter." (Ibid., pp. 3031)

I. Judge Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies by engaging in the

following actions:
Respondents argue that "Had Lewies legitimately believed Judge Moeller was biased or
prejudiced against him, his appropriate remedy was to file a motion for disqualification for cause.
Lewies did not pursue this remedy and any claims are now waived." (Respondents' Brief, p. 17)
While LR.C.P. 40(d)(2) allows any party to an action to file a motion to disqualifY a judge
for cause, failure to file such a motion does not waive a party's right to claim bias or prejudice on
appeal. Indeed, up until the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Lewies first read the
language contained in it and denouncing him personally - e.g. "committing a significant offense
against the integrity of the judicial system " 8 - Lewies could not possibly have known the full extent

of any latent bias or prejudice against him. But, once the Memorandum Decision was issued,
published in the regional newspapers, and the general public and members of the Idaho State Bar
began commenting on the judge's disdain for Lewies, actual bias became patently evident.

8

Appellant's Brief, p. 38, R. 182.
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a.) Ex parte communication.
Respondents argue that the "district court did not violate Canon 3(B)(7) because there was
no discussion of substantive issues."

However, when Judge Moeller warned Lewies, and only

Lewies, not to let a "political grudge interfere with his professional judgment," to "decide what

hill he wanted to die on," and tbat the conversation "never happened," he was warning about tbe
petitions Lewies had filed against the County Commissioners (i.e. substantive law) 9 He was not

warning Lewies about any aspect of procedurallaw. 10
By delving into Lewies' state of mind and concluding that he harbored some sort of
political grudge against the County Commissioners tbat served as his motivation for filing
petitions for judicial review against them, Judge Moeller ventured far beyond any actual
evidence before him.

Then, by acting on his own unsupported conclusions about Lewies' state

of mind and initiating an ex parte communication to warn Lewies about not letting his political
grudge interfere with his professional judgment, Judge Moeller demonstrated actual bias or
prejudice.

b.) Converting an award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions, sua sponte.
Respondents' argue that "The district court further explained its rationale in awarding fees
as a sanction pursuant to Rule 11 ... as follows:

9

"Substantive law" means "The part of the law tbat creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of
parties. Cf. Procedural law." Black's Law Dictionary, 9" Ed. (2009).
10
"Procedural law" means "The rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as
opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. (2009).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a two true and correct copies of the foregoing REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF has this 9th day of October, 2013, been served
upon the individuals listed below by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, with proper postage
thereon, and addressed as follows:
Hon. Gregory W. Moeller
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE
151 W. I"N.
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL, ANGELL, STARNES, LLP
90 I Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

W. Lynn Hossner, Esq.

ATTORNEY AT LAW
109 N. 2"ct West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 81405

Karl H. Lewies
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'At the conclusion of the January 22, 2013 hearing, the Court invited the County to
submit an affidavit setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in seeking
Lewies' disqualification (emphasis added). Although much of the oral argument
and briefing has since focused on a prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54(e)
and I.C. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that such an effort is misplaced. The
Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that 'the reasons for which attorney fees may
be awarded pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(!) are not reasons that will
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) .. .Instead, the heart of
the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the provisions of
Rule 11 ... "'
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22)
Yes, it is true that the Court invited the County to submit an affidavit setting forth attorney
fees "reasonably incurred in seeking Lewies' disqualification." (Ibid.) But, why did it then convert
that fee award into Rule II sanctions? What went into the Court's conversion decision?
All that is actually known, is that in its Memorandum Decision the Court arbitrarily
announced, "Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the
provisions of Rule II." Did the Court undertake a Rule II analysis? Did it objectively inquire into
the three prongs of Rule II- the petitions' factual basis, legal basis, and legitimate purposes? Not
at all. So, what caused the Court to convert its award of routine attorney's fees into Rule II
sanctions?
Applying a totality of circumstances test to the following facts suggests that the Court's sua

sponte conversion may have been the product of bias or prejudice against Lewies. The facts are as
follows: (I) the Court's opening question put to Lewies was, "What were you thinking filing these
petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were elected to be Fremont County

I
I
I
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Prosecuting Attorney" (Appellant's Brief, p. 7); (2) the Court delved into Lewies' subjective state
of mind- and found a political grudge; (3) the Court subjectively believed (without any supporting
evidence) that Lewies had filed the petitions to "provoke" the County Commissioners (Ibid., p. 32,
fn. 26); (4) Judge Moeller initiated an ex parte communication and warned Lewies "not to let a
political grudge interfere with his professional judgment" (Id., p. 32); (5) the Court warned the
parties in open court "that it was going to do what it could to put an end to [the pettiness]" (Id., p.
31, fn. 23); and (6) the Court publically denounced Lewies for, among other things, committing a
"significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system" by filing petitions against a known,
future client. (Id., p. 38)
Based on these facts, it reasonably appears that as a result of the "political grudge"
conclusion reached by the Court after its inquiry into Lewies' subjective intentions for filing the
petitions, the Court was biased or prejudiced against Lewies, and as such, was not and acting fairly
and impartially towards him when it converted its earlier award of routine attorney's fees into Rule
II sanctions.

c.) Disregarding allegations of Hall's unethical and improper conduct.
Contrary to Respondents' arguments that there was no unethical or improper conduct by
Hall (Respondents' Brief, pp. 22-29), the actual issue on appeal is not whether Hall committed the
alleged acts of unethical or improper conduct, but whether the Court demonstrated bias or prejudice
against Lewies by choosing not to mention in its Memorandum Decision - not one word- any of
the allegations he made against Hall, but going to great lengths to denounce Lewies.
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During the course of the proceedings, Lewies alleged three instances of unethical or
improper conduct engaged in by Hall. First, that Hall should have conducted a reasonable inquiry
under Rule II into the facts prior to filing motions to disqualifY Lewies. (Transcript p. 61, lines 1525) (Transcript p. 64, lines 13-25; and p. 65, lines 1-18) Second, that Hall violated I.R.P.C. 1.11
prohibiting attorneys who are currently serving as public employees from ... negotiating for private
employment with any person who is involved as a party in a matter in which the lawyer is
participating ... (Transcript p. 69, lines 24-25; and p. 70, lines 1-18) Third, that Hall violated
I.R.P.C. 3.3 prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of fact to a tribunal, as follows: "He
says he's billing $225, that's not the case, he got a contract for $150." (Transcript p. 70, lines 19-25;
and p. 71, lines 1-10)
Yet, the Court mentioned nothing at all about any of Lewies' allegations against Hall in its
Memorandum Decision.

Why not? Why not at least mention the allegations, and if deemed

unfounded, then say so. By completely ignoring the allegations against Hall, in their entirety, it
reasonably appears that the Court was biased or prejudiced against Lewies, and as such, was not and
acting fairly and impartially towards him.

d.) Issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision denouncing Lewies.
Respondents' have submitted no argument or authority on this issue. (Cf, Appellant's
Brief, pp. 38-39)
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J. Attorney's fees should not be awarded to the County.

Respondents' argue that they are entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117,
because Lewies' appeal was brought "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." However, as has
been shown in the preceding pages, there is clearly a reasonable basis in both fact and law for
appealing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against petitions that contained important issues; and
there is clearly a reasonable basis in both fact and law for appealing whether the Court demonstrated
bias or prejudice against Lewies.
Under LA.R. 41(a), Lewies respectfully requests the Supreme Court to permit his later claim
for attorney's fees on the grounds that Respondents' have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law in this matter.

II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that the lower Court
failed to conduct an adequate analysis under Rule 11 before imposing sanctions on Lewies, and
therefore, such sanctions cannot be sustained. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that
the petitions filed by Lewies did not violate Rule 11 signature certification requirements; that the
lower Court's imposition of attorney's fees as a Rule 11 sanction was improper and cannot be
sustained; that the lower Court erred in finding that Lewies (a) had not withdrawn as counsel for
the county; (b) delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review; (c) deeming it
appropriate for the Commissioners to have retained Hall as private counsel; (d) finding that
Lewies was unable to complete his representation of petitioners; and that presiding Judge
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Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies.
Submitted this 91h day of October, 2013

Karl H. Lewies, Esq.
Real Party in Interest - Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD,
CLARY PICKARD, GEORGE TY
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW,
Petitioners,

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-580

AMENDED DECISION ON REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the District Court on a petition for judicial review filed by
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Clay Pickard, Laura Pickard, George Ty
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow ("Petitioners"). Petitioners seek judicial review of the Fremont
County Board of Commissioners' ("the County" or "the Board") decision to adopt Fremont
County Ordinance No. 2013-01, which created an official road map of Fremont County ("the
Official Road Map"). This map designated a road that crosses Petitioners' lands ("the Old
Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek Road" or "the North Road") as a public right-ofway. Petitioners allege that the Board failed to make any factual determinations regarding
whether the North Road was public or private before designating it as public on the Official
Road Map. Accordingly, Petitioners contend that the Board engaged in unlawful procedure,
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or abused its discretion. Petitioners also seek injunctive
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relief from any public or private use and/or maintenance of the North Road that may result
through reliance upon the Official Road Map. Finally, Petitioners seek attorney fees and costs.
Following briefing, orai argument took place on August 27, 2013, after which the Court
took the matter under advisement.

II. FACTUALBACKGROUND
In preparing to adopt an official county road map pursuant to Idaho Code§ 40-202
(20 11 ), 1 the Fremont County Board of Commissioners ("the Board") gave public notice that
"[a]fter months of research [it was] close to establishing the official County road map" and
solicited public comments. 2 The Board received written comments and held three "public
information hearings" in July of2012 to further identify public roadways. 3 All then-identified
roads were presented on maps available at the public hearings and on the Fremont County
website. 4 "After the public information hearings, Fremont County Public Works staff reviewed
the comments for validity and applicability." 5 The maps were then adjusted accordingly. 6
On September 11 and 18,2012, the Board published notice in the Standard Journal, the
local newspaper of record, that a public hearing was scheduled for September 27, 2012. 7 The
purpose of the public hearing was "to take public comments on the proposed official County
Road Map(s)." 8 At the hearing, Commission Chairman Ron "Skip" Hurt further explained, "So
tonight it's kind of a culmination of about two years of research that Betty Davis, who works in
[the] Public Works Department[,] has done."9 He later added, "So we feel like we've gone over
these [maps] pretty carefully and tonight what we want to hear from you is ifthere's anything on
these maps that you think is not designated correctly, something that we missed or something
that's private which should be public or that should be private." 10

1

The Court recognizes that the current version of Title 40 has been amended. Unless it indicates otherwise, the
Court will cite the sections as they appeared during the times relevant to this matter.
z R., p. 1.

3Id
4

R., p. 73.
!d.
6 !d.
7
R., p. 22.
8
R.,p.21. /d.atp.4:12-17.
9
R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 4:18-20.
10
!d. atp. 5:12-17.
5
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Ty and Tuk Nedrow attended the Public Hearing. 11 During the public comments, Ty
Nedrow stated that two roads on the proposed County map were incorrectly designated as county
roads. 12 He referred to these roads as the "East Road" and the "North Road." Tuk Nedrow
stated that no County equipment had ever been on either road and that the County had never
maintained the North Road. 13 Tuk and Ty Nedrow claimed that both roads lead to nowhere. 14
Concerning the East Road, Ty Nedrow said that it went through his field and that fishermen
occasionally got stuck in it while attempting to get to a nearby reservoir. 15 Concerning the North
Road, Tuk Nedrow explained, "It goes through a quarter mile of our property and a quarter mile
of Mr. [Achtley's] and it goes through a half a mile ofBLM and then hits the Forest Service
[road] .... " 16 Ty Nedrow also explained that although the North Road was referred to as the
"mail route," his grandpa had told him that it was a shortcut and had never been used for
carrying mail or passengers but only for stage coaches returning from West Yellowstone without
cargo; the lava rock grates on the road broke many wheels. 17 He also explained that the North
Road was gated on his property and that it was also gated before it reached Mr. Atchley's
property. 18
A discussion arose during the Public Hearing as to whether the North Road was an R.S.
2477 road, which was explained to be a road in use before 1975 that could not be taken from the
public. 19 Recognizing that certain roads might be R.S. 2477 roads, Chairman Hurt indicated that
the Board had "60 days after this hearing to make a decision, and ... we may have to collect
more information. We may have to have another public hearing .... " 20
About two weeks later, on October 15, 2012, the Board held a meeting where it
considered the content of the proposed County map in light of the public comments. 21 The
Board brought up Ty and Tuk Nedrow's objections concerning the East Road and the North
R., pp. 23-24.
R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 4:18-20.
13
Id. at pp. 21:16-18; 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14.
14
Jd. at pp. 15:19-20,21:16-18,21:25-22:3.
15
!d. at p. 15:16-21.
16
!d. at p. 22:3-10.
17
!d. atpp. 16:22-17:20.
18
Jd. at p. 18:15-18.
19
Jd. at 18:22-19:23. In reality, R.S.-2477 was repealed in 1976, and any "rights created under it are valid ifthey
existed before October 21, 1976." Farrell v. Bd. ofComm'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d 304, 310
(2002), overruled on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012).
20
R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 20:7-20:17
21
R., pp. 57-58.
II

12
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Road and agreed that the East Road should be closed to the public, recognizing the issues Ty
Nedrow had raised during the Public Hearing. 22 However, it decided to leave the North Road
designated as a public road. An unidentified woman present at the meeting informed the Board
that "an old Shell Oil map on the Internet" seemed to show that people were being directed down
the North Road as far back as 1956. 23 The Shell Oil map was apparently not presented at the
meeting and does not appear anywhere in the record.Z 4 The Board then concluded that "any
roads [used] prior to [1976] cannot be closed. They fall under this RS-2477 that if they were
ever used as public roads then public domain takes precedence. " 25 In other words, the Board
concluded that because the North Road had been "ascertained a 2477 road," it would be
designated on the Official Road Map as a public road. 26
At an October 29, 2012 meeting, the Board voted and approved by a two-to-one vote the
Official Road Map, 27 which was published as Ordinance No. 2013-01. 28 The Official Road Map
lists the East Road as one of various "Private Roads" and the North Road as a "County Dirt
Road."29 The Board's findings of fact state that the "[r]oads [in the Official Road Map] were
identified as Fremont County roads based on" several criteria, one of which was that "[t]he roads
had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or are the
sole essential connection roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads."

30

In its conclusions oflaw, the

22

R., p. 59 (audio CD recording), 5:09-9:53. All future references to this audio recording are contained within this
timeframe. Regarding the East Road, the Board stated that people were "going up and getting stuff." !d. It did not
specifically mention, as discussed earlier, that Ty Nedrow expressed concern during the Public Hearing that the East
Road went through his field and that many fishermen got stuck in it while attempting to get to a reservoir. R., p. 53,
Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21.
23
R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). The audio recording does not clearly state whether this comment was directed at
the North Road or the East Road; however, in the context of the discussion, the Court concludes that the comment
concerned the North Road. !d. Also, the audio recording does not clearly identifY the woman speaking, but those
present at the meeting were "Commissioners Skip Hurt, Lee Miller, Jordon Stoddard," "Clerk Abbie Mace, Deputy
Clerk Laura Singleton, Public Works Director Marla Vik, Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh, Greg Newkirk,
and Debbie Davis." R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21.
24
The Court is mindful that Respondent's attorneys have alleged in their brief that "the Commissioners reviewed"
the map in question. Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7. However, the recorded transcript does not confirm this assertion,
and the record does not indicate that Mr. Hall or Mr. Starnes were present at the meeting.
25
R., p. 59 (audio CD recording).
26

Jd.

27

R., p. 64.
R., p. 66.
29
R., p. 93.
30
R., pp. 72-73, ~ 6. Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact begins: "Roads were identified as Fremont County roads
based on the following criteria: ... " Jd. This language suggests that the roads met all six listed criteria; however,
this would be problematic since the North Road seems to have been asserted as meeting only the last of the six
criterion, which concerns R.S. 2477 roads. Therefore, the Court interprets this list to suggest that roads met at least
one of the listed criteria.
28
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Board stated that "[a]11 roads identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined by the
Fremont County Board of Commissioners to be County roads, either paved, gravel or
unimproved (dirt); and are not recorded in the Board of Commissioners' official minutes as
vacated or abandoned; and are routinely maintained by the County." 31 The Board more
specifically stated that "[a]ll roads identified in [the Official Road Map] as being R.S.-2477
roads are determined by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners as having been asserted
under Federal Law R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in
official records in the Fremont County Public Works office."32 The Board also stated that "[a]ll
roads found on the Official Fremont County Road Map constitutes public notice that evidence
has been presented to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners that the roads may qualify as
a public right-of-way."

33

It also clarified, "Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County

Road Map does not constitute validation or abandonment of any road. " 34

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Decisions made by a board of county or highway district commissioners in an
abandonment, vacation or validation proceeding are subject to judicial review pursuant to I. C. §
40-208." Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofTeton Cnty., 141 Idaho 855,858, 119
P .3d 630, 633 (2005). In such cases, the court conducts a review without a jury and is confined
to the record. I. C. § 40-208(6). The court may not substitute its judgment for that ofthe
governing board regarding the weight of the information on questions of fact. I.C. § 40-208(7).
In the case at bar, Petitioners do not challenge a decision regarding an abandonment,
vacation, or validation proceeding, but rather the Board's decision to place a disputed road on an
official county highway map in a§ 40-202 proceeding. In Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 858,
119 P.3d at 633, the Supreme Court stated:
[S]ince I.C. § 40-202 is contained in the section of the Code relating to general
provisions for the establishment and maintenance of the state and county highway
system, including procedures required for abandonment, vacation or validation of
highways, it is logical that the statutorily mandated standard of review under § 40208 should apply to § 40-202 decisions.

R., p. 74.
!d.
R., pp. 74-75, ~ 9 (emphasis added).
34 !d.
31

32
33
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Under this code section, the reviewing court may affirm a board's decision or remand the case
for further proceedings. I. C. § 40-208(7). Additionally,
[t]he Court may reverse or modify the [Board's] decision if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the [Board's] findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
information on the whole record; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

!d.
Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by competent and substantial evidence
even though conflicting evidence exists. Wulffv. Sun Valley Co., 127 Idaho 71,73-74,896 P.2d
979, 981-82 (1995). "Substantial and competent evidence is 'relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion."' Hu.ffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d
1244, 1246 (2006) (quoting Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406,412, 18 P.3d 211,217
(2000)). "Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal."

Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634 (citing Love v. Board of County Comm 'rs
of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558,559,671 P.2d 471,472 (1983)). Accordingly, this Court can
freely review any question oflaw, but it will not substitute its own judgment for the Board's as
to the weight afforded the evidence on a question of fact.

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW
Petitioners present the following issues on review for consideration by the Court:
1. Did the Board give proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map (Fremont
County Ordinance No. 2013-01)?
2. Did the Board make proper factual determinations in support of adopting the Official
Road Map (Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01)?
3. By failing to make proper factual determinations, did the Board engage in unlawful
procedure, act arbitrarily and capriciously, or abuse its discretion when it placed the North Road
on the Official Road Map?
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V. DISCUSSION
A.

The Board gave proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map.

"Idaho Code § 40-202 provides the manner in which a board of county commissioners or
highway district designates public highways and rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho
at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. This "initial selection ofthe county highway system and highway
district system" requires that the "board of county or highway or district commissioners" take
several actions. I.C. § 40-202(1). These are: 1) prepare a map "showing the general location of
each highway and public right-or-way in their jurisdiction;" 2) give notice of its "intention to
adopt the map as the official map of that system;" and 3) "specify the time and place [for a
public hearing] at which all interested persons may be heard" regarding the adoption of the
proposed map. Id.
Although Petitioners have asserted that the Board did not provide proper notice, they
have failed to articulate the nature of the deficiency. The Court finds that the Board has fulfilled
the three requirements of I. C. § 40-202(1 ). Specifically, it prepared a map facially complying
with the statute, indicated its intent to adopt the proposed County map, and published proper
notice of the time and place of the public hearing on that map in the Standard Journal on
September 11 and 18, 2012. Petitioners have failed to point to any procedural deficiency in the
manner in which the Board conducted its adoption of the disputed ordinance. Therefore, the
Court must conclude as a matter of law that the Board has fully complied with the notice
requirements ofl.C. § 40-202(1).

B.
The Board failed to make adequate factual determinations before adopting
the Official Road Map.
Idaho Code§ 40-202(1) also requires that "[a]fter the hearing, the commissioners shall
adopt the map, with any changes or revisions considered by them to be advisable in the public
interest, as the official map of the respective highway system." Id. Petitioners claim that before
adopting the map, the Board failed to make proper factual determinations regarding the public or
private status of the North Road. They contend that the North Road is not an R.S. 2477 road and
that the Board is required to prove such status.
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Although the process outlined in I.C. § 40-202(1)-iffollowed properly-results in an
official county map of roads, it "does not also serve to adjudicate the public status of any roads
within the county or create new public highways or rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141
Idaho at 859-60, 119 P.3d at 634-35. 35 Thus, when adopting an initial county map of roads, the
Board neither validates nor vacates roads as R.S. 2477 or other roads. Rather, the Board makes
"a determination that a particular roadway occupies the status, in fact, of a public highway or
right-of-way." !d. at 861. Therefore, the process for establishing an R.S. 2477 road is relevant
to the extent that the Board could reasonably find, based on the evidence before it, that the North
Road was, in fact, an R.S. 2477 road and therefore a public right-of-way.
Under United States Revised Statute 2477, a state government entity can grant public
status to a road on public lands. The Idaho Supreme Court explained this process:
The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that "[t]he right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is
hereby granted." 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). While this statute has
been repealed, otherwise valid leases, permits, patents and similar rights created
under it are valid ifthey existed before October 21, 1976. Pub.L. 94-579, § 706(a)
(1976).

Farrellv. Bd. ofComm'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378,384,64 P.3d 304,310 (2002), overruled
on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012).
Concerning this "freezing" of R. S. 24 77 rights as they existed in 1976, the 1Oth Circuit stated:
The difficulty is in knowing what [valid and existing rights] means. Unlike any
other federal land statute of which we are aware. the establishment ofR.S. 2477
rights of way required no administrative fom1alities: no entry, no application, no
license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public
acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right was vested. As
the Supreme Court ofUtah noted 75 years ago, R.S. 2477 "'was a standing offer
of a free right of way over the public domain,"' and the grant may be accepted
"without formal action by public authorities." Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646, 648 (1929), (quoting Streeter v. Stalnaker, 61
Neb. 205, 85 N.W. 47, 48 (1901)). In its Report to Congress on R.S. 2477: The
History and Management of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way Claims on Federal and
35

It is worth noting that the Idaho Legislature has revised I. C. § 40-202 in what appears to be approval of the
Homestead Farms decision. Subsection 8 now states in relevant part:
The purpose of this official map is to put the public on notice of those highways and public rightsof-way that the board of county or highway district commissioners considers to be public. The
inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way from such a map does not, in itself,
constitute a legal determination of the public status of such highway or public right-of-way. Any
person may challenge, at any time, the inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way
from such map by initiating proceedings as described in section 40-208(7), Idaho Code.
Idaho Code Ann. § 40-202 (2013).
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Other Lands 1 (June 1993 ), the Department of the Interior explained that R.S.
24 77 highways "were constructed without any approval from the federal
government and with no documentation of the public land records, so there are
few official records documenting the right-of-way or indicating that a highway
was constructed on federal land under this authority."
In short, identifying valid R.S. 2477 roads is a difficult and controversial matter. Indeed,
it appears nothing has been done legislatively on the federal level to clarify the process:
Despite decades oflitigation over R.S. 2477 roads, Congress has not spoken to the
issue by amending FLPMA [which repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976] and providing a
statutory framework to help courts resolve the discrepancies between the statutes;
nor has it delegated authority to federal management agencies to promulgate
regulations guiding their administration ofR.S. 2477 claims. In fact, Congress has
actually prohibited the BLM from adopting regulations establishing a framework
for agency adjudication ofR.S. 2477 claims. There is also no legislative history of
R.S. 2477 that might provide informal guidance to litigants.
Hillary M. Hoffmann, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness Society v. Kane County

Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating A Right-of-Way Claim Under Revised Statute
2477, 18 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 3, 9-10 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
Without guidance from the federal government, "[s]tate law governs the manner in which a road
on federal property becomes public under R.S. 2477." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809,
814,264 P.3d 916, 921 (2011) (citing Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 160, 191 P.3d 233,
238 (2008)); accord Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1974);

United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 503, 505 (lOth Cir.1949); Smith v. Mitchell, 21 Wash. 536,
540, 58 P. 667, 668 (1899) ("[Under R.S. 2477,] a highway may be established across or upon
such public lands in any of the ways recognized by the law of the state in which such lands are
located .... ").
In Idaho, a valid and existing R.S. 2477 road exists if"the local government accepted the
road from the federal government." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. This acceptance
can occur in two ways: "through a positive act of acceptance by the local government or
compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time." Galli, 146 Idaho at 159, 191
P.3d at 237 (explaining Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310). A positive act of acceptance
"is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute[s]." Farrell, 138
Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Also, the Supreme Court has stated:
No R.S. 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed from the
public domain. However, if an R.S. 2477 road is established prior to the land
exiting the public domain, regardless if it is officially recognized or not, then that
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grant remains effective even though the land which the road traverses is now
private property.

!d.
Due to the difficulty in granting and/or adjudicating R.S. 24 77 roads, it is understandable
that some states, like Idaho, have procedures for state public officials to identify pubic rights-ofway on maps, including those that may be R.S. 2477 roads, short of adjudication. This is a less
formal process with often non-binding results. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-105 (West)
("Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the class D roads within its
boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976 [the date that R.S. 2477 was
repealed] .... The county shall provide a copy of any map ... to the department. ... The
department is not responsible for the validity of any class D road . ... ") (emphasis added).
In Idaho, when mapping an initial selection of the county highway system, a board is
required to show by the record that-before adopting the Official Road Map-it considered
objections, provided evidence, and made findings concerning the public status of roads contained
therein. Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 861, 119 P.3d at 637. The evidence provided must be
substantial and competent; in other words, it must support whatever factual findings made before
concluding that the road in question is an R.S. 2477 road. As explained above, in Idaho, an R.S.
24 77 road must be established prior to the land exiting the public domain and prior to October
21, 1976. If a road is so established but not yet officially recognized, the original grant remains
effective even after the land is privately acquired, regardless of the date of acquisition.
In the case at bar, the Board met together after the Public Hearing and discussed whether
the North Road was established prior to 1976. Although Ty Nedrow had testified at the Public
Hearing that the North Road had been a shortcut used for empty stage coaches returning from
West Yellowstone, the record establishes that the Board did not consider his testimony and made
no factual determination regarding it. Instead, the Board and those present focused mainly on
the statement of an unidentified woman present at the meeting: "I actually came across an old
Shell Oil map on the Internet that, by looking at it, it looks like that that's actually the way back
in 1956 they were trying to route people." 36 The Board accepted this interpretation of the map,
even though it apparently never actually saw a copy of the referenced map. Additionally, the
record contains neither a copy of the map nor further mention of where to locate the map.
36

R., p. 59 (audio CD recording).
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Therefore, this Court has no way of confirming that (1) the map actually existed, (2) the
unidentified speaker's interpretation of the map was correct or reasonable, and (3) the map
provided the Board with substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support its factual
determination that the North Road had been established prior to 1976. Ultimately, this Court
cannot properly evaluate the Board's conclusion that the North Road had been "ascertained a
2477 road" and should be designated on the Official Road Map as a public road. 37
The Court is mindful that the Board neither attempted to adjudicate the North Road as an
R.S. 2477 road, nor was it not required to do so. See Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859-60,
119 P.3d at 634-35. However, the evidence before the Board in the record must at a minimum
support its determination that the North Road qualifies for R. S. 24 77 status. See !d. at 861, 119
P.3d at 636. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Board's findings and
conclusions on this issue.
Even assuming that the Board properly considered Ty Nedrow's testimony and that this,
in conjunction with the "old Shell Oil map," somehow provided substantial and competent
evidence to support the Board's determination that the North Road was in use and established
prior to October 21, 1976, nothing in the record establishes that this occurred before the North
Road left the public domain. This is an additional requirement before an R.S. 2477 road can be
established. The record only shows that Petitioners currently own the land around the North
Road. Although Ty Nedrow said that the North Road had been used for stagecoaches,
suggesting a strong possibility that the road was used and established prior to it being privately
owned, nowhere in the record does the Board address or make findings regarding this necessary
element of an R.S. 2477 road. In sum, the Board did not, before adopting the Official Road Map,
make adequate factual determinations that the North Road was established prior to the land
exiting the public domain and prior to October 21, 1976. Thus, its inclusion in the Official Road
Map as a public road was clearly erroneous. I. C. § 40-208(7)(e).
The Court recognizes that when it sits in an appellate capacity, it should not "search the
record for error." Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213,218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004).
Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, and to assist the parties on remand, the Court
believes it is appropriate to note that other factual findings of the Board are problematic. 38 For

37

Jd

38

These matters did not provide the basis for the Court's decision.
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example, the Official Road Map appears to list the North Road as a "County Dirt Road," not as
an R.S. 2477 road. 39 However, in its conclusions of law, the Board stated that "[a]ll roads
identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined ... to be County roads, either paved, gravel
or unimproved (dirt); ... and are routinely maintained by the County."40 While the North Road
appears to be listed as a "County Dirt Road," there is no factual support in the record for finding
that the North Road is routinely maintained by the County. On the contrary, Tuk Nedrow stated
at the Public Hearing that the County had never placed equipment on or maintained the North
Road. 41 Even if the Board had depicted the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road on the official map,
rather than as a "County Dirt Road," it specifically stated that"[a]ll roads identified in [the
Official Road Map] as ... R.S.-2477 roads ... hav[e] been asserted under Federal Law R.S.
24 77 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-1 07. The same are identified in official records in the
Fremont County Public Works office.'.42 The record is devoid of any official record that
identifies the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road.

C.
The record establishes that the Board's decision designating the North Road
on the Official Road Map as an R.S. 2477 Road was clearly erroneous and it acted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.
"An action is capricious if it was done without a rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was
done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining
principles." Am. Lung Ass 'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep 't ofAgric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130
P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Board's decision that the North
Road was an R.S. 2477 road appears from the record to be based entirely upon an interpretation
of an alleged map found on the Internet that the Board itself failed to examine or include in the
record for the Court to examine. Also, although the Board concluded that the North Road was
routinely maintained by the County, it neither provided support for this conclusion nor addressed
the oral testimony claiming the contrary. Moreover, it did not consider or make factual
determinations regarding when the North Road left the public domain. Therefore, the Board's
decision was clearly erroneous because it lacked adequate factual support from reliable,

39
40

41
42

R.,
R.,
R.,
R.,

p. 93.
p. 74.
p. 59 (audio CD recording), pp. 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14.

p. 74.
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probative, and substantial evidence. Additionally, the decision to rely upon the limited evidence
set forth in the record was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of its discretion.

D.

Petitioners may seek reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Petitioners seek recovery of their attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117 and
12-121, as well as I.R.C.P. 54( d) and (e). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that fees
and costs could not be awarded against a county in a petition for judicial review under I. C. § 12117 inasmuch as it would not qualify as "a civil action" because it was not "commenced by the
filing of a complaint with the court." Smith v. Washington County, Idaho, 150 Idaho 388,391,
247 P.3d 615, 618 (2010). However, I.C. § 12-117(1) was amended by the Idaho legislature in
2012, changing the language from "any administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding"
to "any proceeding." Additionally, I.C. § 12-117(5) was amended to specifically include a
"petition for judicial review" among the type of cases defined as a "proceeding." Therefore, the
amendments to I.C. § 12-117 appear to be a deliberate response by the legislature to avoid the
holding in Smith.
Under the current version ofi.C. § 12-117, a court "shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." This language not only
covers attorney fees but "reasonable expenses," which the Court interprets to include what are
generally referred to as "costs" under I.R.C.P. 54( d). Therefore, Petitioners are entitled to seek
costs and fees under I.C. § 12-117 and have fourteen days to submit a memorandum of costs and
fees.
Petitioners have also requested attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e).
"Attorney fees are not available to a party on appeal from an agency decision under [I.C. § 12121]" because it pertains to civil actions. Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135
Idaho 630, 637,22 P.3d 105, 112 (2001); see also Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist.,
148 Idaho 630, 635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) also
pertains to civil actions and is, therefore, likewise inapplicable to this case.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record below and the applicable laws and standards, the Court finds
that the Findings and Conclusions issued by the Board in support of County Ordinance No.
2013-01 on October 29, 2012 violate I.C. §§ 40-202 or 40-208. Therefore, the portions of
County Ordinance No. 2013-01 declaring the North Road to be a public right-of-way (either as
an R.S. 2477 Road or as a County Dirt Road) are hereby VACATED. This matter shall be
REMANDED to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to properly consider the status of
the North Road and issue a new County Map in a manner consistent with this opinion.
In light of this decision, Petitioners' request for injunctive relief has been rendered moot.
However, ifthe County or members of the general public attempt to maintain and/or use the
North Road in reliance on the current Official Road Map and/or County Ordinance No. 2013-01,
Petitioners' claim for injunctive relief would at that time become ripe for adjudication.
Finally, Petitioners, as prevailing parties, are entitled to seek costs and fees under I.C. §
12-11 7, by filing an appropriate motion and memorandum of costs and fees within fourteen days.
SO ORDERED this

f'cl
__QJ_: day of October, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECISION ON
REVIEW was this 23,..,( day of October, 2013, served upon the following individuals via U.S.
Mail:
Lynn Hossner
Attorney at Law
109 North Second West
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
Blake G. Hall, esq.
Nathan R. Starnes, esq.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Fremont County Board of Commissioners
151 West 1st North
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445
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-------=.::::::::::--.....::::::.=-Filed:

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 656-7108
ISB Nos. 2434 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
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ABBie l'vlACE,

Attorneys for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580

STIPULATION FOR
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individual1y and in
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents.

Defendants, by and through counsel of record, NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER,
P.A., hereby stipulate that the law firm of HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP, shall be
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#276 P.004/005

substituted as counsel of record for Defendants, and copies of all pleadings or other papers
should be directed to:
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Phone:208-522-3003
Fax: 208-656-7108
Email: bgh@hasattorneys.com: nrs@hasattomeys.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _6_ day of November, 2013 by the method indicated below:
Lynn Rossner, Esq.
109N 2nd W
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax: 624-3783

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[xfFax
[ ] Overnight Mail

Honorable Gregory W. Moeller
FREMONT COUNTY COURTHOUSE
151 W P'N
St. Anthony, ID 83445
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[ ] Hand Delivery
m:rnight Mail
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NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 656-7108
ISB Nos. 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com

tllV -8 2013

Attorneys for Respondents/Appellants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP"
HURT, individually and in his official
capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents/Appellants.

1.

Respondents hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on

Review 10/10/13 ); and Amended Decision on Review (10/23/13) by the Honorable Gregory W.
Moeller.
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2. Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the Decision
on Review and Amended Decision on Review by the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller are final
within the meaning ofRule 11(a)(2) and 11(f), Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to "judgments,
orders and decrees."
3. Appellants preliminary statement of issues on appeal are as follows:
a.

The Court erred in its application ofldaho Code§ 40-202;

b.

The Court erred in requiring Appellants to conduct a road validation

proceeding of a single road (RS 2477 road) where the County is attempting to adopt
the first official county roadmap;
c.

The Court erred in declaring that the Appellants acted in an arbitrary and

capricious manner in designating a single road (RS 24 77 road) as a public road and
when adopting the first official county roadmap;
d.

The Court erred in finding that Petitioner's may seek reasonable attorney's

fees and costs on appeal.
4. A reporter's transcript of the oral argument hearing held on August 27, 2013 is
requested, excluding nothing.
a.

Appellant otherwise requests appropriation ofthe entire reporter's standard
transcript as defined in Rule 25 (c), Idaho Appellate Rule;

b.

Appellant requests, pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, that the
reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts.

6.

Appellant requests the following be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:
a.

the entire record on appeal with the district court;
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b.

all documents not formally filed by the Court or clerks but treated as
"lodged" with the Court or clerk, including memoranda or otherwise.

7.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

8. I certify that:
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b) the clerk of the district court has been paid $100 in advance to be held in trust
for the court reporter for preparation of the transcript pursuant to Rule 24(c), Idaho
Appellate Rules;
(c) any additional fee will be paid upon determination of the amount required;
(d) the clerk of the district court has been paid $100 in advance for preparation of
the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho Appellate Rules;
(e) the Appellate filing fee has been paid;
(f) service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,
Idaho Appellate Rules, and David Marlow, CSR, Madison County Courthouse, PO
Box 389, Rexburg, ID 83340, pursuant to Rule 24 (c), Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this~ day ofNovember, 2013.
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~

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this

__J:!:_ day of November, 2013 by the method indicated below:
Lynn Rossner, Esq.
109N 2ndw
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax:
David Marlow, CSR
Madison County Courthouse
PO Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83340
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
PO Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83440

[
[

Mailing
Hand Delivery
] Fax
] Overnight Mail

[
[

Mailing
Hand Delivery
] Fax
] Overnight Mail
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[
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Mailing
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] Fax
] Overnight Mail
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 656-7108
JSB Nos. 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattorneys.com

County o1 Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:
··---

[~0~ ~13]
26

Qf.83lE MACE, CLt:iiK

By·· ....JZ!2~.L..------.=:-::-:-:-7":"~:-::L:
Dep:1ty Clerk

Attorneys for Respondents/Appellants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP"
HURT, individually and in his official
capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents/Appellants.

1.

RESPONDENTS, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, by and

through counsel of record, Hall Angell Starnes, LLP, hereby appeals against the above named
PETITIONERS, Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay
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Pickard, Geroge Ty Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow, by and through their counsel Lynn
Rossner, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on Review 10/10/13); and Amended
Decision on Review (10/23/13) by the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller presiding.

2.

Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the

Decision on Review and Amended Decision on Review by the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller
are final within the meaning of Rule ll(a)(2) and ll(f), Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to
"judgments, orders and decrees."
3.

Appellants preliminary statement of issues on appeal are as follows:
a.

The Court erred in its application ofldaho Code § 40-202;

b.

The Court erred in requiring Appellants to conduct a road validation

proceeding of a single road (RS 24 77 road) where the County is attempting to
adopt the first official county roadmap;
c.

The Court erred in declaring that the Appellants acted in an arbitrary and

capricious manner in designating a single road (RS 2477 road) as a public road
and when adopting the first official county roadmap;
d.

The Court erred in finding that Petitioner=s may seek reasonable

attomey=s fees and costs on appeal.
4.

A reporter's transcript of the oral argument hearing held on August 27, 2013 is

requested, excluding nothing.
a.

Appellant otherwise requests appropriation of the entire reporter's
standard transcript as defined in Rule 25 (c), Idaho Appellate Rule;

b.

Appellant requests, pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, that the
reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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6.

Appellant requests the following be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:

a.

the entire record on appeal with the district court;

b.

all documents not formally filed by the Court or clerks but treated as
"lodged" with the Court or clerk, including memoranda or otherwise.

7.
8.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.
I certify that:

(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;
(b) the clerk of the district court has been paid $1 00 in advance to be held in trust
for the court reporter for preparation of the transcript pursuant to Rule 24(c),
Idaho Appellate Rules;
(c) any additional fee will be paid upon determination of the amount required;
(d) the clerk of the district court has been paid $100 in advance for preparation of
the clerk=s record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho Appellate Rules;
(e) the Appellate filing fee has been paid;
(f) service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,
Idaho Appellate Rules, and David Marlow, CSR, Madison County Courthouse,
PO Box 389, Rexburg, ID 83340, pursuant to Rule 24 (c), Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this __dQ_ day ofNovember, 2013.
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;

'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this~ day ofNovember, 2013 by the method indicated below:
Lynn Rossner, Esq.
109N2ndw
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax:
David Marlow, CSR
Madison County Courthouse
PO Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83340
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
PO Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83440

J><f Mailing
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Hand Delivery
Fax
Overnight Mail
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Mailing
Hand Delivery
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

~ounty of Fremont State

of Idaho

In the Supreme Court of the S ate otidatlhl

FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, 'LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, DAVID
TUKNEDROW,
Petitioners-Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

)
)

FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

)
)

Respondent-Appellant.

•
ORDER RE: AMENDED NOTICE OF
APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 41584-2013
Fremont County No. 2012-580

)
)

)

The Notice of Appeal filed November 8, 2013 in District Court and November 12,
2013 with this Court is not in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17(o), for the reason there is
no designation of who the Respondents or Respondents Counsel are. .In addition only the August
27,2013 hearing will be prepared unless Appellant designates by date(s) and title(s) additional
transcripts to prepare. Therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is SUSPENDED in order
for Appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17(o).
The Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with the District Court within fourteen (14) days from
the date of this Order or this appeal will be dismissed.
DATED

this~day ofNovember, 2013.
For the$J11Pre3rn

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
District Court Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAl DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY

it 1

FlYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA PlOWU'>,
CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TV NEDROW, DAVID TUK
NEDROW,

Case No.

CV-2012-0000580

ClERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAl

Petitioners-Respondents,

v.
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
RONALD "SKIP" HURT and LEROY MILLER,
Respondent~Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDfOAl DISTRICT, FREMONT COUNTY.
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORY W. MOEUER PRESIDING

CASE NUMBER FROM COURT:
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:

CV-2012-0000580
Decision of Review and Amended
Decision on Review
AITORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
Blake G. Hall
AITORNEV FOR RESPONDENT:
lynn Hossner
APPEALED BV:
Board Of County Commissioners for
Fremont County Idaho, Ronald 11Sklp"
Hurt and leroy Miller
APPEALED AGAINST:
Flying A Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma
Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard,
George Ty Nedrow & David Tuk Nedrow
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED:
November 8, 2013
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED:
N/A
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAl FILED:
N/A
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAl FILED:
N/A
YES
APPEllATE FEE PAID:
RESPONDENT OR CROSS-RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAl RECORD FILED:
N/A
TRANSCRIPT FILED:
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED? YES
DISTRICT COURT REPORTER:
DAVID MARLOW
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Dated this 8th day of November, 2013

ABBIE MACE
Clerk of the District Court
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 656-7108

12

ISB Nos. 1434, 7011 & 7484

bgh@basattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomevs.com

Attorneys for Respondents/Appellants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF FREMONT
FLYING "A• RANCH, INC., an Idaho
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and
DAVID TUK. NEDROW,

Case No. CV-12-580
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioners,
vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political subdivision
of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP"
HURT, individually and in his official
capacity, and LEROY MILLER,
individually and in his official capacity,
Respondents/Appellants.

Review 10/10113); and Amended Decision on Review (10123/13) by the Honorable OregoryW.
Moeller.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2. Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the Decision
on Review and Amended Decision on Review by the Honorable Oregory W. Moeller arc final
within the meaning of Rule ll(a)(2) and ll(t), Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to "judgments,

orders and decrees. •
3. Appellants preliminary statement of issues on appeal are as follows:

a.

The Court erred in its application of Idaho Code § 40-202;

b.

The Court erred in requiring Appellants to conduct a road validation

proceeding of a single road (RS 2477 road) where the County is attempting to adopt

the :first official county roadmap;
c.

The Court erred in declaring that the Appellants acted in an arbitrary and

capricious manner in designating a single road (RS 2477 road) as a public road and
when adopting the first official county roadmap;
d.

The Court erred in finding that Petitioner's may seek reasonable attorney's

fees and costs on appeal.
4. A reporter's transcript of the oral argument hearing held on August 27, 2013 is

requested, excluding nothing.
a.

Appellant otherwise requests app1opriation of the entire reporter's standard
transcript as defined in Rule 25 (c), Idaho Appellate Rule;

b.

Appellant requests, pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, that the
reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts.

6.

Appellant requests the following be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:
a.

the entire record on appeal with the district court;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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b.

all docwnents not formally filed by the Court or clerks but treated as
"lodged• with the Comt or clerk, including memoranda or otherwise.

7.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

8. I certify that:

(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;
(b) the clerk of the district court bas been paid $100 in advance to be held in trust

for the court reporter for preparation of the transaipt pursuant to Rule 24(c), Idaho
Appellate Rules;

(c) any additional fee will be paid upon determination of the amount required;
(d) the clerk of the district court bas been paid S100 in advance for preparation of
the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho Appellate Rules;
(e) the Appellate filing fee has been paid;
(f) service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,

Idaho Appellate Rules, and David Marlow, CSR, Madison ColDlty Courthouse, PO

Box 389, Rexburg, ID 83340, pursuant to Rule 24 (c), Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this

.:r_ day ofNovember, 2013.
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this
_]!:_day of November, 2013 by the method indicated below:
Lynn Hossner, Esq.
109N2DCIW
St. Anthony, ID 83445
Fax:
David Marlow, CSR
Madison County Courthouse
POBox389
Rexburg, ID 83340
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
P0Box389
Rexburg, ID 83440

f11
[

[

Mailing

Hand Delivery
Fax

] Overnight Mail
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Mailing
Hand Delivery
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] Overnight Mail
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Mailing

] Hand Delivery
] Fax
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Overnight Mail
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation,
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard,
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David
Tuk Nedrow
Pia intiff(s )/Respond ent(s ),

Supreme Court No: 41584-2013
Case No:

CV-2012-0000580

vs
NOTICE OF LODGING
Board Of County Commissioners for
Fremont County, a political subdivision of
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt,
individually and in his official capacity, and
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official
capacity
Defendant(s)/Appellant(s).

Notice is hereby given that on January 31. 2014, the Clerk's Record (X L
Reporter's Transcript (X ) Exhibits ( X ) in the above referenced appeal was Lodged
with the Idaho Court of Appeals.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY

Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation,
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard,
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David
Tuk Nedrow
Plaintiff(s}/Respondent(s},

Supreme Court No: 41584-2013
Case No:

CV-2012-0000580

vs
Appeal Record Certificate of Service
Board Of County Commissioners for
Fremont County, a political subdivision of
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt,
individually and in his official capacity, and
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official
capacity
Defendant(s}/Appellant(s}.

I, Abbie Mace, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court at St. Anthony, Fremont, Idaho, this 31st day of January, 2014.
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Bee y Harrigfeld
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation,
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard,
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David
Tuk Nedrow
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s),

Supreme Court No: 41584-2013

Vs

Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits

Case No: CV2012-580

Board Of County Commissioners for
Fremont County, a political subdivision of
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt,
individually and in his official capacity, and
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official
capacity
Defendant(s)/Appellant(s).

I, Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that the
following is a list of the exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with
the Supreme Court or retained as indicated:
NO.

DESCRIPTION
SENT/RETAINED
Lodged Appeal Record
Sent
Sent
Picture of Map included in Lodged in Appeal Record
CD of Work Meeting- Not able to transcribe
Sent

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 31st day of January, 2014.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY

Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation,
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, laura Pickard,
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David
Tuk Nedrow
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s),

Supreme Court No: 41584-2013
Case No:

CV-2012-0000580

vs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Board Of County Commissioners for
Fremont County, a political subdivision of
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt,
individually and in his official capacity, and
leroy Miller, individually and in his official
capacity
Defendant(s)/Appellant(s).

I, Abbie Mace, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record
and any reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as
follows:
lynn Hossner
109 North 2nd West
St. Anthony, ID 83445

Blake G. Hall
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 31st day January of, 2014.

Abbie Mace
Clerk of the District Court
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